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Abstract 
This thesis examines banking efficiency and the productivity of thirteen 
transition Central and Eastern European banking systems during 1998-2003 using 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). It proposes a non-parametric methodology for 
non-radial Russell output efficiency measure of banking firms, incorporating risk as 
an undesirable output. In addition, the proposed efficiency measure handles 
unrestricted data, i. e. both positive and negative. The Luenberger productivity index is 
suggested, which is applicable to technology where the desirable and undesirable 
outputs are jointly produced, and are possibly negative. Furthermore, the thesis 
addresses the main issue in the literature on banking performance measurement, 
which concerns the lack of consistency in the conceptual and theoretical 
considerations in describing the banking production process. Consequently, a meta- 
analysis tool, to examine the choice of inputs and outputs definitions in the banking 
efficiency literature, is suggested. In addition, the performance measures are 
estimated using three alternative definitions of the banking production process 
focusing on the risk and environmental dimensions of bank efficiency and 
productivity, with further comparative analysis using bootstrapping and kernel density 
techniques. Overall, the empirical results suggest that in Central and Eastern Europe 
Czech, Hungarian and Polish banks were the most technical efficient banks and the 
banking risk was mainly affected by external environmental factors during the 
analyzed period. Productivity analysis implies that the main driver of productivity 
change in the Central and Eastern European banks is the technological improvement. 
As meta-analysis revealed, the choice of particular approach of describing the banking 
production process is determined not by the availability of particular input or output 
variable information but the concepts of researcher's theoretical considerations. 
Statistical tests and density analysis indicate that efficiency scores, returns parameters 
and productivity indexes are sensitive to the choice of particular approaches. 
Key words: DEA, negative data, undesirable output, banking, transition economy, 
bootstrapping, kernel density analysis 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
In May 2004, ten countries, primarily from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), 
joined the European Union. While two new member states, Cyprus and Malta, have 
long histories of being financial centres with well-developed banking environments. 
Eight post-communist new member countries have had to make major strides in 
establishing functioning market economies and changing their financial systems to 
catch up with EU levels. The transformation of the CEE countries and the 
development of their banking systems has attracted considerable attention in terms of 
highlighting the need to better understand the competitiveness and the efficiency of 
financial institutions in the process of financial integration and convergence in the 
EU. That is, since the banking sector plays an important role in financial systems, its 
'stability' is crucial for the overall 'systemic stability' in the country and given the 
high economic cross-border repercussions of any instability, for the stability in the 
entire region itself. Hence, in this thesis I aim to investigate the efficiency and 
productivity of banking systems in the CEE region with particular focus on risk 
management. 
The banking markets of the CEE countries' have undergone significant 
restructurisation, moving away from a socialistic system to a market one. In the 
process of this restructurisation the 'monobank' system was broken down and a two - 
tier banking system was established. During the initial stages of the transition the 
weak legacy of the banking system reforms, poor supervisory environment and the 
mismanagement of the banking privatisation programme led to banking crises in the 
region. However, throughout the transition, the supervision and regulation of the 
banking sector was gradually improved and the banking system strengthened, thus 
leading to financial deepening in the economy and an increased profitability in the 
sector. The discussion of the banking sector development in CEE countries in more 
detail with particular focus on the historical background of the banking systems, the 
restructuring and establishment of a two - tier banking system, the banking crises, a 
status check of the current health of the banking system and a comparative analysis of 
1 For the purpose of the thesis, the CEE region is taken to be comprised of the following thirteen 
countries: Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Moldova, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. 
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the macroeconomic and banking sector indicators for the countries of Western Europe 
and the CEE is presented in the Chapter 2 of the thesis. 
The aforementioned changes in the CEE banking market, as well as increasing 
interest in the financial and economic development of the region among academics 
and practitioners, motivates the examination of banking efficiency and productivity in 
these CEE transition economies. However, the first hurdle that such as analysis faces 
is the difficulty of modelling banking production processes not only because of "the 
usual difficulties in studies of this kind, such as measuring "input" properly, but raise 
even more difficult questions concerning concepts of output" (Speagle and Kohn, 
1958, p. 22). Several input/output approaches are suggested in the literature, 
nevertheless there is no consensus among them. I employ a meta-analysis tool to 
examine whether the choice of approach of inputs and outputs definitions in the 
banking efficiency literature are primarily conceptual and based on theoretical 
considerations (Chapter 3). 
In Chapter 4,1 propose an undesirable output framework to construct the 
banking production process where the banking risk is the undesirable by-product. In 
doing so, I classify 'bad' output production modelling into two categories, 
technological and behavioural, depending on the relationship between desirable and 
undesirable outputs. In the context of the behavioural origin of undesirable output, I 
focused on banking production and extended the three-stage DEA procedure 
suggested by Pastor (1999a) to decompose undesirable output in banking (risk) into 
endogenous and exogenous components. In the proposed models, I also impose the 
axiom of weak disposability of undesirable outputs (see Fdre, Grosskopf, Lovell and 
Pasurka (1989)) and the relevant concepts of efficiency incorporate a range 
directional distance function approach following Silva Portela, Thanassoulis and 
Simpson (2004) to handle unrestricted data, i. e., both negative and non-negative 
values. To reduce the effect of slacks on the efficiency measure, I estimate the non- 
radial Russell measure of output technical efficiency. 
Since I utilise three alternative input/output methodologies, namely 
Intermediation, Production and Profit/Revenue based approaches, I perform a 
comparative analysis of sensitivity of the efficiency measures and provide an analysis 
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of the reported returns to scale to the choice of the input/output approach adopted in 
Chapter 5. Along with the distribution and inter-distribution mobility analysis of 
efficiency scores across alternative approaches proposed by Tortosa-Ausina (2002a), I 
estimate and statistically compare the distributions of estimated efficiency scores 
using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Wilcoxon-Mann-Witney tests, as suggested by 
Banker and Natarajan (2004), and the distributions of the true efficiency scores 
utilising the bootstrap-based Simar-Zelenyuk-adapted-Li test (Simar and Zelenyuk, 
2006). 
Another contribution of the thesis is the proposition of a Luenberger 
productivity index applicable to the technology where the desirable and undesirable 
outputs are jointly produced and are possibly negative (Chapter 6). Moreover, the 
chapter proposes a decomposition of the technological shift and the efficiency change 
components of Luenberger productivity index into factors determined by 
environmental effects, risk management effects and the technology adjusted for the 
risk and environment. In addition, I statistically assess the sensitivity of the 
Luenberger productivity indexes to the choice of the modelling methodology using 
statistical tests and both univariate and bivariate kernel density analysis. 
The last chapter, Chapter 7, concludes the thesis, summarises contributions 
and achievements, and then outlines areas for further work. And, I hope you will 
enjoy reading this thesis as much as I enjoyed the research which it describes. 
_ 
CHAPTER TWO: BANKING SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN 
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
2.1. Introduction 
It is well known that the stable and efficient banking system forms a. key factor 
in the economic development of a country due to the particularly important role of 
external finance providers in financial systems: banks direct savings to investment 
opportunities; they form a significant component of the corporate governance 
mechanism of organisations and they provide payment and clearing systems (media of 
exchange). Therefore, successful transition from rigid state control to a free market 
system requires a strong and well-functioning banking system where savers and 
investors have confidence in the financial system, and in banks, in particular, as they 
are a repository for their funds. 
Over the past one and half decades, Central and Eastern European transition 
Countries (CEEC) have made tremendous progress in integrating with the world 
economy. Financial systems of CEEC have undertaken substantial efforts to build a 
new financial infrastructure under the constraints of the legacies from central 
planning, while the new conditions created by the transition process policies. Banking 
reforms in these countries were an integral part of restructuring the economy to 
establish market forces and sustain economic stability and growth. However, in the 
initial stages of the reforms, the economies of these countries experienced several 
severe financial crises, due both to the absence of effective regulatory and legal 
structures, and corporate distress. Nonetheless, the crises have accelerated the 
privatization process in the banking industry and foreign penetration into the banking 
market (Yildirim and Philippatos , 2003). Given the fact that, of the countries 
analysed, eight Central and Eastern European ones (Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia), featured among the 
earliest and swiftest economic and banking reformers and later became members of 
the European Union in May 2004, it is particularly interesting to trace and compare 
the developments of their banking systems with banking systems of other analyzed 
CEE countries. 
Thus, the analysis in this chapter focuses on a comparative discussion of the 
CEE countries' banking systems development processes. In particular, in the. next 
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section (Section 2.2) 1 look at transformation process of the banking systems, 
providing details of their historical background, the establishment of a two-tier 
banking system and the restructuring process itself. Section 2.3 discusses the banking 
crises (both systemic and borderline/smaller (non-systemic) banking crises) these 
CEE countries experienced. Section 2.4 gives a brief overview of the development 
dynamics of the current CEE countries' banking systems, particularly details on their 
banking system reforms, the banking privatisation process, the ownership structure of 
banking system and their financial intermediation activities and profitabilities. In 
Section 2.5,1 analyse and compare the macroeconomic and banking sector indicators 
for the countries of Western and Eastern Europe. Section 2.6 offers some concluding 
remarks. 
2.2. Transformation process of CEE countries'banking systems 
In the late 1980s, most Eastern European countries started transforming from 
centrally planned economies to market oriented ones. Comprehensive macro - 
economic programs were undertaken to stabilise the economies of the countries and to 
introduce a market driven economy. Prior to these reforms, a socialist banking system-., 
was, in effect, in all the CEE countries. As a general rule, the socialist banking system 
consisted, in addition to a Savings Bank, of a monobank which was at the centre of 
this structure and performed the dual roles of a central bank and a commercial bank. 
The monobank was responsible for issuing currency, providing savings deposit 
facilities to households, managing payment system among the enterprises, ensuring 
that banks granted resources to the enterprises for undertaking their various 
investment activities and covering the deficits of the State budget. Additionally, there 
was a group of specialised banks concentrating on the area of economic activity (e. g. 
industry) and a Foreign Trade Bank which specialised in managing the foreign debt 
and assets, and the foreign exchange transactions of enterprises. However, credit 
granting in these banks was based on central plan decisions and political priority 
rather than on credit risk analysis, efficiency and profitability considerations as would 
be the case in banks operating in a market economy. In other words, banks in socialist 
banking system performed the role of government agencies. Moreover, the monobank 
acted as the Treasury of the state and was the sole source of credit for the economy 
(Thome 1993, Yildirim and Philippatos, 2003). 
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After the collapse of the Communist regime in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
the banking system of CEE countries started to change rapidly, in consequence of 
political opening and the introduction of market forces. At the onset of transition, 
schemes for restructuring the banking system were introduced. The key element of the 
banking restructuring reforms typically consisted of the introduction of a new 
regulatory and supervisory framework. The first aspect of the restructuring reforms 
was implemented by introducing a new central bank with the introduction of new 
banking laws, i. e. the breaking up of the monobank system to establish an 
independent central bank and set up a two-tier banking system with separate functions 
for the central bank and commercial banks. Table 2.1 presents main historical 
episodes of CEE countries' banking systems and covers the break-up of -the 
monobank and establishment of a two-tier banking system, and introduction of 
national currency as the sole legal tender. 
Table 2.1. Main historical episodes of CEE countries' banking systems 
Country New central banks law 
Major amendments of 
central bank law 
National currency adopted 
(sole legal tender) 
Croatia Nov 1992 Apr2001(U) Jan 1992 
May 1994 
the Czech Republic Dec 1992 
Estonia* Mar 1990 May 2003(U) Jun 1992 
Jun 1992 
Hungary 01 Oct 191. 2001 (U) 
Latvia* Mar 1990 May 1992 (U) May 1992 
Jul 1992 
Lithuania* Feb 1990 Mar 1996 (U) May 1992 
Oct 1992 
Moldova* Jun 1991 Jul 1995 (U) Jun 1992 
Jul 1993 
Poland Jan 1989 1997 (U) 
Romania Mar 1991 May 1998 (U) 
Russia* Dec 1990 June 2002 (U) Jul 1993 
Jul 1993 
Slovakia Dec 1992 (D) 
Slovenia Jun 1991 July 2002 
Ukraine* Mar 1991 May 1999 (U) Nov 1992 
Nov 1992 
Source: Maliszewski (2000), Croatian National Bank, Eesti Pank (Estonian central bank), Mag ar ZY Nemzeti Bank (the central bank of the Republic of Hungary), Bank of Russia. 
Note: (U) - central bank independence upgraded, (D) - central bank independence reduced. 
* In former Soviet Union countries, Soviet monobank system formally changed into two-tier rý 
banking system, consisting of Gosbank (State Bank of the USSR) and a number of specialized 
state-owned banking institutions in 1987. Dates on 'New central banks law' for these 
countries are dates of establishing of country's own independent central bank. 
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In most countries, the establishment of a two-tier system was an essential part 
of the macroeconomic stabilisation process. Although the countries of Central Europe 
took the lead in establishing independent central banks, closely followed by Baltic 
and CIS countries; Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia 
stabilized their economies at the start of the banking reform process. Their relative 
success in banking reforms was helped by a mixture of good policies and favourable 
initial conditions (see Maliszewski, 2000 and De Melo et al, 1997). Since Hungary 
and Poland were on the fast track to join the EU, they upgraded their central banks 
independence to meet the Maastricht criteria. Although the first years of the existence 
of Croatia and FYR Macedonia (former Yugoslav Republic), were marked by military 
conflicts and high inflation, Croatia achieved macroeconomic stabilisation without 
institutional changes. The new central bank law was introduced in 1991 in Romania, 
and in 1998, as part of the new government reform program, changes to the central 
bank law were introduced. 
The banking systems and central banks of Countries of Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) were initially restricted by the existence of the Rouble zone. 
The Baltic countries introduced their currencies first and left the monetary union. 
Other countries of the CIS subsequently introduced their own currencies, and 
upgraded their central banks' independence. In most CEE countries, the economy was 
more or less stabilised after leaving the rouble area, and central bank independence 
was used as an instrument to improve the credibility of their new policies 
(Maliszewski, 2000). 
Table 2.2 presents GMT2 indices of political and economic independence 
based on the central bank laws of the CEE countries. Components of the Political 
Independence (PI) index are GI 'Governor not appointed by the government', G2 
'Governor appointed for more than 5 years', G3 'Provisions for governor's dismissal 
non - political only', B4 'None of the board appointed by the government', B5 'Board 
appointed for more than 5 years', R6 'No mandatory government representative in the 
board', R7 'Government approval of monetary policy is not required', C8 'Statutory 
responsibility to pursue monetary stability', C9 'Presence of legal provision 
2 GMT index is the central bank independence index (proxy for actual independence) calculated using 
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (199 1) methodology. 
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supporting bank in conflicts with the government'. Economic independence of central 
bank (El) index consists of the following eight components: DIO 'Direct credit 
facility is not automatic', DII 'Direct credit facility is at the market interest rate', D12 
'Direct credit facility is temporarily', D13 'Direct credit facility is of limited amount', 
D 14 'Central bank does not participate in the primary market', D 15 'All direct credit 
is securitized', M16 'Discount rate is set by the central bank', M17 'Supervision of 
commercial banks is not entrusted to the central bank (2 points) or not entrusted to the 
central bank alone (I point)'. Each component is counted as one point. The measure 
of overall independence is obtained by summing the two sub - indices. 
Table 2.2. Aggregate indices of political (PI), economic (El) and overall (01) 
independence of CEE countries' central banks 
Country 
Political independence (PI) 
(max 9) 
Economic independence (El) 
(max 9) 
Overall independence (01) 
(01 PI + El) (max 18) 
Lithuania'96 8 7 15 
Poland'97 7 7 14 
Moldova'95- 8 5 13 
Estonia'93 6 7 13 
the Czech Republic'92 8 5 13 
Latvia'92 9 3 12 
Croatia'92 7 4 11 
Russia'95 5 6 11 
Slovakia'92 5 6 11 
Slovenia'91 7 4 11 
Hungary'97 3 7 10 
Romania'91 4 3 7 
Ukraine'91 3 2 5 
Note: The year attached to the country is the year of the latest enactment or amendment referring to. 
Source: Maliszewski (2000) 
During the banking system reforms, the licensing policy for most kinds of 
banking business was liberalised, sectoral. restrictions on specialised banks were lifted 
and privately owned banks were established. However, quite liberal licensing policies 
coupled with shortcoming in the legal framework and supervisory system resulted in a 
very rapid increase in the number of banks (Table 2.3) which often engaged in 
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unsound operating practices (Reininger, Schardax and Summer, 2001). These 
deficiencies together with an uncertain economic environment resulted in a number of 
banking crises which are described in the next section. 
Table 2.3. Number of banks in the banking sector of CEE countries (1995 - 2003) 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Croatia 54 58 60 60 53 43 43 46 41 
the Czech 
Republic 55 53 
50 45 42 40 
I 
38 37 33 5 
Estonia 18 15 12 7 7 7 7 7 
Hungary 40 39 37 36 
Latvia 42 35 32 24 22 23 23 23 
Lithuania 15 12 12 15 14 13 14 15 
'Moldova 25 22 22 23 20 20 19 16 16 
Poland 81 81 81 83 77 73 69 59 58 
Romania 41 41 39 38 
Russia 2297 2029 1697 1476 1349 1311 1319 1329 1329 
Slovakia 33 29 29 26 25 23 21 20 21 
Slovenia 41 36 34 34 31 28 24 22 22 
Ukraine 230 229 227 175 
] 
161 :: 1: 5: 4: 15 158 
Source: EBRD (2003,2004), Croatian National Bank web-site, Czech National Bank web-site, 
National Bank of Poland web - site, National Bank of Slovakia web-site, Bank of Slovenia 
2.3. Banking system crises in Central and Eastern Europe 
As discussed in the previous section, the creation of a capitalist banking 
system in the CEE countries began with the formation of a two-tier banking system, 
where the commercial banking wing of the monobank was broken up into a number of 
state-owned commercial banks. However, these artificially established banks inherited 
many problems from central planning, such as old bureaucratic networks, capital 
inadequacy, non - performing loans to State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), non - 
diversified loan portfolios of unknown quality, loans from the savings bank or the 
central bank, inexperienced management and personnel, and underdeveloped branch 
networks. In some countries restrictions on the establishment of new banks were 
relaxed, and in others organization of new banks was encouraged to enhance 
competition. As a result, given the poor supervisory environment and the low 
qualifications of banking staff, these newly created banking institutions with so little 
genuine banking experience made many inefficient decisions. Moreover, most of 
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banks were still under the state ownership and lent to the state-owned industries, 
which became an important source of inflationary pressure during the early phase of 
transition. Consequently, many of these CEE countries experienced severe banking 
crises due to the reasons stated above as well as delays in enterprise restructuring, 
failure to develop a well - functioning capital market, mismanagement of 
privatization programmes, a lack of proper banking regulations and speculative 
acquisitions and mergers. Table 2.4 gives details on the date, type, causes, scope and 
estimated losses and costs of the banking crises that the CEE sample countries 
experienced. 
Most of banking crisis in CEE countries had little or no cross-boarder 
repercussions. However, the Russian crisis of August 1998 was at least one event in 
the history of the region which had major sub-regional, if not regional implications 
(Grigorian and Manole, 2006). Although, the Russian crisis revealed the weaknesses 
of the Russian economy and was a major adverse shock to the banking sector and the 
economy of Russia as a whole, it had adverse effects on the economies of the entire 
region. The direct effects of the Russian crisis on the financial sector were most 
notable in the CIS countries, and some of them were perhaps hit almost as hard as 
Russia itself. The CEE and Baltic countries were affected much less since, by then, 
they had reoriented most of their trade toward Western Europe. 
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2.4. Development dynamics of current banking systems of CEE 
countries 
In the previous sections I reviewed the historical developments of the banking 
sectors of the CEE countries, focusing on the key historical episodes of their banking 
industries and their banking crises. In this part of the analysis, I provide a detailed 
overview of the key regional trends of the banking sectors in the CEE countries, 
particularly privatisation and ownership structures, market concentration, lending 
structures and financial intermediation. 
Definition of country sub-groups 
With the purpose of facilitating the analysis I have divided the 13 CEE countries' 
banking systems into three sub-groups: the accession countries, the negotiating 
countries and the CIS countries. Although by categorizing the countries into these 
subgroups, I reflect their stage of integration with the European Union, the degree of 
development of their banking sector and their geographical aspects are also taken into 
account. 
The sub - groups I refer to are defined as follows: Accession countries (AC), 
which includes eight new EU members that joined in May 2004, (Czech Republic 
(CZ), Estonia (ES), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Poland (PL), 
Slovakia (SL) and Slovenia (SN)). In the analyzed region, these countries are clearly 
the most advanced in terms of legal and institutional reforms. Negotiating countries 
(NC), these are countries that were in the process of negotiations to join the EU 
(Croatia (CT) and Romania (RM)) .4 -5 Finally, Coninionit-ealth of Independent States 
(CIS), these are the former Soviet republics which are the neighbouring countries of 
an enlarged EU and who have suffered through severe recessions caused by the 
transition from planned economies (Russia (RF), Moldova (ML) and Ukraine (UN)). 
4 Although, Romania joined the EU in the second wave on the I Jan 2007, it is included in the analysis C) 
as a negotiating country. 
Due to data limitation, other acceding and negotiating countries are not considered. However, 
similarity of these countries include problems due to high growth of consumer loans, which affected 
the health of external balance and resulted establishing of restrictive measures by central banks (RZB 
Research Group, 2004). 
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Banking system reforms: EBRD index 
Reforms of the banking sector are at different stages in these countries. Although, in 
general the banking system of the CEE countries has developed significantly over the 
past years, for some discussed countries there are still many challenges ahead (for 
example for the countries of CIS sub-group). Table 2.5 exhibits the progress of the 
analysed countries in developing their banking systems as for 2004. 
Table 2.5. Banking system development ranking 
CEE countries' Banking System Reform Index 
Rating Country 
1. Little progress beyond establishment of a 
two-tier system 
2. Interest rates significantly influencing the 
allocation of credit 
Russia (2), Ukraine (2+) 
3. Substantial progress in recapitalizing 
banks, bank auditing, establishment of a 
functioning prudential and supervisory 
system; significant presence of private banks; 
full interest rate liberalisation. 
Lithuania (3), Moldova (3-), Poland 
(3+), Romania (3), Slovenia (3+) 
4. Well-functioning banking competition and Hungary (4), Latvia(4-), Slovakia (4-), 
prudential supervision Croatia (4), Czech Republic (4-), 
Estonia (4) 
Source: EBRD (2004) 
According to the EBRD index of the banking system reforms, all the analysed CIS 
countries are classified around 2 (except Moldova 3-); most of the accession countries 
get index values of around 4. Ranking 3 classification contains countries from each 
sub-group, whereas accessed countries have ranks 3+ (Poland and Slovenia) and 3 for 
Lithuania. Negotiating country Romania gets ranking 3. As it was said above, Croatia 
has a very developed banking system and it is the only country not from Accession 
countries sub-group which has an EBRD banking system development ranking of 4. 
These rankings are evident of the stage of banking sector development in the 
countries. However, for some countries (e. g. CIS countries) much remains to be done 
in order to improve the banking system functioning, namely to strengthen the 
regulatory framework, to increase financial intermediation etc. 
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Privatisation and foreign ownership 
One of the important objectives of the banking system restructuring process in the 
CEE countries was the privatisation of the banks. According to Thorne (1993), there 
are three reasons for stressing bank privatisation as the final and most important goal 
in banking system restructuring of CEE countries 6. These reasons are connected to 
each other and are presented in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6. Reasons for stressing banking privatisation in CEE countries 
Reasons for stressing banking privatisation in CEE countries 
Adequate corporate 
structure 
Efficient banking system and 
competition 
Influence the banking 
restructuring strategy 
Private ownership of banks provides 
better incentives to discipline the risk 
taking behaviour of managers, limits 
government intervention into the 
allocation of credit and enhance the 
incentives to improve monitoring and 
screening technologies for banks 
(Reininger, Schardax and Summer, 
2001). Therefore, recapitalisation of 
the banks and a transfer of ownership 
to the private sector is the only way of 
assuring an adequate corporate 
governance structure based on an 
appropriate system of risk and 
rewards. 
For the banking system to operate 
efficiently, in the sense that good banks will 
dominate the system and bad banks will be 
competed out of the system, a sufficient 
number of banks with adequate corporate 
structure is required. Privatisation is a way 
to increase the number of banks with such 
appropriate corporate structure. 
The privatisation of state - owned banks 
influences the chosen restructuring 
strategy. In other words, the authorities 
should take into account the fact that 'the 
recap ital isation of a state owned bank 
only has the benefit of making explicit 
something that was implicit by its 
condition of being state - owned: that the 
state is responsible for the banks non - 
performing loans and the income loses 
that might be generated there or 
(Thome, 1993, p. 987). Therefore, in 
most cases of bank privatisation, the 
main objective of any privatisation 
strategy which is to maximise the present 
discount value of the assets subject to 
being privatized, may not hold. 
The privatisation process in the CEE countries was aimed to break down the 
discredited institutions of state ownership and to promote private ownership. In other 
words, the privatisation of the banking systems in the CEE countries was designed to 
eliminate the inappropriate incentives to bank management and enhance competition 
as well as attract capital injections and increase efficiency of banks through 
transferring ownership rights from the public to the private sector 7. Table 2.7 shows 
the dynamics of the reduction of the market share of state - owned banks in the 
analysed countries. 
Thorne (1993) pointed out three reasons for stressin. - .1 
bank privatisation, which are described further. 
However, the general titles of these reasons are given by me. 7 However, as previous sections discussed, the outcome of private ownership may not necessarily be 
efficient. 
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Table 2.7. Market share of state-owned banks 
(in % of total assets of banking systern) 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Croatia 78.4 41.9 43.1 45.6 5.7 5.0 4.0 3.0 
the Czech 
Republic 38.5 24.3 3.7 4.5 ý. I .3 
Estonia 28.9 1 14.8 12.5 7.9 0 0 01 0 
Latvia 9.9 6.9 6.8 2.6 2.9 3.2 4.0 1 4.1 
Lithuania 61.8 54 48.8 . 33.6 28.6 8.3 0.1 
0.1 
Moldova 0.3 7.9 9.8 10.2 13.4 15.5 
Poland 63.0 51.1 38.2 36.7 22.1 21.1 21.7 22.9 2 2.3 
Romania 50.3 46.1 41.8 40.4 41.5 
Russia 3) 7 41.9 32.4 31.6 31.7 
Slovakia 62.2 59.4 9.5 4.4 1.5 
Slovenia 1 40.7 24.9 
Ukraine 13.5 13.7 12.5 11.9 1 11.8 12 9.8 
Source: EBRD (2003,2004), Croatian National Bank web-site, Czech National Bank web-site, 
National Bank of Poland web - site, National Bank of Slovakia web-site, Bank of Slovenia, RZB 
Research Group, 2004 
Although progress in bank, privatisation differs among the CEE countries, in most 
countries the privatisation process (precisely, the mode of privatisation namely tender 
and direct sales to foreign banks) encouraged foreign participation in the CEE 
countries banking sector. Foreign participation in the banking sector was considered 
as a mode to enhance competition, transfer know-how in conducting banking business 
and improve screening and monitoring technology and managerial skills. 
Figure 2.1 shows the share of foreign ownership in the banking sector's equity in 
2002. Most accession countries and negotiating countries have a high degree of 
foreign ownership, which resulted not only from privatisation, but also from the 
establishment of new banks. The market share of foreign banks in the CIS counties' 
banking systems remains rather low. 
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Market share of foreign owned banks (2002) 
in % of total assets of banking system 
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Figure 2.1. Market share offoreion m\ncd bank's in CIT COL111trICS. 
Source: IMF. R/B Research Group. 1-004. Central Bank ofthe Russian Federation. 
Size and concentration of the banking sector 
The sizes of' the banking sectors of' the CFF, countries varies substantialh. both in 
absolute value (measured in FUR nin. ) and relative to the countries' GDlls (FiLlLires 
2.2 and 21.3). For example. Fiaire 2.3) SUIlgests that the size of' the banking sector in 
tile RUssian Federation. Czech Republic and Poland are. obviOLISIý'. tile largest arnong 
the discussed countries. as the economics of these countries are larue. llo\\e\er. 
according to Figure 2.2. the \ ariation of' the size ol'the bankino sector. relative to the tr L- 
size of' the econoiný. does not have a corresponding correlation ývith the size in 
absolute terms. /\ccordiii,, ]\. the CIS countries alono mth tile accession country 
Lithuania and the negotiating Romania. have banking sectors sized less than 40% of' 
their GDP levcls. The bankin,, li sectors in the 
Czech Republic. Slovakia and Croatia. 
compared to their (jDPs. are relatively large and their sizes exceed 900/0 of' the 
countries' economics. 
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Banking sector size 
Total assets of banking sector, % of GDP, 2002 
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1-1ý'Llre 2.2. Banking sector size in CTT. countries (Lis % ol'GDll tr tr Source: R7.11 Research Group. -1004. National Bank ol'Moldma 
Banking sector size 
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Fil,,, Lire 23. Banking sector size in CIT Countries (FUR 11111) 
Source: RZB Research Group. 2004, National Bank ol'Moldova. own estimations 
Usually. market concentration is hiolier in small countries. and therefore it is more L- 
meaningful to compare CFF countries across their peers among the sub uroup (Vigure 
2.4). Accordinok. in AC sub-proup Baltic COL[Iltl'IeS Fstonia and Lithuania displa\ the tý ý 
highest market concentration. while the Poland and lftlllUarý' - the least. and in the tr L- . 
CIS SLib-group Moldova has a lilohly concentrated banking sector while lo, ý\ market 
concentration is found in the Ukraine and Russia. Market concentration in the 
negotiatin- countries Is also relatively hioll. 
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Market concentration 
market share of top five banks in% of assets as of year-end 2003 
12C 
I AC I NC I CIS 
F1, UUrc 2.4. Market concentration ofhanklno sector In CF F. count -ics Z7 Cý -I 
Source: IMF. RZ13 Research Group. 2004 
Financial intermediation: Structure of lending and deposits 
The intermediation I'Linctions of the bankni() system captured t-)\ the credit deli\, ci*\ 
t7 - countries are presented 
Table 2.8 and deposit takino acti\ itics ol'banks in the CEF 
and Table 2.9. With respect to total credits as a per cent ofGDP. tile AC Sub - group 
of countries displays strong orowh with the exception of tile Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. \\ here this ratio decreased as a I-CSI. Ilt of batik restructuring. In tile C01.11111-iCS 
of the other sub - -roups. this ratio is even loxvcr than that ofthe accessed countries'. 
I lox\e\ cr. tile total loans over GDII ratio ofthe FAirozone bý the end ot"2003 reached 
II O(Yo of GD11. and the distance of the analyzed countries' ratio to tile one of tile 
l'ILII'OZ011C IS Still substantial. 
In the structure of lenclinp. credits to private enterprises (in 11/0 of GDII) stronply t: - I- - 
increased over the last N-cars. The consumer loans scoment of Icndim, activitN. the 
most dynamic field of banking in tile CT'I'l countries. displayed high growth rates in 
terins of FUR and % of GD11. IIox\cvcr. the Furozone ratio of credits to households 
mer the GIR ratio bý the end of 200') \\as 49%. and again it is indicative of the 
substantial difference between these figUres in the analyzed COLIntries and Furozone. 
The dynamics of' deposit services in the CF E countries' banking s\ stems sho\\ s much 
more moderate dc\ clopment (Tablc 2.9). Total deposits as a percent ofG DI) ratio has 
increased in all the diSCLIsscd countries. The clitTerence bemecii this F1, ULire tor the 
F'urozonc (55% - 2003) is smaller than that ofthe credit categories. 4- 
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Banking sector profitability 
In banking, interest spreads drive a wedge between the rate of return to depositors and 
the financing costs to borrowers and, therefore, it affects the equilibrium between the 
supply of deposits and the demand for loans. The spread may be interpreted as an 
indicator of banking sector efficiency taking into account the minimum reserve 
requirements (Reininger, Schardax and Summer, 2001). But it is also, a major 
determinant of banking sector profitability. Table 2.10 reports the average interest 
spread in the discussed CEE countries and gives information about the average 
lending and deposit rates in the banking system. According to the Table 2.10, in the 
accession countries, financial intermediation is provided at a lower cost for the real 
sector of economy, and the interest spread of this sub-group of countries is similar to 
that of most developed industrial countries where the spreads are usually low. The 
negotiating countries report higher spreads, and the CIS countries spreads decreased 
over the last year but still remain relatively high. 
Banking sector profitability in the CEE countries was inadequate in recent years. In 
1999, some discussed countries' banking sectors suffered losses. The banking 
industry's Return on Equity (ROA) and Return on Assets (ROA) were even negative 
(Tables 2.11 and 2.12). Statistics for 2000 - 2003 show a clear improvement in 
banking profitability. 
Table 2.11. Return on assets (ROA) in bankina svstem of CEE countries 
1999 2000 2001 2001 2003 
Croatia 0.7 1.4 0.9 1.6 1.6 
the Czech 
Republic 
-0.3 0.7 0.7 1.2 1.2 
Estonia 1.5 1.2 2.7 1.6 1.7 
Hungary 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.5 
Latvia 1.0 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 
Lithuania 0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.9 1.4 
Moldova 4.2 7.4 4.3 4.3 4.5 
Poland 0.9 1.1 1.0 0.5 0.5 
Romania -1.5 1.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 
Russia -0.3 0.9 2.4 2.6 2.6 
Slovakia -2.27 1.41 1.07 1.2 1. 
Slovenia 0.8 1.1 0.4 1.1 1.0 
Ukraine -0.1 1.2 1.2 1.0 
z! ýources: imi- country Report No. 05/64 (200), HLB Research Uroup (2004) pp. 17,19,21,23,25, 
27,299 31,35,37,45,47. 
Table 2.12. Return on Eauitv (ROF) in banking -, vctem nf CFF. rmintrie. q 
1999 2000 2001 2001 2003 
Croatia 10.6 12.2 13.1 14.6 15.7 
the Czech 
Republic 
-5.3 13.1 16.6 27.4 23.7 
Estonia 9.4 8.0 20.7 14.7 14.1 
Hungary 13.5 17.7 16.2 19.5 
Latvia 11.2 18.6 19.0 16.4 16.7 
Lithuania 1.1 4.0 -1.1 8.5 13.4 
Moldova 18.0 25.0 14.3 16.7 20.3 
Poland 12.9 14.5 12.8 5.2 5.9 
Romania -15.3 12.5 21.8 18.8 19.3 
Russia -4.0 8.0 19.4 18.0 17.8 
Slovakia -30.2 9.5 14.4 13.6 12.9 
Slovenia 7.7 11.4 4.7 13.0 12.8 
Ukraine 7.5 8.0 7.6 
Sources: 1W Country Keport No. U-5/64 (2U05), RZB Researcb Group, 2004. 
Table 2.13 shows the size of nonperforming loans (for some countries classified 
loans) relative to the total assets of the banking sector. According to table 2.13, for 
some countries the current level of nonperforming loans seems to be fairly high 
(Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine). However, I should bear in mind the 
difference in the classification of the non-performing and classified loans according to 
the particular country's banking sector regulation the overview of which is given in 
Appendix A. 
Table 2.13. Non-verformin loans (in Dercent of total loans) 
1999 2000 2001 2001 2003 
Croatia* 10.3 9.5 7.3 5.9 5.2 
the Czech 
Republic 
10.8 13.4 10.8 6.2 
Estonia 1.7 1.0 1.3 0.8 0.4 
Hungary 3.0 2.7 2.9 2.6 
Latvia* 6.8 4.5 2.8 2.0 1.4 
Lithuania* 11.9 10.8 7.4 5.8 2.6 
Moldova 29.3 20.6 10.4 7.7 6.2 
Poland* 13.7 15.5 18.6 22.0 21.8 
Romania 6.4 3.9 2.8 8.3 
Russia 13.4 7.7 6.2 5.6 5.0 
Slovakia* 36.5 27.9 32.3 21.8 17.7 
Slovenia* 1 11.0 12.4 12.8 13.3 13.6 
Ukraine 1 29.6 25.1 21.9 28.3 
mie: - uiassmea ioans in u/o to total loans 
Sources: IMF Country Report No. 05/64 (2005), IMF Country Report No. 04/357, IMF Country Report 
No. 05/213, IMF Country Report No. 04/316, RZB Research Group, 2004. 
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2.5. Comparative macroeconomic and banking sector indicators 
for Western Europe and CEE countries 
The objective of this section is to compare the CEE countries economies with 
the economies of developed countries to look at differences in the size of the financial 
system, banking activity and macroeconomic indicators. Table 2.14 presents size 
indicators of the financial system in the CEE countries and the EU member countries: 
Italy, Greece, Austria and Germany; and the USA. The size of the banking system is 
measured by the ratio of the banking system's total assets over GDP. Total market 
capitalisation is the sum of stock market and bond market capitalisation for the 
transition countries, and stock market capitalisation for the developed countries. The 
size of non-bank intermediaries is the ratio of the total assets of the insurance sector, 
pension and investment funds and other institutional investors over GDP. Data in 
Table 2.14 shows that the CEE countries' financial sectors are small and still in their 
development stage, and still lag behind the financial system of developed countries. 
Table 2.14. Comparative indicators for banking system of CEE and developed 
nmintrie. q 
Banking system 
assets/GDP, 
In% 1998-2001 average 
Non-bank intermediaries 
assets/GDP, 
in% 1998-2001 avera2e 
M 
Market capitalisation, in% 
1998-2001 averag), e 
Croatia 71.9 8.4**** 14.0 
the Czech 
Republic 
101.9 18.6** 34.9 
Estonia 75.6* 
Hungary 60.2 11.8**** 55.5 
Latvia 83.6* 
Lithuania 33.5* 
Moldova 35.1 * 
Poland 52.3 4.3** 27.5 
Romania 31.6* 
Russia 37.8* 
Slovakia 88.5 23.6 
Slovenia 75.1 17.2**** 26.5 
Ukraine 28.3* 
Italy 105.7** 88.3*** 58.2 
Greece I 10.0** 35.0*** 80.3 
Austria 187.1 ** 61.5** 15.6 
Gen-nany 178.8** 74.2** 61.6 
USA 85.2** 198.0** 155.1 
Note: 2002; average 1998 - 2000: average 1998 - 1999; average 1998 - 2001; 4n 
market capitalisation for transition countries includes stock market capitalisation and market 
value of bonds, for developed countries - only stock market capitalisation 
Source: RZB Research Group, 2004, National Bank of Moldova, Dalid M. (2003) 
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Table 2.15 reports the corruption perception index for the CEE countries 
and selected developed countries. This is taken from the annual survey by the Berlin- 
based organization, Transparency International. Accordingly, this index defines 
corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain, and measures the degree to 
which corruption is perceived to exist among a country's public officials and 
politicians. According to Table 2.15, the AC sub-group countries show relatively 
lower corruption levels while the CIS countries corruption perception index is found 
to be high. 
Table 2.15. Corruption perception index for CEE countries and selected developed 
countries 
Country rank Country 
2004 
CPI Score 
(10 -highly clean, 
0- highly corrupt) 
31 Estonia 6.0_ 
31 Slovenia 6.0 
42 Hungary 4.8_ 
44 Lithuania 4.6 
51 Czech Republic 4.2_ 
57 Latvia 4.0 
57 Slovakia 4.0 
67 Croatia 3.5 
67 Poland 3.5 
87 Romania 2.9 
90 Russia 2.8 
114 Moldova 2.3 
122 Ukraine 2.2 
42 Italy 4.8 
49 Greece 4.3 
13 Austria 8.4 
15 Germany 8.2 
17 USA 7.5 
Source: Transparency International, 2004. Web: www. transparency. org. 
2.6. Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter was to provide an overview of the development of 
banking markets in Central and Eastern Europe. I have considered major specifics 
pertinent to economic transition in the region, and, in particular, to the stability and 
development of banking systems, such as banking system reforms, the privatisation 
process in the banking industry, the ownership structure of the banking system, the 
financial intermediation activity and the profitability of the sector. 
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As the analysis reveals, nowadays the CEE banking sector is characterised by 
a relatively high degree of heterogeneity. However, while the development of banking 
system, and economy in general, was different in each country, the region shared a 
common experience, which is the transition from a monobank to a two-tired banking 
system, which was marked by financial crises. Moreover, another similarity of the 
transformation is the privatisation of state-owned banks, the increasing shares of 
foreign banks' participation in the banking market, the gradual decline of the 
proportion of non-performing loans and an adequate capitalisation of the banking 
sector. 
In conclusion, the CEE banking market was highly dynamic over the last 
years with rapid financial deepening, though at different levels in different countries. 
Therefore, it is particularly interesting to examine the development of the banking 
market in these countries and assess their efficiency and productivity. 
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CHAPTER THREE: META-ANALYSIS OF INPUTS AND 
OUTPUTS IN BANKING EFFICIENCYAND PRODUCTIVITY 
STUDIES, AND THE STRUCTURE OF BANK PRODUCTION 
SUMMARY 
The literature on efficiency and productivity analysis in the banking industry is vast 
and rapidly growing. However, this research differs considerably in how banks' inputs 
and outputs are defined and measured. These differences reflect the preference of 
researchers for different models of banking production, such as the intermediation, 
production and value-added approaches. Generally, inputs in these models are taken 
from a range of flow variables in the income account, while outputs are taken from a 
range of stock variables on both sides of the balance sheet. The comparison is further 
complicated by the fact that researchers often use different databases, which almost 
inevitably leads to different definitions and measurements of input and output 
variables, and of the types of banks, e. g. savings banks, commercial banks, retail 
banks and investment banks. For example, it is difficult to tell whether a certain 
choice of variables has been dictated by 'pure' theoretical considerations or simply by 
the issue of data availability. In this chapter I combine and examine research findings 
which employ the same database - Bankscope. The major objective is to 
systematically examine the use of flow and stock measures of inputs and outputs in 
different modelling frameworks of banking efficiency, where any differences in the 
choice of approach of inputs and outputs definitions are primarily conceptual (since 
the same data source was used) and therefore can be compared more effectively. 
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1. Introduction 
Productivity and efficiency are important aspects of the economic performance 
and production structure in the banking industry, and much academic and public 
attention is devoted to these strategic facets. Nevertheless, as authors of one of the 
earliest studies on the definition of banking production, Speagle and Kohn (1958), 
argued that "the problems that generally beset the definition and measurement of 
output in economic activity were found equally in banking, with the addition of 
special difficulties inherent in the nature of the industry" (p. 23)., and despite 
substantial research efforts, it is generally recognised that even nowadays one of the 
main difficulties in these explorations, is a lack of agreement in the definition and 
measurement of a bank's inputs and outputs. Moreover, the treatment of deposit 
products is still the subject of considerable financial debates 8. For example, Speagle 
and Kohn maintain that deposits may be considered the "raw material" of banking 
business and they are a bank's "lifeblood", and still consider them an output of the 
bank9. 
More to the point on this chapter, a keen interest in comparative studies is 
generally devoted to the above questions, i. e. to measurement methods and efficiency 
concepts, but not much thought is normally given to issues relating to the variation of 
data sources. I take up the challenge in this chapter by combining and examining 
research findings which employ the same database - the world banking information 
source: BankScope database. This chapter makes several major contributions to the 
literature. This is to my knowledge the only survey which provides a comprehensive, 
critical comparison of efficiency and productivity literature and makes no limitations 
on variable selection due to data accessibility bias. This study critically analyses basic 
methodologies of different models of banking production, such as the intermediation, 
production and value-added approaches and maintains an empirical verification 
procedure in which it provides ample comparison of empirical findings. In particular, 
I try to systematically examine the use of flow and stock measures of inputs and 
outputs in different modelling frameworks of banking efficiency. To analyse 
8 See Triplett (1992), Wykoff (1992), Hunter, Timme and Young (1990). 
9 Speagle and Kohn (195 8) analyze the nature of labor-using bank operations and the response of labor C, input to growth and technical changes in the banking industry. The only input used in the study is labor. C, 
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methodological and empirical applications of banking production models, this work 
conducts a Meta analysis of 37 papers. 
The chapter is organized as follows. First, I discuss and compare the banking 
production process and banking inputs and outputs in the measurement modelling 
literature (Section 3.2). Then, in Section 3.3,1 construct the Meta study database of 
banking efficiency studies which used the Bankscope database, and systemise the 
modelling frameworks of measurement of inputs and outputs in the banking efficiency 
literature. The last section, Section 3.4, gives conclusions to the meta-analysis. 
3.2. Modeling banking production process: review of 
approaches 
Characterizing the banking production process and its underlying determinants 
is fundamental to modeling and measuring the economic performance of banks. It is 
recognized that in terms of production efficiency, the performance of banks is 
considered transformation process of multiple inputs into multiple outputs. However, 
due to the integrated nature of the banking production process, and the functions of 
financial intermediaries, methodological developments face difficulties in the 
definition and measurement of banking inputs and outputs. For example, the 
production activity of financial firms can be viewed as the transformation of non- 
financial inputs into financial outputslo. If so, the primary factors on the input side of 
a financial service business are straightforward and characterized by labour and 
capital. Therefore, only the output side is subject to the characterization and 
measurement issues. On the other hand, since deposits can be viewed both as an input 
or an output, not only non-monetary but also monetary inputs as well as outputs could 
be involved in the banking production process (See Figure 3.1). 
10 1 trace out this definition of financial institutions to the work of Fixler and Zieschang, 1999. They 
adopt user-cost framework in their survey. 
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Figure 3.1. Banking production process 
Monetary inputs Monetary outputs 
(eg. Deposits) [! 
a: nking production 
(eg. Loans) 
Non-monetary inputs process Non-monetary outputs 
(eg. Labour, Capital) (eg. Banking services, such 
as deroSit services) 
There is an extensive research literature on specifying the appropriate 
methodology of modeling of the banking production process, covering the financial 
framework of the inputs and outputs, definitional problems and reasonable measures 
for their quantities. The literature distinguishes the following approaches to banks' 
activity specification. 
The production approach defines the banking activity as the production of 
services. This approach has been adopted by the contributions of Benston (1965) and 
Bell and Murphy (1968). Under this approach, banks are viewed as firms, which 
transform physical inputs (capital and labour) into different categories of outputs (loan 
and deposit accounts). In this framework, deposits are outputs and it is assumed that a 
bank provides depository services as a form of production in its own right. According 
to this approach, inputs and outputs are measured in physical quantities, and 
productivity and efficiency analysis is based on the comparison of quantities of 
services given with the quantity of resources used (Mlima and Hjalmarsson, 2002). 
This highlights a basic problem of the production approach, which considers the 
measurement of output volumes, i. e. whether the number of accounts, number of 
operations on these accounts, or the quantity in monetary units as the relevant 
measure. According to Freixas and Rochet, 1997, usually researchers use currency 
units of measurement (dollar amounts, for example) because these can be obtained 
more easily. The possible biases, in this case, could be corrected by adding 
heterogeneity factors for homogenizing the data. This approach is sometimes called 
the service provision approach. In their study Mlima and Hjalmarsson, 2002 pointed 
out that this approach is also known as the value-added approach, but I present a 
separate discussion of the value-added approach later in this section. 
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The second main theoretical paradigm for modeling banking production 
structure is the intermediation approach. Under this approach, banks are 
intermediators of financial services and the key role of banks is resource mobilization 
and distribution, by performing which they facilitate smooth investment activities in 
the economy. Indeed, in this approach banks are considered intermediary institutions 
and the banking production process is seen as the transformation of borrowed money 
- deposits - into the money lent to borrowers, i. e. loans (see, for instance, Sealey and 
Lindley (1977) for a discussion). The intermediation approach specifies banking 
activities more comprehensively than the production approach in view of the fact that 
the banking production process originates from the transformation of different 
characteristics of deposits and loans: divisible, liquid and riskless deposits (typically) 
into indivisible, illiquid and risky loans (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). 
As a consequence of a comprehensive specification of costs, the 
intermediation approach has become more popular in the recent literature and exists in 
a number of forms. For example, the approach has different versions including asset 
.,,. approach, profit or user cost approach and risk management approach. 
The asset 
approach is regarded as one form of the intermediation approach, but sometimes as 
the intermediation approach itself. It assumes that the banking production process 
focuses on liabilities as inputs and assets as outputs, so that one of the cases is where 
funds are inputs and loans are outputs. The asset approach has been criticized by 
Berger and Humphrey (1992) because it ignores the fact that banks might spend 
significant resources for transactions and saving deposits. In the profit or user cost 
approach the financial input-output status of each product is determined by the sign of 
its user cost price, i. e. by the net contribution of the product to bank revenue. This 
framework focuses on the maximization of a bank's profit and so the comparison of 
financial returns and the opportunity costs of funds are considered. Thus, if the return 
to a commodity is greater than its opportunity cost then the commodity is regarded as 
output, if not it is regarded as an input (Hancook, 1991). Hence, if I follow Hancock's 
rule, in simplified example, demand deposits would be classified as outputs, since 
banks very often pay no interest on them but provide unpriced services, such as check 
cashing, use of ATMs, and other transactions services, while time deposits would be 
classified as inputs, since they have an interest cost. According to Berger et al., 1993 
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this approach reduces mis-specification and mis-measurement problems. However, 
some problems still arise with this approach. 
This approach is sensitive to interest rate fluctuations, since as interest rates 
fluctuate, so does the user cost. It may cause an item which is considered to be an 
output in one period to turn into an input in the next period if the sign of its user cost 
changes. Second, there is an issue of complexity of marginal revenues and costs 
measurement for each individual liability item, because as in case of demand deposits, 
I argue that they have no interest cost, but it does not mean, that they have no costs, 
because banks are subject to the acquisition cost of demand deposits which is equal to 
the cost of unpriced services produced by the bank. Thus the answer to the question 
whether an item is an input or output becomes a subject of significant measurement 
error and is sensitive to changes in data over time (Grigorian D. A. and Manole V., 
2002). 
The risk management approach is also considered a form of the intermediation 
approach (Mlima and Hjalmarsson, 2002), but. some authors (e. g. Freixas and Rochet, 
1997) distinguish it as a separate approach - the so - called modem approach. This 
approach is used to incorporate risks in the measurement of banks' activities. In this 
framework, the specificity of banks' activities is to take risks in order to produce 
acceptable returns. This idea was already implicit in Hughes and Mester, 1993; 
Mester, 1996; Heshmati, 1997. A number of promising trends are apparent in the 
literature on the risk management modeling of banks' economic performance. 
Methodological developments, with perhaps the most potential are those 
incorporating the probability of the banks' failure and the quality of the banks' assets 
in the estimations. In the next Chapter I will extend the idea of the risk management 
methodology not only in the framework of the Intermediation approach, but also in 
the modeling of Production and Profit/Revenue based methodologies. 
Finally, the value added approach defines banks' inputs and outputs according 
to their share of value added (Berger and Humphrey, 1992). This approach assumes 
that any item on both sides of the balance sheet may be identified as outputs or inputs 
depending on their contribution to the generation of bank value added. Also, 
according to Maggi and Rossi (2003), any balance sheet item is considered as output 
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if it absorbs a relevant share of capital and labour, otherwise it is treated as input or 
non-relevant output. Weelock and Wilson (1995) argue that while the value-added 
approach and the user-cost approaches differ in their details, empirically, they tend to 
suggest similar classification of inputs and outputs. However, given the similarities, 
the main exception in the classification is demand deposits, which are an output in 
user-cost approach, and both an input and an output in value-added approach. II Also, 
the value added approach differs from the user cost approach in that it is based on 
actual operating cost data rather than determining these costs explicitly (Grigorian 
D. A. and Manole V., 2002). 
As Berger and Humphrey (1997) pointed out, there is no 'perfect approach, 
and as Favero and Papi (1995) argue, all of these approaches have their strengths, but 
none of them is necessarily perfect. For example, the production approach focuses on 
operating costs and takes no account of important issues like the cost of deposits, 
which is a crucial component in interest and non-interest expenses trade-off 
(Humphrey, 1991). But at the same time, this approach may be more appropriate for 
comparative efficiency analyses of bank branches, especially when transactional 
activity pattern differences exist between branches. The intermediation approach, on 
the other hand, includes both operating and interest expenses, but primarily 
concentrates on defining such activities as receiving funds at interest and using them 
to make loans, and ignores others, for example transaction services. 
With respect to the aforementioned approaches, it has been argued in the 
literature that these approaches, along with Bergendhal's (1998) idea 12 , could be 
pooled into two broadly defined ones, which are profit maximization and service 
provision (Grigorian and Manole, 2006). Thus, profit maximization combines features 
of Bergendhal's profit maximization and risk management and service provision 
brings together elements of service provision, intermediation and utility provision. 
However, in the next Chapter, I suggest another combination of the managerial goals 
suggested by Bergendhal and link them to the input/output methodologies utilized in 
the thesis. 
" This approach is also known as a dual approach, because it considers both the input and output 
characteristics of deposits. 
12 Bergendhal, 1998 mentioned that efficient bank management targets five fundamental goals: profit 
maximization, risk management, service provision, intermediation, and utility provision. 
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In the reminder of this Chapter, I investigate the extent to which the choice of 
approach of banks' activity specification depends on researchers' theoretical 
considerations. I am interested in a systematic analysis of the applications of flow and 
stock measures of inputs and outputs in different modelling frameworks of banking 
efficiency and I examine studies, which used a single source of data - the Bankscope 
data base. 
3.3. Inputs and outputs in banking efficiency studies 
using Bankscope: A Meta study 
To evaluate the controversial concepts of banks' activity specification the 
Meta study scientific tool will be used. This method is sometimes called the "study of 
studies" or "analysis of analyses" 13 . This research methodology provides a systematic 
way of bringing together findings from previous empirical research on a given issue. 
This tool helps construct an' analytical framework for the research synthesis of 
comparative case studies of surveys undertaken in this area. In this chapter we slightly 
amend the traditional meta-study focus by comparing theoretical and methodological 
issues, rather than empirical findings of different studies. 
In our meta-study we review 37 studies that use a relatively easily accessible 
data base of financial information for banks - the comprehensive and global database 
of Bureau van Dijk - Bankscope. For analytical purposes, we construct a table, which 
systematically covers important information concerning the research design. In 
addition to the applied approaches of banking inputs and outputs, information about 
the analyzed country and methodology used has also been included in the table (see 
Table 3.1). 
13 First this methodolog was used by Gene Glass in 1976. It was referred to a philosophy and was not oy 
a statistical technique. Glass argued that literature review should be as systematic as primary research 
and should interpret the results of individual studies in the context of distributions of findings, partially C) 
determined by study characteristics and partially random. Since that time, meta-analysis has become a 
widely accepted research tool in a variety of disciplines (Bangert-Drowns and Rudner, 1991) 
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The analysis is presented in the form of a meta-regression model, which evaluates the 
relation between the approach used in the study and the input and output variables 
specification adopted 14. In our meta-analysis we review 41 studies which are obtained 
from the information contained in Table 3.1. Consideration of the specificities of the 
banking production process discussed in the previous sections led us to the 
multinomial logistic model specification with the chosen approach as the dependent 
variable Wj being presented in the form of categorical variable. 15 The choice of the 
MLR model is characterised by the use of K unordered choices to represent the 
different model specifications. This allows the description of the studies to be 
categorical in nature, so that there is no numerical significance to the ordering of the 
study types. This model uses as the category identifier: k=K, where: 
kI production approach 
kK unspecified model approach 
The key variable to be explained by the regression is the numerical count of each type 
of study used in the sample, and the regression is estimated by maximum likelihood 
methods. The model determines the choice of study type by the probabilistic odds of 
choosing that type conditional on the relative strength of one or more explanatory 
variables. Adopting the logistic function as the underlying density function of the 
random choices leads to the conditional or multinomial logit model: 
Pr ob (type = j) = exp 
(x', P)/ Y_ exp (x' P) k 
k 
so that the corresponding log-odds ratio is 
14 In view of the fact that a single piece of research may use more than one approach, in meta - analysis 
we do not group together the papers containing two approaches, for that reason in our meta - analysis 
'study' does not equate to 'paper'. 
15 In previous model specification and estimations we run the analysis using the MetaStat 1.5 program 
(developed by Rudner L. M., Glass G. V., Evartt D. L. and Emery J. ). Meta-Stat 1.5 is a comprehensive 
package designed to help in the meta-analysis of research studies in the social and behavioral sciences. 
Statistical techniques presented by the software are based on traditional assumptions of random 
sampling and independence. For regression analysis it uses the iterative stepwise approach. The key 
advantage of this approach is that it allows the computation of regression statistics (R2 and beta 
weights) without having to invert the correlation matrix. Thus the non-multicolinearity restriction is not 
needed for computing the multiple correlation and accuracy is improved. The standard errors for the 
beta weights, and hence the corresponding t-statistics are based on Gauss-Jordon inverted correlation 
matrix (Rudner et al., 2002). However, the results were very sensitive to the changes of categories of 4D 
the dependent variable which was avoided by using multinomial logistic regression (MLR). 
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log log[Prob(type = j)lProb(type = K)]= x., 
'p 
The explanatory variables may be specific to the study in question or they may be 
general over all studies. The coefficients P measure the effect on the probability of 
choosing a study of typej relative to the probability of choosing a study of type K, the 
basic choice. In this case the basic choice is taken as the intermediation approach, so 
that an intuitive interpretation of the regression model is: 
F 
probability of modelj relative to probability of the intermediation model = x., 
In other words, the following model is specified: 
Logit(pif, 
i 
)=Ex. 
/ 
p 
where TV, is a matrix of response with k=4 levels (k =I when Production approach 
was utilized in the study, K=2- for Intermediation approach, k=3- Value-added 
approach and k=4 when researchers unspecified the input/output approach) and is 
multinornial distributed, and X is a matrix of predictors. To predict the choice of the 
approach (outcome in our multinomial logit model) we use the Input/Output variable, 
dummy for published studies (I - if the study is published, 0- if not) and the year the 
study was published (or became available for unpublished works). Input variables are 
combined into 6 groups: i) inputs based on labour factor; ii) inputs based on deposits; 
iii) capital based inputs; iv) interest expenses; v) non-interest expenses; vi) inputs 
describing quality of banking activity. Groups describing the output variables are 
following: i) loans; ii) securities and/or investments; iii) other earning assets; iv) off- 
balance sheet items; v) non - interest revenue; vi) interest revenue; vii) deposits as 
outputs; viii) liquid assets. All Input/Output groups are presented in the fonn of 
dummy variables being I if this type of Input/Output used in the study, and 0- 
otherwise. 
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With respect to the heterogeneity among studies, we made the following 
specification in the studies - input and output categories are combined on a general 
basis and stand on authors' definitions. Obviously, different combinations of groups 
of the input and output variables may be used in the meta-regression and thus may 
affect the estimation results. However, we believe that the groups described above 
capture all the specificities of each approach used in the categorical dependant 
variable. 
Before the MLR analysis, in order to have a clear picture of the studies 
presented in the Table 3.1, we present a frequency analysis of the variables used in the 
studies, viz., labour, deposits and capital, loans, deposits and OBS items in Figures 
3.2- 3.8 respectively. 
Figure 3.2. Frequency of approaches used in the analysed 
studies 
Figure 3.3. Frequency of inputs based on labour ir 
the analysed studies 
-71 
Lý 
44 
Figure 3.4. Frequency of inputs based on deposits Figure 3.5. Frequency of inputs based on capital in 
in the analysed studies the analysed studies 
: 1. 
Ll 
c 
0. 
L6 
Figure 3.7. Frequency of deposits as output in the 
analysed studies 
cr 
I 
As can be seen from Figure 3.2, papers that make use of the intermediation 
approach outnumber the others by at least five to one. This indicates that in 63.4% of 
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Figure 3.6. Frequency of loans as output in the 
analysed studies 
Figure 3.8. Frequency of OBS items as output in 
the analvsed studies 
empirical analysis, researchers prefer to use the intermediation approach, followed by 
value added approach (12.2%). The production approach was used in 7.3% of papers, 
the profit approach - in 4.9 %, and the rather new - dual approach was used in 2.4%. 
Profit maximization and service provision approaches share 4.9% and 2.4% 
respectively. According to Berger and Humphrey (1991), the intermediation approach 
captures the varied nature of modem banking firms and therefore this argument can 
be treated as an explanation of the popularity of this approach. Consequently, as a 
base outcome in our MLR, we use the Intermediation approach as being the most 
popular in our sample. And to reduce the dimensionality of Kj to the four levels 
described previously, we classify the dual approach as a type of value-added 
approach, the profit - as type of Intermediation approach, and the service provision 
approach - as type of Production approach. 
16 
Figure 3.3 indicates that 35 studies use labour as an input, whereas deposits 
are used only in 21 studies (Figure 3.4), and capital in 23 studies. According to Figure 
3.6, loans are used as output in 36 studies. It means that almost all studies of banking 
production approaches tend to agree to classify loans as output. And.. some surveys 
indicate that their focus is on revenue generating elements (Drake L. M. et al., 2006), 
or those which use a single output model with output variable being total assets (De 
Guevara J. F., Maudos J. and P6rez F., 2002). Deposits are classified as output in 16 
studies out of 41 (Figure 3.7). Figure 3.8 indicates a noteworthy trend, which is the 
inclusion of Off-balance-sheet items and contingent liabilities into the analysis as an 
output variable. In 9.8% and 2.4% of studies respectively these variables were 
included into the outputs. 
3.4. Results 
The results table, Table 3.2 picks out, in bold, the cases where the explanatory 
variables are statistically significant at the 10 percent level or less (p-value 0.10 or 
less). Overall, four key findings can be identified. Two refer to the general variables: 
16 The results of the MLR estimation using the Production approach as a base outcome are presented in C:, 
the Appendix B. 
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Consistently, the Year variable has a negative effect on the choice of model 
relative to the intermediation model, although its statistical significance is weak. 
This demonstrates that while researchers over time seem to be converging on the 
intermediation model as the most preferred type, other models still make an 
appearance in later work. Overall, however, the popularity of the non- 
intermediation approaches seems to be declining over time. This perhaps reflects 
an increasingly more complex view of what banks do in practice. 
Table 3.2. Results of Multinomial Logisti Meta-Re gressions 
Production Value-Added Unspecified Production Value-Added Unspecified 
Xlabou, 0.08 (0.932) 1.44 (0.151) -2.24 (0.025) Yloans -1.08 (0.280) 1.54 (0.124) -1.47 (0.141) 
Dpubl -1.91 (0.056) -0.84 (0.404) 0.11 (0.914) 
Dpubl 
-1.94 (0.052) -0.70 (0.483) 0.52 (0.607) 
Year -0.09 (0.932) -1.44 (0.151) -0-10 (0-919) Year 0.68 (0.500) -1.54 (0.124) -0.51 (0.607) 
Xdeposit 0.13 (0.896) -0.80 (0.423) 0.18 (0.857) Yi,, est -0.09 (0.931) -0.03 (0.974) -0.11 (0.9 10) 
Dpubl -1.98 (0.048) -1.22 (0.224) 0.17 (0.865) 
Dpubl 
-1.98 (0.047) -1.38 (0.167) 0.15 (0.878) 
Year -0.73 (0.465) -0.61 (0.543) -0.27 (0.786) Year -0.67 (0.502) -1.02 (0.310) -0.19 (0.851) 
Xcapital 0.46 (0.642) 0.06 (0.952) 0.16 (0.873) Yeam -0.39 (0.699) 0.24 (. 808) -0.60 (0.547) 
Dpubl -1.67 (0.094) -1.38 (0.168) 0.15 (0.882) 
Dpubl 
-1.76 (0.078) -1.33 (0.184) 0.18 (0.857) 
Year -0.47 (0.642) -0.95 (0.341) -0.24 (0.814) Year -0.70 (0.483) -1.22 (0.221) -0.21 (0.831) 
Xi,, t-e, p 
0.39 (0.696) -0-00 (1-000) -0-00 (1-000) Yobs 0.14 (0.888) 0.27 (0.789) -0.00 (1.000) 
Dpubl -1.96 (0.050) -1.79 (0.074) 0.17 (0.865) Dpubl -1.95 (0.051) -1.32 (0.186) 
0.15 (0.880) 
Year -0.96 (0.337) -0.15 (0.885) -0.21 (0.834) Year -0.87 (0.396) -1.22 (0.221) -0.18 
(0.854) 
X, O, i, t -0.00 
(1.000) -0.03 (0.976 -0.44 (0.660) Y, o,, e, -0.00 (1.000) -0.00 
(1.000) -0.00 (1.000) 
Dpubl -1.76 (0.078) -1.35 (0.176) 0.17 (0.868) 
Dpubl -1.95 (0.052) -1.34 (0.179) 0.19 (0.853) 
Year -0.30 (0.762) -1.16 (0.245) -0.20 (0.841) Year -0.63 (0.530) -0.98 (0.326) -0.23 
(0.820) 
Xquality -0.00 (1.000) -0.00 (1.000) -0.00 (1.000) Yi, t, e, -0.19 (0.850) -0.00 (1.000) -0.00 
(1.000) 
Dpubl -1.94 (0.053) -1.33 (0.185) 0.18 (0.855) Dpubl -1.97 (0.049) -1.62 (0.104) 
0.17 (0.861) 
Year -0.89 (0.372) -1.23 (0.219) -0.23 (0.821) Year -0.68 (0.497) -0.69 (0.490) -0.22 
(0.827) 
- 
Ydepos 14.94 (0.000) 0.71 (0.477) 
Dpubl -2.21 (0.027) -2.09 (0.037) 0.11 (0.909) 
Year -14.94 (0.00) -3140.7 (. 000) -0.14 (0.887) 
Note: I-able presents estimatea parameter /, statistics witn p- value in brackets. 
2. The same effect holds for the publication dummy variable. Amongst the large 
number of published and unpublished papers on banking efficiency which have 
used the Bankscope database, the use of the non-intermediation approaches 
diminishes when the research passes the publication refereeing process. 
Turning now to individual study specific variables, two further clear conclusions 
emerge. 
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3. First, the use of deposits as an output massively increases the probability that a 
production model is used. The size of the marginal effect surpasses all other 
parameters by a factor of 10 or more, and the p-value is zero to three decimal 
places. Unequivocally, it can be said that the use of deposits as an output is 
associated with the production approach. 
4. Second, no other output or input variable is statistically significant at the 10 per 
cent level or less in explaining the choice of model type. Interestingly, this 
includes the use of both loans and other earning assets as outputs. In other words, 
the use of loans and other earning assets as outputs does not lead to a statistically 
significant decrease in the probability of using a non-intermediation model. 
The lack of significance of many variables suggests a lack of consistency in 
the choice of input/output approaches amongst research studies and a lack of 
agreement about relevant inputs and outputs. Therefore, with respect to the 
weaknesses of meta studies, which lie in the heterogeneity of the analysed studies and 
the bias towards published papers, I can conclude that in choosing the approach and 
defining the input and output variables, researchers mainly rely on concepts of their 
theoretical considerations. And the choice of a particular approach of describing the 
banking production process is not affected by the availability of a particular input or 
output variable information. 
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to fill a gap in the literature by reviewing the recent 
literature on efficiency and productivity analysis in the banking industry with focus on 
inputs and outputs definition and measurement, and by combining and examining 
research findings which employ the same database - Bankscope. 
Given the findings of above section, it is, thus, noteworthy that the specified 
theoretical differences in the choice of inputs and outputs definitions and input and 
output variables used in surveys could differ. In particular, in 
' 
the Table 3.1 one can 
find some work where researchers do not specify the approach. Also it is worth noting 
that the different specifications of inputs and outputs are used even when researchers 
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follow the same approach. Indeed, yet again these facts are proof of the difficulty of 
defining inputs and outputs in the banking industry. Thus, as a myriad of different 
variables are used to describe the banking production process, researchers would 
readily admit that the difference in choice of inputs and outputs can influence 
efficiency scores (see Berg et al, 1991). Therefore we simply cannot anticipate and 
much less systematically analyze these concepts. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DEALING WITH ENWRONMENTAL 
VARIABLES AND RISK DECOMPOSITION IN BANKING: 
UNDESIRABLE OUTPUT FRAMEWORK 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter I propose the technological and behavioural modelling of production 
with undesirable output and extend the three-stage DEA procedure suggested by 
Pastor (1999a) to decompose undesirable output in banking (risk). The models 
proposed estimate the non-radial Russell measure of output technical efficiency of 
production and incorporate undesirable outputs and negative components. I use the 
axiom of weak disposability of undesirable outputs (Fdre, Grosskopf, Lovell and 
Pasurka (1989)), and handle unrestricted data in the proposed models using the range 
directional distance function (Silva Portela, Thanassoulis and Simpson (2004)). 1 
apply these models to the discussed Eastern European banking systems using the 
Intermediation, Production and Profit input/output methodologies. 
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4.1. Introduction 
Risk is the fundamental element of the banking business. In the process of 
providing financial services, commercial banks typically expose themselves to various 
kinds of financial risks, including credit, market, interest rate and liquidity risk. The 
economic liberalisation and shift to a market driven economy in the transition 
countries led to competition intensification in their banking industry resulting in 
complexity of banking risk. Aside from the credit risk (the risk of customer or 
counterparty default) involved in lending operations, banking risks generally are 
mostly linked to exposures resulting from adverse movement in market rates or 
prices, with the further potential that a bank will be unable to meet its obligations. 
Although all banking risks are critical components of a comprehensive risk 
management, the effective management of credit risk is essential for the long-term 
success of a banking institution. This is because credit risk remains the leading source 
of problems in banks world-wide 17 . 
Judgments about the ex-post risk awareness of a bank are typically based on 
bank financial statements and reports that contain accounting and other data, and loan 
losses or non-performing loans which are used as one measure of the risk profile and 
portfolio quality of a bank (FRBSF Economic Letter, 1999). Recently, banking 
efficiency studies have explicitly accounted for banking risk by incorporating this 
information via variables capturing the quality of the bank's assets and the probability 
of the bank's failure (Table 4.1). For example, in parametric studies, risk was 
incorporated as arguments in the cost function or as the dependant variable of an 
equation in a system of equations implicitly assuming that the risk was of an 
exogenous nature. Generally, the volume of non-performing loans or their ratio to the 
total loans was used as a proxy for the (credit) risk. As it was argued in the literature 
(Berger and DeYoung, 1997), the inclusion of non-performing loans into the analysis 
as problem loans or risk has the advantage of being contingent on less managerial 
discretion than the use of the loan loss provisions. Therefore, to estimate management 
efficiency, in the parametric studies of Altunbas et al. (2000) and Pastor and Serrano 
(2005), the loan loss provisions were utilised. 
17 More details on credit risk and its management can be found in the papers issued by the Basel 
Committee, such as 'Credit risk modelling: Current Practices and Application' (Apr 1999), 'Principles 
for the Management of Credit Risk' (Sept 2000) and 'Sound Credit Risk Assessment and Valuation for 
Loans' (Jun 2006). 
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Moreover, in the latter study the environmental variables were included into the 
analysis with the purpose of decomposing risk into exogenous and endogenous 
elements. 
In all the non-parametric studies presented in Table 4.1, the banking risk was 
defined by the loan loss provisions or total provisions and was incorporated into the 
banking production model as an input. This implied on endogenous origin for the 
risk 18 . Furthermore, the surveys of Pastor (1999a and 2002) suggest a 
decomposition 
of risk into internal and external components depending on the origin of the risk. And 
the internal risk (controllable by the bank) is also included in the model as an input. 
Additionally, the models in these studies estimate efficiency measures of the bank 
taking into account the environmental condition banks operating in. This was done by 
the use of cyclical and banking sector specific sector variables integrated into the 
models as non-discretionary inputs. An alternative, statistical, way of quantifying the 
effect of environmental and market factors on efficiency taking into account banking 
risk is via the Slack-Based Model of Tone (2001). This is presented in the study of 
Drake, Hall and Simper (2006). 
Although most of the efficiency studies on banking risk assume banking 
production processes where all the outputs are desirable and the risk is either an input 
or an exogenous variable in the model, I consider an undesirable output framework 
for the same. As the goal of bank management is to better match the economic capital 
with the bank's risk profile and to effectively assess the quality of loans and other 
banking services and products, inefficient risk management can affect the financial 
stability of the bank and even lead to the bank's failure. However, the risk and 
expected profit of the banks are positively related, i. e. higher the risk, higher the 
anticipated profit. At the same time I need to bear in mind that the higher risk assumes 
higher probability of failure and therefore the likelihood of getting the higher profits 
from risky assets is lower than in less risky assets. 
Therefore, from the bank's perspective, loans are not always 'high quality' 
output in view of the fact that the quality of the loan depends on its riskiness and the 
18 The exception is the study of Drake and Hall (2003) in which the risk was considered as an 
exogenous factor affecting the banking production and included into the non-parametric linear 
programming model as an uncontrollable or non-discretionary input. 
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probability of its repayment. Although according to the survey of Speagle and Kohn 
(1958) on employment and banking output (one of the earliest discussions on banking 
inputs and outputs), "from a social-economic standpoint, loans may be considered 
'high quality' output" (p. 34). Furthermore, loans as an output of banking production 
contain a risk, the level of which bank managers are interested in minimising to the 
optimum level, at which point the risk taking by the bank and its exposure is the 
lowest given the optimal expected profits. Thus, in order not to "miscalculate a bank's 
level of inefficiency; e. g., banks scrimping on credit evaluations or producing 
excessively risky loans might be labeled as efficient when compared to banks 
spending resources to ensure their loans are of higher quality" (Mester, 1996, p. 1026), 
1 included risk into the analysis. However, "if we want to consider risk as an 
undesirable quality we must reward (increasing their efficiency) those banks that are 
good risk managers" (Pastor, 1999a, p. 376, first emphasis is mine). To do so I treated 
the banking risk as an undesirable output of banking production19. In addition, in the 
modelling I take into account that the minimisation of the risk requires costs (for 
example, risk assessment systems (credit scoring, credit history etc), monitoring of 
loans), and therefore the risk is incorporated not as a strongly disposable component 
(as it was modelled in all the non-parametric studies discussed earlier) but as a weakly 
disposable undesirable output. Analogously to all non-parametric studies, I take Loan 
Loss Provisions (LLP) as a proxy for risk. I further assume that the Eastern European 
banks are not engaged in income smoothing behaviour using the provisions for loan 
20 losses accounts 
However, to construct a model incorporating an undesirable output, it is important 
to identify the origins of the 'good' and 'bad' outputs in the production framework. 
In this study, I distinguish between two types of production processes with desirable 
and undesirable outputs: those that are based on technological relationships between 
the 'good' and 'bad' outputs, and those, which assume a behavioral origin of 
desirable and undesirable outputs. 
19 Additionally, according to Berger and DeYoung (1997), the bad management hypothesis they test t' t5 
suggested that the major risks facing financial institutions are caused internally. Consequently, I 
include the risk into the model directly as part of the production process (as undesirable output). 
20 An existence of negative values of LLP in some analysed banks (given the fact that the positive LLP 
are tax-deductible) may suggest that Eastern European banks are not smoothing their incomes through 
LLP. 
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In the context of behavioral modeling I focus on the banking production process 
and extend the three-stage sequential DEA procedure suggested by Pastor (1999a) to 
decompose the undesirable outputs in banking risk into endogenous (poor 
management) and exogenous (macroeconomic) factors. Moreover, this procedure 
also takes into account external factors affecting efficiency, which makes it 
specifically useful for cross-country (cross-region) analysis where it is deemed that 
these variables are important in accounting for the potential differences in country- 
specific banking technology and environmental and/or regulatory conditions. 21,22,23 In 
addition, I also posit that as corruption is an obstacle which can impair banking and 
business performance, this should also be taken into account. Indeed, according to the 
Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International), in many parts of the CEE 
region corruption is endemic. 24 Therefore, another contribution of this thesis to the 
literature is that along with the other environmental variables, I include a corruption 
perception index in the analysis. 
In relation to the non-parametric model that I introduce, I also impose the axiom 
of weak disposability of undesirable outputs ýp a piecewise linear representation of the 
production technology, as suggested by Fdre, Grosskopf, Lovell and Pasurka (1989). 
in addition, the relevant concepts of efficiency incorporate a range directional 
21 Short survey of studies incorporated environmental, economic and regulatory factors in bank 
efficiency analysis can be found in Drake, Hall and Simper, 2006. 
22 The environmental variables used in single country's banking system too. For instance, analysis in 
the analysis of Hong Kong banks Drake, Hall and Simper (2006) included the following 
macroeconomic variable: private consumption, government expenditure, GDP fixed capital formation, 
net export of goods, net export of services, discount window base rate, unemployment, retail sales 
values, expenditure on housing, and current account balance; and the following regulatory variable: 
dummy variable for the Hong Kong property crash/Asian financial crisis, dummy variable for handover 
to the PR of China, dummies for 1999 and 2001. Pastor (1999a) in the analysis of Spanish banking 
system initially considered the following business cycle and structural economic variables affecting the 
., e rate risk and efficiency: rate of growth of 
GNP, average rate of growth of GNP in last 5 years, averag 
of growth of private investment rate in last 5 years, average rate of growth of public investment rate in 
last 5 years, unemployment rate, lagged unemployment rate, unemployment rate of growth, average 
unemployment rate of growth in last 5 years, variance of unemployment within year, variance of the 
unemployment in the prior period, private investment per person, private investment er km2, public 
M2 investment per person, public investment per k, GNP per person, GNP per kin, branches per 
person, branches per kM2 , diversification index of bank branches, sector diversification 
index by 
sectors. 
23 To incorporate country-specific environmental conditions into the analysis of French and Spanish 
banking industries, Dietsch and Lozano Vivas (2000) used the following environmental variables: 
population density, per capita income, density of demand, Herfindhal index of concentration, average 
capital ratio, intermediation ratio, number of branches per km2. Pastor (2002) find that risk in his 
Spanish, Italian, French and German banking systems analysis is influenced by inter-annual coefficient 
of the variation of nominal GDP, growth rate of GDP, cumulative growth of GDP, and the efficiency is 
influenced by per capita wage, density deposits, national income per branch, capital adequacy ratio. 1 24 More info about the corruption can be found in the World Bank web-site, 
http: //psdblog-worldbank. org/psdblog/eastem-europeý_and_central-asia. 
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distance function approach following Silva Portela, Thanassoulis and Simpson (2004) 
to handle unrestricted data, i. e., both negative and non-negative values. The models 
proposed, therefore, estimate the non-radial Russell measure of output technical 
efficiency in banking production incorporating undesirable outputs and negative 
components. Finally, I also consider three different frameworks to the banking 
production process, viz. the Intermediation, Production and Profit/Revenue 
input/output specification approaches. This is primarily to analyse the sensitivity of 
the results. Moreover, to my knowledge, this is the first attempt to apply this type of 
three-stage undesirable output framework to the study of CEE banking systems. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2,1 briefly review studies on 
banking efficiency analysis in the CEE countries and the theoretical and empirical 
literature on undesirable output modelling. I further suggest a new classification. In 
section 4.3 1 describe the data and methodology proposed in the thesis. Section 4.4 
presents the empirical results and, finally, I provide concluding remarks in Section 
4.5. 
4.2. CCE Bank Efficiency and technological and behavioral 
modeling approaches incorporating undesirable outputs. 
In relationship to the literature that discusses the standard analyses of financial 
intermediary efficiency measurement, there is a dearth of studies that consider cross- 
country comparisons within Eastern Europe. For example, Croatian banks were 
examined by Kraft and Tirtiroglu (1998) and Jemric and Vujcic (2002); Hungarian 
banks by Hasan and Marton (2003); Polish banks by Opiela (2000); and Taci and 
Zampieri (1998) investigated the cost efficiency of Czech banks. However, 
interestingly, these studies have found conflicting . results with respect to policy 
conclusions. That is, with respect to the performance of private- and state-owned 
banks, Kraft and Tirtiroglu (1998) find that Croatia's newly established private banks 
are less efficient than old private and state banks, whereas (Taci and Zampieri, 1998) 
investigations find that the cost efficiency of Czech banks shows that private banks 
appear more efficient. 
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Although not all of these studies explicitly distinguish between foreign owned 
and domestic owned banks, several have given some evidence of foreign - owned 
banks performance. For example, Jemric and Vujcic (2002) find that foreign - owned 
banks in Croatia are significantly more efficient than domestically owned banks. The 
same conclusion is made for Poland by Opiela (2000)25 and for Hungary by Hasan 
and Marton. However, Weil (2003) who examines Polish and Czech banks finds that 
the greater efficiency of foreign banks could be attributed to advantages in corporate 
governance and better skills, rather than to the scale and mix of their operations. 
Further, the remaining studies that have dealt with cross - country 
comparisons of Eastern European transition countries; Fries, Neven and Seabright 
(2002) examine the performance and profitability of 515 banks in 16 transition 
countries over 1994 - 99; and find that a bank's performance depends on the 'reform 
environment'. Grigorian and Manole (2006) estimate bank efficiency in 17 countries 
and conclude that there is strong evidence of higher efficiency being associated with 
foreign controlling ownership, and weaker evidence of efficiency improving as a 
result of prudential rules improving. The authors also find that privatization does not 
lead to a statistically significant improvement in efficiency. Finally, Yildirim and 
Philippatos (2002) estimate bank cost and profit efficiency across 12 transition 
countries (1993 - 2000) and find that profit efficiency levels are lower than cost 
efficiency, and this relation is stronger for foreign banks than for other banks in the 
considered countries. They also find evidence of higher efficiency levels associated 
with large banks, which is at variance with studies such that of Bonin, Hasan and 
Wachtel (2003). 
The measurement of firms' performance accounting for undesirable outputs, 
has recently received increasing attention and several modeling approaches for 
incorporating bad outputs have been proposed. For example, Scheel (1998) compares 
non - parametric DEA approaches for the joint production of good and bad outputs 
and classifies them as direct and indirect approaches. According to this classification, 
indirect approaches treat desirable and undesirable outputs differently by using a 
monotone decreasing function f. In other words, undesirable output data is 
" Opiela (2000) employs SFA and observes that there is a larger number of 100 percent efficient banks 
:, n - owned than among Polish-owned banks, however this result is more suggestive than amona, foreig 4D 
conclusive. 
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transformed by the monotonically decreasing function f, so that the transformed bad 
output data can be included in the technological set as desired output. Hence, three 
types of transformation procedures can then be distinguished: the 'additive inverse' 
where the undesirable output U is included into the program as desirable output and 
takes values f (U) =_U 26; 'translated' - where the monotonically decreasing 
functionf takes the form of f' (U) = -u, ' +A and, 8i is a sufficiently large scalar; and 
6multiplicative inverse' where the undesirable output U, before its incorporation into 
the program, is transformed to a 6normal' - desirable output using the function 
f" (U)= I/UI. 
Altematively, a researcher can use the direct approach, where the structure of a 
technology set is changed in such a way that the original data on an undesirable output 
is incorporated into the program but with modified assumptions; that is, imposing the 
weak disposability assumption on bad output. As Scheel (1998) argues, the direct 
approach is used in cases where it is impossible to reduce bad output without 
simultaneous reduction of the good output. Hence, prior to the choice of the modeling 
approach, in order to allow for proper and objective quantification and measurement 
of the performance of firms with respect to the 'bad' byproducts of the production 
process, the nature of the undesirable output and its relationship to the desirable 
utput(s) have to be defined. I classify two different types of undesirable output origin: 
technological and behavioural, see Figure 4.1. 
Undesirable output <> Desirable output 
Technological origin Behavioural origin 
I` aspect 2 nd aspect 
Dominating technical o 'Sub-components' of 
Endogenous Exogenous 
facilities technology, research 
factors factors 
Figure 4.1. Technological and behavioural. type of relationships between desirable 
and undesirable 
26 This is equivalent to the treating the undesirable output as an input. 
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The technological nature of an undesirable output can be characterised by two 
aspects. That is, the technical facilities necessary for the output production, provided 
that these facilities are dominant elements in the determining the production process. 
For example, in electricity production, these facilities differ by the type of energy 
source fuel: nuclear, coal, gas and oil, water etc. It is clear, that the undesirable output 
and its relation to the good outcomes of production process in different types of 
electricity generating plants are different. The second aspect is related to the 
technology used in the particular type of firm, as well as to the directions of the on- 
site research and product development activities within the firm and/or industry. 
Again, in the example of the electricity production companies, the companies which 
utilise natural gas and oil, differ by the electricity generating technology (combined or 
simple cycle) and operating mode (baseload or peaking). Evidently, even in the same 
type of electricity production but with different sub-components of technological 
process, the level of bad output (e. g., C02) emission can vary. 
A second type of undesirable output can be deemed as behavioural. While the 
technological origin of bad by-products maintains the idea that the relationship 
between desirable and undesirable outputs of the production process is subject to 
physical endogenous factors, the second type of undesirable output attributes 
behavioural peculiarities which can be either exogenous or endogenous to the firm. In 
fact, endogenous behavioural factors may be the same among the different industries 
(e. g. bad management), but the exogenous factors could also vary from industry to 
industry. In the context of the banking industry, the nature of an undesirable output of 
production process is related to several factors which are illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
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Different types of 
contracts Bad management 
Moral hazard 
Endogenous 
factors 
Inappropriate Difficult 
terms 
II 
monitoring 
(under the bank's control) 
Principal - ag, ent Asymmetric 
problent 
I 
<-> 
I 
information 
UNDESIRABLE 
OUTPUT 
(Risk and Problem 
loans) 
Moral hazard Exogenous 
factors 
(beyond the bank's 
control) 
lnfýrior borrowers ('lemons') 
L J- 
------------------------------- 
Macroeconomic 
situation 
Figure 4.2. Behavioural nature of undesirable output in banking industry 
The undesirable output of the production process is particular to the banking 
industry. In Figure 4.2,1 distinguish between two special characteristics of the market 
where banks operate: asymmetric information and the existence of principal - agent 
problems. In relation to banking firms, these two factors could be either endogenous 
or exogenous. For example, asymmetric information can occur when one side of a 
banking contract (bank or bank's customer) has information that the other does not. 
From a bank's perspective, this could mean that the bank has greater knowledge, 
typically of the service itself, than it's customer. But it could also imply that the 
customers possess superior knowledge in relation to the terms of the contract, for 
instance various priorities in relation to their business needs. The principal - agent 
issue arises because of the differences between principal's and his/her agent interests 
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(for a survey, see Altunbas et. al. (2000), Llewellyn (1995,1998,1999), and Peristiani 
and Wizman (1997)). 
The endogenous factors are controllable by the bank and are mainly related to 
management behavior 27 . The factors which may cause bad management (X- 
efficiencies) are adverse selection (when bank management cannot detennine some 
characteristics of the borrower that are relevant to the determination of the loan 
contract price), and moral hazard of management (managers act in their own 
interests). These could arise because of different types of contracts as a result of 
difficulties in their monitoring and 'appropriate' terms specification. However, the 
exogenous factors of undesirable output originating in the banking production process 
are beyond the bank's control and related to macroeconomic variables and to 
customers (in this case to borrowers). These factors include the moral hazard of 
borrowers (a situation in which borrowers, who do not bear the full cost of their 
actions and have an incentive to behave in ways which are not beneficial to the bank) 
and inferior borrowers - the so called 'lemons'. 
Hence in this study, I utilize a non-parametric specification which incorporates 
undesirable outputs, implements weak disposability of the undesirable outputs and 
strong disposability of inputs and desirable outputs (see also, Fdre et al (1989) and 
Fare and Grosskopf (2004)). Moreover, the models defined in this study have three 
features; they estimate the non-radial Russell measure (Hua et al, 2007); they 
calculate efficiency in the presence of negative data using a directional distance 
function approach proposed by Silva Portela et al (2004); and they incorporate non- 
discretionary inputs (macroeconomic and banking sector environmental variables). 
That is, suppose I have n number of banks ([-- 1, ..., n). The model assumes that 
production process is captured by the following expression, 
27 An approach which considers bank's management behavior through the intertemporal relationships 
between cost efficiency, asset quality, capitalization and risk, is suggested by Berger and DeYoung 
(1997). They look at specific types of management behavior which are bad management, bad luck, 
skimping and moral hazard behavior. They utilize Granger causality methods and find that in case of 
US banking sector the increase in problem loans leads to reduction in cost efficiency - bad luck. The 
fall of cost efficiency which is followed by the increasing of problem loans at industry level, lead 
eff icient banks to be engaged in skimping behavior (bad management). 
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P: R, ' -> P(x) c R', where 
and XER: ' denotes input vectors, y= (yl, LLP) E R' denotes the output vectors, 
subvector y9 defines good outputs, subvector LLP denotes the undesirable output of 
banking production 28 , and P(x) is the output set and represents the set of all output 
vectors producible by the input vector x. I assume that the bad output LLP is weakly 
disposable and that good outputs are strongly disposable. The matrix of observed 
inputs by M is nxM, and nxS is a matrix of observed outputs by S= (Y-, LLP), 
where Y9 is a submatrix of observed 'good' outputs and LLP is a submatrix of 
observed risk. Matrix M is non-negative and has strictly positive row sums and 
column sums, whereas matrices r and LLP can be negative. 
Since r and LLP can be negative, in the models I apply the following Range 
Directional vectors where (see, Silva Portela et al (2004)), 
R LLPO - min[LLP, } (4.2) 
rl'o = max 
{yg, y, 9,0 r=1, R (4.3) 
Equation (4.2) shows the range of possible improvement of unit o in increasing 
the desirable outputs y' The range of possible improvement of unit o in the 
decreasing undesirable output LLP is captured by equation by (4.3). The three stages 
of the analysis are now presented. 
4.2.1. Stage 1. 'Risk management efficiency' 
As shown in Figure 4.2, risk in banking arises due to endogenous and exogenous 
factors. Hence, I need to remove the effect of external factors from the risk, since 
banks can reduce only that part of risk which attributed to managerial inefficiency 
(see Pastor, (1999a) and (1999b)). One of the potential problems is that the 
accounting process of bank data (via the profit and loss account) allows the LLP 
(proxy for risk in the models) to be negative. For that reason, the following method, 
based on range directional DEA, is utilized to decompose LLP into endogenous and 
28 The same as Pastor (1999a), Hughes and Mester (1993), Mester (1996), Altunbas et a] (2000), Drake 
and Hall (2003), Drake, Hall and Simper (2005) 1 use Loan Loss Provisions (LLP) as a proxy for bank 
credit risk. But, unlike to these studies, LLP is considered as undesirable output of banking production 
process. 
63 
exogenous components. The exogenous factors are incorporated into the model as 
non-discretionary inputs 29 . 
Max y 
s. t. 
Aj LUj :5 LLPO - 70 
RLLp. 
n 
EA 
./L>L0 
J=j 
n EAJZ+ :! ýZ+O, pp (4.4) pi p 
. /. I n 
EAjz-az-, q ql qO Q 
J=j 
n 
ZAJ 
= I, A! ýý 0, vj 
J. 1 
where Aj is a vector of non-negative weights, LLPj is the amount of loan loss 
and provisions, Lj is the amount of loans, 
Z, =(Zl', IZ2j' ... I 
ZPJ) 
Z (Z -, Z-Z-) are the vectors of positively or negatively (respectively) the Ij 2j Qj 
external cyclical conditions of the economy, which affect banking risk. 
The value of ý, is the proportion of risk due to factors internal to bank, i. e., 
bad management. That is, if Tj =I, then the bank is risk management inefficient, 
whereas a bank with Tj =0 is found to be risk management efficient. Therefore, the 
larger T, denotes that the larger is the proportion of loan loss reserves assigned to 
inefficient risk management. 
4.2.2. Stage 2. 'Efficiency adjusted for risk' 
in this stage of the analysis I propose a new measure of output efficiency 
incorporating desirable and undesirable outputs (both possibly negative) which are 
derived from the range directional good output and bad output distance functions (4.2) 
and (4.3). The measure of output efficiency extends the work of Fdre et al (1989) and 
29 Non-discretionary input can be defined as an input which is exogenously fixed and beyond the 
discretionary control of DMUs (Banker and Morey, 1986). Non-discretionary inputs comprise those 
factors that are sign of different economical (macro-, or on industry level) and political (governance) 
aspects which may affect risk attitude and performance of banks. 
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Fare and GrosskoPf (2004). These studies impose a weak disposability assumption on 
undesirable outputs. In addition, the former study uses a hyperbolic efficiency 
measure whereas later uses directional output distance function with an appropriately 
chosen direction of undesirable output to construct a model which accounts for the 
reduction of undesirable output. Yet, these interesting methods are rather restrictive, 
because they measure radial efficiency which requires a proportional change of both 
desirable and undesirable output. That is, the production process may not allow for 
equiproportional increases in good and decreases in bad output. In addition, the radial 
expansion/contraction may leave slack in certain outputs; hence, I develop a non- 
radial linear programming model which measures Russell efficiency and accounts for 
undesirable outputs with possible negative desirable and undesirable outputs. 
The proposed output-oriented model for banking is as follows: 
iRI 
Max 0= -Ear + _, 8 
S r=l s 
S. t. 
lAix y 
: ý- X, O 
J=j 
n 
Ajyg > Y9 + ctRg rj rO rO 
(4.5) 
Aj LLP = LLPO -, 80 R LLIý 
J=j 
n 
Aj = 1, Aj ý: 0 
J=j 
where s=R+1, because in the modelling of banking production, I assume that the 
only undesirable output is risk (LLP as a proxy). However, as in Figure 4.2, and as it 
is mentioned in Pastor ((1999a) and (1999b)), banks can minimise only that part of 
risk which is due to the internal factors. For this reason, the following model accounts 
for that part of the risk that arises due to the bad management of the bank (, vLLP): 
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Max p= + 
Ss 
s. t. 
n 
'ýj xy :5 x1o 
9 >yg Z"jYrj 
- rO +arR' rO 
n 
Ay ILP = yoLLPO - 
PORY,, 
LLp,, 
J=j 
M 
Aj >0 
(4.6) 
where R,, LLp. = yOLLPO - min(yj LLý, 1. This allows the measurement of a bank's j 
risk performance since model (4.6) estimates the efficiency level of banks by taking 
into account the risk which is due exclusively to poor risk management. 
The comparison of the efficiency measure which accounts for total risk (1-0, ) 
obtained by estimath"ig model (4.5) with efficiency measure adjusted for risk sourced 
to internal factors (1-pj) obtained by estimating model (4.6), will present an insight 
into which factors affect bank performance. Since external cyclical factors are 
beyond the bank's control, the bank should also take them into account in order to 
minimise their impact. Therefore, the ratio of these two efficiency measures shows 
whether the bank successfully copes with external factors and how the internal 
management efficiency affects overall riskiness. Along with Pastor (1999b), I call 
this ratio the 'Risk Management Effect' (RME). 
RMEJ = -1 
--0-'- 
I-pj 
(4.7) 
If a bank has RME=I, this implies that the bank is risk management efficient, 
if RME< then bank is risk management inefficient and endogenous factors affect the 
performance of the bank. Finally, if RE>I, then the bank is risk management 
inefficient and exogenous factors affect the performance of bank. 
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4.2.3. Stage 3. Efficiency adjusted for risk and 
environment 
Model (4.6) considers internal factors affecting the bank's risk management and 
adjusts for the factors of exogenous cyclical dynamics of the economy. However, the 
internal management of the bank can be affected by the economic factors of the 
banking system, since the efficiency of the banking system can itself affect the 
efficiency of one particular bank in the system. For that reason, I adjust for the risk of 
the exogenous macroeconomic factors calculated by Model (4.6), by adding the 
banking system specific variables. The new Model is as follows. 30 
Max O= 
i 
a, + 
s r-I s 
s. t. 
n 
1 Ai xy :5 x10 
j=I 
n 
lAjyg >yg +a,. Rý' rj - rO rO 
J=j 
Aj yj LLPJ = yo LLPO -, 80 
RY. 
LLp. 
J. 1 
n 
Pi PO J=j 
QqOl Q 11j Qqj 
Aj ý: o 
(4.8) 
where Q, ' = (Ql'j, 
Q2' Qp'j ) and Q; = (Qýp Qý Qý ) are the vectors of banking jii 2i 
system specific variables with a positive or negative influence. The optimal solution 
fl, is adjusted by risk and by the envirom-nental factors of the banking system. I 
The comparison of (1-p. ) and (1-f2j) gives an insight into the impact of the 
environmental factors of the banking system on the efficiency of the bank. This ratio 
represents an 'Enviromnent Effect' (EE). 
30 A general non-parametric model which accounts for undesirable outputs with possible negative 
desirable and undesirable outputs and estimates non-radial Russell efficiency measure with or without 
non-discretionary inputs with negative and positive impact on efficiency, are available from authors 
upon request. 
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1-p, 
EE3= (4.9) 
The enviromnental variables are non-discretionary inputs (or outputs depending 
on the effect of this factor on the efficiency). Therefore, when EEj=1, it implies that 
a bank operates in more favourable envirom-nent; and when EEj<1 then it implies that 
a bank operates in more difficult environment. Based on these ratios, I can 
decompose (I - Oj), obtained by estimating model (4.5), into the following components. 
(I - 0. /) = (I - nj) 
(1-p! ) (1-01) 
= (I - Q., )EE, RME, (4.10) (I - nj) G- PJ) 
The decomposition (4.10) allows an investigation into the efficiency measure 0, 
and highlights the origins of banking efficiency. Accordingly, changes of banking 
efficiency (1-0j) are related to changes of efficiency adjusted by risk and environment 
-Qj), changes of Environmental Effect (EEj), and changes of the Risk Management 
Eff&ct (RMEj). 
4.3 Data and methodology 
4 
As data on each bank is not available for every year, in the sample of a balanced 
panel, I include 159 commercial banks which operated in Croatia (CT), the Czech 
Republic (CZ), Estonia (ES), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Moldova 
(ML), Poland (PL), Romania (RM), Russia (RF), Slovakia (SL), Slovenia (SN) and 
Ukraine (UN) during 1998 - 2003. The beginning of. the sample period was chosen in 
order to consider the post-banking crises effect on the efficiency of commercial banks 
of the region. The distribution of banks across countries and their percentage share of 
total assets as a proportion of the whole banking system respectively is presented in 
Table 4.2 31 . It 
is noted that the sample does not represent the entire population of 
banks of some countries but the relatively successful top tier of banks of country's 
banking system (e. g., Romania, Russia, Ukraine). 
31 List of the analyzed banks can be found in Appendix C. 
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Table 4.2. Distribution of banks across the countries (1998 - 2003) and assets of 
sample banks as percentage of total banking system assets in 2002. 
Country CT cz ES HU LV LT ML 
Number of banks 18 9 4 6 18 8 5 
Total Assets (% of 90.4 68.9 91.1* 55.8 93.3 91.0 60.9 
total banking system 
assets) 
Share of analysed 7.8 20.7 2.6 10.1 2.4 1.7 0.1 
banks' total'assets in 
overall sample's total 
assets (%) 
Country PL RM RF SL SN UN Total 
Number of banks 20 8 33 11 10 9 159 
Total Assets (% of 60.2 44.8 21.1 69.6 98.2 30.0 - 
total banking system 
assets) 
Share of analysed 27.8 2.3 9.8 6.2 7.3 1.2 100 
banks' total assets in 
overall sample's total 
assets (%) 
Note: * Percentage of total assets in total banking system assets of analysed Estonian banks is as in 
2003. 
Source: RZB Research Group (2004), Bankscope, own calculation 
As discussed in previous chapter, despite substantial research efforts, it is 
generally recognised that one of the main difficulties in the analysis of economic 
performance and production structure in the banking industry is lack of agreement in 
the defining and measuring of banks' inputs and outputs. Literature suggests a range 
of different methodologies which were described in previous chapter. Indeed, the 
choice of input/output approach has to reflect the objective of the bank. Hence, I may 
consider the banking production processes from different angles and classify 
Bergendhal's (1998) bank management targets into three broadly defined ones; profit 
maximization, intermediation and service/utility production (Figure 4.3). Thus, profit 
maximization combines features of Bergendhal's profit maximization (Profit/Revenue 
approach); service/utility production brings together elements of service provision and 
utility provision (Production approach); and finally - intermediation (Intermediation 
approach). Because of banking business specificity, risk management is vitally 
important; consequently, I include this fundamental goal of bank management into all 
the aspects of banking production. 
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Flairc 4.1. Fundamental ooals ofbank mana,, ement and Input Output inctliodolo(-, ics Ir 2! ý 17 1 
Therct'orc. to model the banking production process considerill, 2 Undesirable by- 
products. I SPCCII'ý Intermediation. Production and Profit, 'Revenuc-based approaches 
(in line ýN ith Drake. I lall and Simper (2005)) \\ hich take MtO aCCOL111t the LjUalltý and 
risk- of banks' assets b\ incorporatin- in the output side oood and bad Outputs. In 
modeling the Intermediation approach I use 'deposits* (deposits and short term 
l'unding). Iabour' (personnel expenses) and *capital' (total fixed assets) Lis iIIpUtS. and 
-loans' (total customer loans). *other earning assets' (total other earning assets), 'net 
commission. net I'ce and nct trading income' and *other income' (total operating 
income - net interest revenue - net commission. net fee. net tradim, income) as 
desirable OLltplltS. III tile Case Ofthe Production approach. I have five desirable OUtpUtS 
and two Inputs. The desirable outputs are: *loans' (total customer loans). 'other 
carning assets' (total other earning assets). *net commission. net tee and net trading 
income'. 'deposits' (deposits and short term funclin, _, ). "other income' (total operating 
income - net interest rc\cnue - net Commission. net tee. net trading income). The mo I 
inputs are 'labour' (cmployce expenses) and 'otlicr operating expenscs . (Other 
- Fhese input Output modelling approaches have been used bv Drake. Hall and Simper (2005) in 
examKing Japanese bankino s)stem ushg SBA I slightQ changed the inputmutput variables 
specificathn hi order to account Or the -bad' Output. 
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operating expenses + other administrative expenses). Three desirable outputs are 
utilised in the Profit/Revenue approach: 'net interest income', 'other income' (total 
operating income - net interest revenue - net commission, net fee, net trading income) 
and 'net commission, net fee and net trading income'. The inputs are 'labour' 
(employee expenses) and 'other operating expenses' (other operating expenses + other 
administrative expenses). I employ 'Loan Loss Provisions' as a proxy measure of 
bank's asset quality and risk which is a 'bad' output in all three approaches. The 
summary statistics for overall sample is provided in Table 4.3 33 . 
Table 4.3. Summary statistics for Eastern European banks' Inputs and Outputs 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum- 
Inputs 
Deposits and short term funding (1) 2842609 5214396 2634 34400000 
Personnel expenses (I), (PR), (P) 61852 111297. 439 963459 
Total Fixed assets (1) 132069 276848 341 3792885 
Other operating expenses (PR), (P) 72325 129308 0 1443558 
Outputs 
Desirable outputs 
Total customer loans (I), (P) 1667050 2775524 412 18800000' 
Total other earning assets (1), (P) 1470471 3168465 1030 25400000 
Net Interest Revenue (PR) 127984 268104.4 -141163 4015469 
Other Income (1), (P), (PR) 16576 67628 -280331 980210 
Net commission, net fee and net trading 76784 162079 -1419131 1183182 
income (I), (PR), (P) 
Deposits and short term funding (P) 2842609 5214396 2634 34400000 
Undesirable outputs 
Loan Loss Provisions (I), (PR), (P) 37612 162977 -1033022 2707264 
Note. Figures are presented in PPP USD 000s for CEE countries over 1998-2003. (1) 
Intermediation Approach, (PR) Profit/Revenue Approach, (P) Production Approach 
In this research I consider the cyclical economic variables (Zj), which are GDP 
(based on PPP) per capita, GDP deflator (2004 base), GDP change (in percent), 
inflation, inflation change (in percent), and unemployment rate. Along with the 
cyclical variables, I include in the analysis a corruption perception index. This 
variable captures the impact of a factor which has the potential to severely impact the 
performance of banks and business. 
33 Summary statistics for individual countries are given in Appendix D. 
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Moreover, the following banking system specific variables are considered as 
potential non-discretionary inputs (Qj): concentration, overhead costs and net interest 
margin of the banking system, deposit money bank versus central bank assets, and 
average wage in the financial intermediation industry. Additionally, corruption was 
also considered as a possible factor influencing efficiency. Environmental variables 
description and data sources are given in Table 4.4 and more details on each 
environmental variable can be found in Appendix E. 
To test the influence of the variables, I utilise the nonparametric procedures 
suggested by Banker and Natarajan (2004). The null hypothesis was that the 
efficiency scores estimated by the model with and without particular environmental 
variables are from the same population, i. e., the environmental variable is not 
influential. The alternative hypothesis is that the efficiency scores estimated by the 
model with and without particular environmental variables are from different 
populations, which means that the environmental variable influences the efficiency 
and risk of banks in problems (4.4) and (4.8) respectively. Table 4.5 reports the D- 
values (Kolmogorov-Smimov test statistics) and probabilities of considered variables. 
Table 4.5 presents all considered cyclical variables and corruption influence the 
risk in banking. I assume that GDP per capita, GDP deflator, GDP change and 
corruption negatively affect risk; and inflation, inflation change and unemployment 
rate have positive effect on risk. The risk decomposition is same for all three 
input/output methodologies. The impact of concentration and net interest margin on 
efficiency is estimated utilising the Intermediation approach. I assume that 
concentration has negative effect on efficiency, whereas net interest margin - positive. 
Efficiency measures calculated using the Production and Profit/Revenue approach are 
positively effected by net interest margin and corruption perception in the banking 
system, and negatively - by overhead cost in the banking industry. 
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Table 4.5. Kolmogorov-Smimov test of influence of the enviromnental 
variables on the efficiency 
Intermediation annroach 
Variables characterising cyclical dynamics ofthe Environmental variables characterising banking 
econonty and Corruption - Programme (4) system - Programme (8) 
Variable KS D-Statistics Variable KS D-Statistics 
(P-value) (P-value) 
GDPCAP 0.1981 (0.000) CONCENT 0.0660 (0.031) 
GDPDEF 0.3333 (0.000) AVWAGE 0.0482 (0.217) 
GDPCH 0.4769 (0.000) MARGIN 0.07334 (0.012) 
INFL 0.2725 (0.000) DEPOS 0.0419 (0.371) 
INFLCH 0.2914 (0.000) OVCOST 0.0535 (0.131) 
UNEMPL 0.3176 (0.000) CORR 0.0545 (0.117) 
CORR 0.3512 (0.000) 
Production approach 
Variables characterising cyclical dynamics of the Environmental variables characterising banking 
economy and Corruption - Programme (4) system - Programme (8) 
__ Variable KS D-Statistics Variable KS D-Statistics 
(P-value) (P-value) 
GDPCAP 0.1981 (0.000) CONCENT 0.0440 (0.314) 
GDPDEF 0.3333 (0.000) AVWAGE 0.0566 (0.094) 
GDPCH 0.4769 (0.000) MARGIN 0.0681 (0.024) 
INFIL 0.2725 (0.000) DEPOS 0.0566 (0.094) 
INFLCH 0.2914 (0.000) OVCOST 0.0818 (0.003) 
UNEMPL 0.3176 (0.000) CORR 0.0734 (0.012) 
CORR 0.3512 (0.000) 
Prorit/Revenue-based approach 
Variables characterising cyclical dynamics ofthe Environmental variables characterising banking 
economy and Corruption - Programme (4) system - Programme (8) 
Variable KS D-Statistics Variable KS D-Statistics 
(P-value) (P-value) 
GDPCAP 0.1981 (0.000) CONCENT 0.0472 (0.239) 
GDPDEF 0.3333 (0.000) AVWAGE 0.0503 (0.179) 
GDPCH 0.4769 (0.000) MARGIN 0.0996 (0.000) 
INFL 0.2725 (0.000) DEPOS 0.0482 (0.217) 
INFLCH 0.2914 (0.000) OVCOST 0.0723 (0.014) 
UNEMPL 0.3176 (0.000) CORR 0.0671 (0.027) 
CORR 0.3512 (0.000) 
Note: Bold-typed variables are influencing banking efficiency/risk at 5% level of significance. 
4.4. Estimation results. 
Risk management efficiency and risk decomposition. 
The average risk management efficiency results of the break-down of LLP due 
to external and internal factors are presented in Figure 4.4. The Figure 4.4 shows the 
average LLP decomposition across all considered Eastern European banks which is 
averaged using a weighted geometric average. 
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LLP decomposition 
(Overall sample) 
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Fiaire 4.4.1,1.11 decomposition Ior the analyzed Fastern Furopean countries hankino 
S%, stelils. 
In 1998 the risk due to internal I'actors (had mailagemcnt) \\as 126.91)ý10 and it 
declined sharplN In 1999 to 3.7/o. This could be explained bý tile *disaster 111ýollia . 
phenomenon. since most ol'the considered countries had linancial crises In the middle 
of' 1990s. However the Russian crisis of' Auoust 1998 \\as at least one e\ciit In tile 
history of' the re-ion. \\ hich had major repional and sub-i-colonal implications. Fills 
possibly led banks to be more risk averse in 1999.1 lo\\ ever. as the "disaster niý opia' 
phenomenon al'U'LleS. llý tile t1ille of' the Impact due to the event becomes less. and the 
decomposition off-IT in later \cars reflects thcse chanoes. Cý 
Although the overall panel data sample presents thirteen bankin- systems Z7 tý . 
opcratino in oric -cooraphical rcgio". it is x\orth notino that Ilic risk mariaoemcrit t7 tr t, I t7 Z- 
cfficlency analysis I'o r inclMdual countries sho\\s that the differences In the risk 
manag, cment across hanking systerris arc substantial. `4 For example. the proportion of 
internal risk in Croatian. I hinoanan. Slovenian and all Baltic hankino svstems is 2- . 
relati\e1v loxN and steadv over the analysed period. Noticeabl\. the ovcrall togrepate 
risk decomposition prccloviiuiantlý mirrors Czech. Polish and Russian banks risk 
decomposition. and this is not unexpected siricc they present 59.3% of the sample. 
Althou, oh in the Czech Republic and Russia thc lowest level ot'cridogerious risk ý\as Z- 
Figures on Banking Risk decomposition by countries are presented in Appendix F. 
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observed in 1999 and the highest level in 2001 in Russia, and in 2001-2002 in the 
Czech Republic, the risk management in these two countries was substantially 
improved in 2003 and was roughly 20% inefficient. In Poland, as in the Czech 
Republic and Russia, the risk management was mostly efficient in 1999, but worsened 
in later years with the most aggressive risk management in 2003. Risk management 
in Romanian banks varied from year to year: being aggressive in 1998, and risk averse 
in 1999 and then again aggressive in 2000 and so on. In Slovakian banking system 
risk managements had the reverse pattern, being less risky in 1998, and more risky in 
1999, and so on during the analysed period. Risk management in Moldovan banks 
was about 50% inefficient in 1998-2000, and was almost 100% efficient in 2001- 
2002, while in 2003 it was 26% inefficient. Ukrainian banks were 90% risk 
management inefficient in 1998, and during 1998-2001 improved their risk efficiency 
which became 9% in 200 1, and this remained stable at this level for rest of the sample 
period. Interestingly, in 2001 or 2002 the majority of banking systems had an 
aggressive risk management strategy (this excludes Moldovan and Ukrainian). 
4.4.2. Efficiency adjusted for risk, adjusted for risk and 
environment and decomposition of banking efficiency. 
Tables 4.6,4.7 and 4.8 provide a summary of the geometric average efficiency 
measures (1-0) and adjusted efficiency measures (1-p) and (142) obtained under the 
Intermediation, Production and Profit/Revenue based approacheS35' while a 
comparative analysis of the efficiency measures across these alternative 
methodologies on the three dimensional plots for the whole sample over the analyzed 
period is provided in Figures 4.5 to 4.7. 
"I use weighted geometric mean and weights for (1-0) are total output less for LLP, for (I-P) and (I- 
. (2) are total output 
less for yLLP. Because of the specificity of DEA analysis, all provided efficiency 
estimates are based on estimated panel data sample, therefore country's efficiency level presents an 
average of efficiency scores of all country's banks analysed in the paper hence calculated relative to all 
the banks of the sample. The same logic is behind the average efficiency level of analysed sub-groups. 
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According to the efficiency results calculated using the Intermediation approach, 
the average efficiency scores vary between 89.9% in 1998 and 92.4% in 2003. 
Despite this low variation in the overall aggregated efficiency scores, it is clear that 
the most technically efficient banks are in the Czech Republic and Hungary where the 
efficiency level in these countries varies between 90 and 100%. Banks in the rest of 
the sample have roughly the same technical efficiency level ranging between 80% and 
90%. However, the average efficiency results of the Moldovan and Ukrainian banks 
are much higher than the sample aggregate. A posited reason is that Moldovan and 
most Ukrainian banks are small-sized banks, and the since the sample contains few 
number of such banks, the models in the analysis might not be able to discriminate 
between them very well as I have assumed variable returns to scale production. 
Although the aggregate levels of efficiency are different, the trends in the efficiency 
levels in all the countries of the region over time are similar. Accordingly, the 
efficiency level increased from 1998 till 2000, sharply declined in 2001, and rose 
again thereafter. 
In general, the adjustment of banking technical efficiency in the CEE countries 
for risk has increased the efficiency level reported by the Intermediation approach for 
the accessed and negotiating countries, while the incorporation of credit risk lowers 
the efficiency of the CIS countries. These results suggest that banks in the accessed 
and negotiating countries had better risk management strategies than those in the CIS 
countries. The consideration of envirom-nental variables slightly improves the results 
of Romania, Ukraine and Moldova. 
In contrast, the average efficiency scores for the sample, according to the 
Production approach, range from 91% in 1998 to 87% in 2003, with the lowest score 
of 82% recorded in 200 1. As with the Intermediation approach, the Czech, Polish and 
Hungarian banks appear to out-perform the banks in the rest of the countries. The 
adjustments for the risk and for risk and environment give similar results as to those 
of the Intermediation modeling methodology. Finally, the Profit/Revenue-based 
approach produces evidence of inefficiency levels which vary between 9 and 19 per 
cent. This contrasts with an inefficiency level of around 5 to 13 per cent according to 
the Intermediation approach and between 6 and 16 per dent according to the 
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ProdLiction approach. According, to tlic Prolil approach. the Czcch 1 lungarý 
and Poland are tlic inost lechnicalIN eilicient. li is interesting) to note. that 
the domiturn in relative efficiencý levels in 2001 and 2002. \\Illch Nvas reported hý 
proious mo methodologics as ý\ell. had the most signil-icant cl't'cct on the c1licienc\ 
le\ el olTzech banking industr\. But b\ 2003. Czech banks impro\ ed their ctlicienc\ 
(100%). *Risk" and *rlsk and environment' ad . justments of' cllicienc\ 
have the saine 
ctl'cct as in previous IIIPLlt'OLltjlut approaches. 
It is c1car fi-om Fiurcs 4.5-4.7 that the Nariation in efficieno scores across the 
Interiliccliation. Production and Protit'Revenue approaches I'Or all three (1-0). 
4-2) efficiency measures are relatively similar. I lowever. the peaks and dips ol' and (I 
the slope in the oraphs are evidence that the efficiency results calCUlated hý difterent 
input,, output modeling specifications are not stable and vary across the elllciencý 
evaluation methods. Similar to the 1-indings of Drake. I lall and Simper (-()0', ) and 
contrarv to Tortosa-Ausina (2002a). I lound that the Intermediation approach 
prodUces relativel\ higher effliciency scores than the Production illethodoloux. 
llo\Ne\'ei-. unlike Drake et al (2005). the Prolit'Rcvenue based eillicienc\ scores \\ei*c 
the lowest. 
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Tables 4.9 -- 4.11 sho\\ the decomposition ot'non-radial clliciencý (1-0) in ternis 
of equation 4.10 across tile IIII)LIVOLItput modclinýo approaches used. AlthOLI-Ull the 
cl'ticienc\ measure is adjUsted by risk and environmental faCtOI-S. I illClUdc It in the 
Tables I'Or analý tical purposes. Re,,,, ardless of the Inputloutput methodology used. the 
decomposition of tile results reveals that. generally. em tronniental efTects and risk 
management etTects are relatively stable and close to one. 
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However, according to the Intermediation approach, the CIS countries' banks 
operate in a fairly more favorable environment than the accessed and negotiating 
countries' banks. Indeed, the competition for market share in the latter banking 
systems implies that those banks operate in a tougher environment. According to the 
Production approach, accessed countries had the most favorable environment in the 
region for banking services provision. However, the Romanian banking system 
appeared to have been considerably affected by the impact of environmental factors 
during 2000-2003, and this is likely to be attributable to the effect of the failure of the 
country's largest investment fund, FNI, in May 2000. This, in turn, was exacerbated 
by the following instability of the financial system itself (see for example, IMF - 
Remes and Ghizari (2000)). The Profit/Revenue based approach reports a relatively 
stable Environmental Effect (EE). However, in the Profit/Revenue approach the EE 
factor is less than the EE reported by the Intermediation approach for the accessed 
countries and is roughly the same for the negotiating countries and the CIS. It is 
interesting to note that the financial distress in Romania, was captured by EE only 
when the Production approach was utilized. The Intermediation approach dýd not 
produce any evidence for that, whereas Profit/Revenue based. approach showed the 
decrease in the EE (i. e., the environmental effect deteriorated) only in 2002-2003. 
The Risk Management Effect (RME) reported by the Intermediation approach is 
also stable and around 1, and external and internal factors affect risk alternately. 
Although the Production approach reports relatively stable RME, most RMEp,.,, d,,,,,,, 
are greater than one (i. e., exogenous factors affect the banking risk), and the strongest 
influence of these factors on risk were on Romanian banks in 2000 and thereafter. 
RMEProfitlRevenue is also evidence of the mostly external economic factors, rather than 
internal factors, affecting risk during the analyzed period. Furthermore, the EE shows 
that in 2002-2003 Romania suffered significantly from external environment. 
interestingly, both LLP decomposition and RME calculated by the three 
methodologies suggest that in 2001 the banks in the majority of sampled countries 
(exceptions include the Czech Republic in the Intermediation case, Romania, Russia 
and Poland in the Production approach, the Czech Republic and Poland in the 
Profit/Revenue based modeling) manage risk less effectively than in other years. 
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4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the risk and efficiency of Eastern European banking 
systems using the extended three-stage sequential DEA procedure suggested by Pastor 
(1999a) to decompose the undesirable outputs in banking (risk) into endogenous (due 
to poor management) and exogenous (due to macroeconomic conditions) components. 
Five important methodological issues were addressed: undesirable output 
decomposition, negative data in undesirable output modelling, non-radial efficiency in 
weak-disposability modelling of undesirable outputs using a piecewise linear 
representation of the production technology, inclusion of corruption into efficiency 
analysis and comparison of different bank modelling methodologies. 
The results show that the adjustment of the efficiency scores by 'risk' and 'risk 
and environmental conditions' gives more insight the banking production and risk 
management. However, the analysis indicates that the adoption of different 
approaches to the specification of inputs and outputs of banking production can 
produce significantly different efficiency scores and different technical efficiency 
decompositions. However, regardless of the input/output modeling methodology 
adopted, the most technically efficient banks are in the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland. 
The risk decomposition components are relatively stable over the analyzed 
period, and suggest that banking risk is generally affected by external environmental 
factors. However, the EE (Environmental Effect) estimated by the Production 
approach reflects the possible effect of the financial distress of 2000 in Romania on 
banking efficiency scores, whereas the Intermediation approach does not give any 
evidence for that and Profit/Revenue approach, only in 2002-2003. However, both 
LLP decomposition and RME calculated by the three methodologies suggest that in 
2001, the banks in most countries managed risk worse than in other years, which is a 
possible reflection of the 'Disaster myopia' phenomenon. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: UNDESIRABLE OUTPUT IN BANKING 
PRODUCTION MODELING METHODOLOGIES: STATISTICAL 
TESTS AND RETURN ANALYSIS 
SUMMARY 
This chapter presents a statistical analysis of CEE banking efficiency measures 
estimated by three input/output methodologies, namely Intermediation, Production 
and Profit/Revenue based approaches. Along with distribution and inter-distribution 
mobility analysis of efficiency scores across alternative approaches, a statistical 
comparison is undertaken for the distributions of the estimated efficiency scores using 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Wilcoxon-Mann-Witney tests, as suggested by Banker and 
Natarajan (2004), and the distributions of the true efficiency scores utilising 
bootstrap-based Simar-Zelenyuk-adapted-Li test. Interestingly, the evidence suggests 
that although the efficiency levels differ across the input/output approaches, the 
change of the positions of the banks relative to the mean is not substantial across the 
different approaches. Additionally, I statistically test the returns of the banks and 
investigate the sensitivity of the returns parameters to the input-output approach 
adopted. Furthermore, I draw conclusions regarding the banks' returns to scale 
profiles based on the aforementioned returns parameters. Finally, a comparative 
analysis based on the distribution and inter-distribution mobility analysis suggested by 
Tortosa-Ausina (2002a) is performed. The results suggest that Eastern European 
banks analysed operate with variable returns to scale. 
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1. Introduction 
The definition of the banking production process is an important issue in 
banking efficiency studies and is based primarily on the philosophical understanding 
of what banks do and why they exist. A variety of Input/Output methodologies 
describing the banking production process has been proposed, depending upon the 
perceived bank's goal, and, in so doing measure the different aspects of bank 
activities. Researchers readily, however, admit that differences in the choice of inputs 
and outputs can influence the efficiency scores. Recently, Tortosa-Ausina (2002a) 
suggested a non-parametric density methodology to analyze the difference of 
efficiency score results estimated by different output specifications. In this chapter 
this method is applied to examine whether the alternative methodologies have an 
effect on the estimated efficiency level. Three different approaches to the input/output 
specification of bank production modeling are considered, namely, the Intermediation, 
Profit/Revenue and Production approaches. 
In order to accurately capture the difference of the distributions of efficiency 
scores hypothesis testing suggested by Banker and Natarajan (2004) is performed 
using non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests. 
However, these tests are based on the estimated distributions rather than the true 
distribution of the efficiency scores. Therefore the Simar-Zelenyuk-adapted-Li test is 
also applied to test the equality of the distributions. 
The comparison of univariate distributions of efficiency scores encodes a lot 
of information, it does not show the transition of efficiency scores levels when 
alternative approaches are used. Therefore, transition probability matrices and 
stochastic kernel density analysis of efficiency scores mobility are also used as 
suggested by Tortosa-Ausina. 
Another interesting issue in efficiency and productivity measurement is an 
analysis of firms' returns, i. e. whether the underlying technology exhibits increasing, 
constant or decreasing returns. The survey of. Banker et al (2004) gives an excellent 
discussion of the returns to scale measurement in different DEA models. Several 
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studies propose various ways of testing the hypothesis regarding returns to scale, such 
as non-parametric tests, bootstrap methods etc. 36 
However, no study examines the differences in terms of the conclusions 
regarding the banking firms' returns profiles based on the returns parameters 
estimated by alternative input/output methodologies. Therefore, this study attempts to 
identify how the choice of the production methodology affects the conclusions 
regarding the banks' returns. In the analysis tests of Banker and Natarajan(2004) and 
technique based on distribution and inter-distribution methods (Tortosa-Ausina, 
2002a, 2002b) are employed. 
5.2. Efficiency score dynamics across different 
InputlOutput approaches 
5.2.1. Density analysis of efficiency estimators of different 
InputlOutput approaches 
Tortosa-Ausina (2002a) suggested a non-parametric technique both univariate 
and stochastic based on kernel smoothing, to undertake a comparative analysis and 
mobility estimation of efficiency scores using different output definitions with 
application to the Spanish banking industry. Although this method was later modified 
37 to perform different types of analysis , in this chapter the similar visualisation 
procedures of efficiency scores comparison from the earlier paper are used. 
The objective of the process is to investigate the mobility and dependency of 
the efficiency scores on the input/output specification methodology, via kernel 
smoothing. Kernel smoothing consists primarily of estimating a density function f(x) 
evaluated at an arbitrary point x and is given by 
36 For a short survey see Simar and Wilson (2002). 
37 For example, this method was extended by adding ergodic distribution analysis of efficiency scores, 
to assess the dynamics and long run tendencies of cost efficiency (Totrosa-Ausina, 2002b). In 2003, 
Tortosa-Ausina performed an analysis of the importance of non-traditional activities in banking 
performance measurement by utilising a distribution analysis. Stochastic kernels were used to explain 
efficiency differentials in banking as an impact of specialization, ownership type and the size of banks 
(Totrosa-Ausina, 2004). 
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N X4 LJ]K 
-' Th., .I, h 
where K is a kernel function and h is a smoothing parameter, or bandwidth. 
1) 
However, standard kernel density estimators do not take into account the 
boundary condition of efficiency scores (EFF, :! ý 1), therefore, as suggested by Simar 
and Wilson (1998), the reflection method described by Silverman (1986) and Scott 
(1992) is used to avoid bias problems near the boundary in estimation of the kernel 
density of efficiency scores. Accordingly, letting each efficiency estimate EFF, be 
reflected by its symmetric image 2- EFF, ýt I, j=1, ..., N, and the kernel 
density of 
the resulting 2N points can be estimated as: 
iNx- (2 - 
PFFm))] 
6(x) 
[K 
+K (5.2) 
2Nh hh 
Eff M where N is the number of banks being analysed, , are the efficiency scores 
computed according to the input/output methodology M, K is a kernel function 
38 
,h is 
the bandwidth. 39 
Then defining the reflected version of the density function: 
26 (x) if EFFjm :! ý 1 (5.3) 
0 otherwise 
formula (5.3) is used to estimate and visualise the density of efficiency scores 
calculated by different Input/Output methodology. 
5.2.2. Statistical tests of the differences between efficiency 
scores obtained under the alternative methodologies 
Since three alternative input/output methodologies are used to construct the 
banking production process, a statistical assessment of the difference between the 
1 
1,2 
38 The Gaussian kernel: K(t) -T= e2 is used. 2 2; r ,T 
311 obtain the bandwidth using Sheather and Jones (1991) solve-the-equation plug-in-approach, which 
is known as hsji,,. Matlab code obtained from Steve Marron's web page 
(hlM: //www. stat. unc. edu/factilty/inan-on. htmi). Link provided by Tortosa-Ausina (2002b). 
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estimated efficiency scores by different the approaches is also of interest. Following 
Banker (1996) and Banker and Natarajan (2004), one can do this by evaluating the 
null hypothesis of no difference in the efficiency obtained under alternartive 
methodologies, i. e. 
Ho: F(EFF"') = F(EFF 112) . The null hypothesis suggests that the efficiency scores 
are ftom the same population, so that efficiency scores are consistent across the 
methodologies implying that any changes in the choice of the variables do not affect 
the efficiency scores. 
The altemative hypothesis is 
H, : F(EFFm') # F(EFF "') - i. e., efficiency scores are ftom different populations 
such that efficiency scores are sensitive to the choice of variables. 
where (EFF") and (EFF"') are estimated efficiency scores obtained under the 
methodology I and methodology 2 respectively, and F"'(EFFm') and FM2 
(EFFM 2. ) 
are corresponding probability distributions. 
To test these hypotheses I used parametric Kolmogorov-Smimov, Wilcoxon- 
Mann-Whitney and Simar-Zelenyuk-adapted-Li tests. 
5.2.3. Non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Wilcoxon- 
Mann-Whitney tests 
Non-parametric tests are distribution-free tests, and characterised with 
assumptions which are less restrictive, "fewer and weaker than those associated with 
parametric tests" (Siegel and Castellan, 1988, p. 34). Therefore, if researchers feel that 
the assumptions of parametric tests are violated, non-parametric tests are preferred. In 
the analysis two popular non-parametric tests: the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the 
equality of two distributions and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test which shows whether 
two independent samples are drawn from the population with the same distributions 
are applied 
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Since testing of whether efficiency scores calculated by different input/output 
methodology are from the same population is of interest, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
two-sample test is employed. This is a test of whether two independent samples are 
samples from the same but not necessarily known probability density function (the 
null hypothesis - HO) or from different probability density functions (the alternative 
hypothesis -H 1), Young, (1977). Moreover, the two-tailed test is sensitive to any kind 
of difference of two samples' distributions, such as differences in location (central 
tendency), dispersion, skewness etc (Siegel and Castellan, 1988). The Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov test is implemented in the following way. First, a maximum vertical distance 
between the observed cumulative distributions of the data (in this case, efficiency 
scores) is calculated: 
D= maxlF 
G, (ýJ)- F 
G2 
Oj I 
(5.4) 
where FG(ý. 
) 
and FGI(ý. 
) 
are cumulative distributions for group I and group 2 
respectively. Next, the derived, real scalar statistic D is compared with a critical value 
which is a function of the confidence interval and the sample size (Young, 1977; 
Siegel and Castellan, 1988). High values of D statistic indicate significant differences 
between the experimental groups (in this case, the efficiency scores between the two 
groups), hence the corresponding probability (P) value will be low (i. e. rejection of 
null hypothesis). Interesting feature of the value of the D statistic (and hence the P 
value) is that it is not affected by scale changes, for example if logs of the data are 
used. Therefore 
D= maxlF 
G, (ln(ý,, )) - 
FG, (ln(ýJ)j 
is equal to equation (5.4). 
(5.5) 
The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, which is also called the Wilcoxon Rank 
Sum test, investigates whether two independent groups are drawn from the same 
population by examining location-shift, i. e. the equality of medians or means of the 
analyzed groups (Rejesus and Lovell, 2003). According to Easton and MCCO1140, 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is one of the most powerful of the non-parametric tests 
available for comparing two populations. 
40 Statistics Glossary. It can be found at http: //www. stats. gla. ac. uk/steps/glossary. 
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In accordance with Hollander and Wolfe (1999), let us consider observations 
of efficiency score values of commercial banks estimated by two different definitions 
(population A and B) and denote the observations by (Xlj,..., X"j; j=1,2). Let N 
present the total number of observations for each methodology, i. e. N= nj + n2- 
Combining all N observations from the two populations A and B {Xjj, ..., X,,.,; 
j=1,2) and ranking them from least to greatest: 
Rj j=1,2 (5.6) 
where ry denote the rank of Xy in the joint ranking sample. 
Since the sample of the analysed banks is large (n, = n2 = 159 ý: 10), the 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Statistics W=Rj can be approximated by a normal distribution, 
so that 
R -[n2(n, +n2+1)/2] 
[n, n2(n, +n2 +1)/12]"2 
(5.7) 
The null hypothesis is tested against the alternative hypothesis at the a-level of 
significance.. by comparing the V with the critical value z,, 12 from the standard normal 
distribution table. The null hypothesis is rejected if ITrl?: z,, 12. 
The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test can also be used to examine whether a 
distribution first-order stochastically dominates the other. To check the statistical 
significance of the stochastic dominance of efficiency scores calculated using 
different input/output methodology, the null-hypothesis tested is: 
Ho :F m'(EFF ") >F AY2 
(EFFU2) 
_ efficiency scores estimated using Methodology I 
first order stochastically dominate the efficiency scores calculated using Afethodology 
2. 
The alternative hypothesis implies that the efficiency scores estimated using 
Methodology 1 does not first order stochastically dominate efficiency scores 
calculated using Methodology 2. 
5.2.4. Simar-Zelenyuk-adapted-L! test for equality of 
efficiency distributions 
The main problem of efficiency scores analysis is that the true efficiency scores 
are not observed but estimated via certain non-parametric technique. Recently, Simar 
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and Zelenyuk (2006) proposed a reliable statistical tool for testing the equality of 
distributions of unobserved DEA-estimated efficiency scores. This approach is based 
on statistical tests suggested by Li (1996) and adapted by authors to the DEA context. 
To evaluate the null hypothesis of no difference in the efficiency scores 
estimated by different methodologies (EFF"'), the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann- 
Whitney tests is complemented by the Simar-Zelenyuk-adapted-Li test. 
To test this hypothesis, the statistic based on the integrated square difference 
criterion can be used, where unknown distribution functions are replaced by the 
corresponding empirical (possibly unknown) functions. This means, that they are 
replaced with the non-parametric kernel density estimators where 'diagonal' terms 
removed (for details, see Simar and Zelenyuk, 2006): 
ind EFFm EFF m I. k +I EFF 
Al 2, j 
_ EFFM 2, k 
?? At 1 "A12, h 
K( 
ljý 
ýK 
h n., (n. I j=l k*j, k=1 hhn, 2(n. 2 j=l k*j. k-I 
h 
EFFM 2. j _ EFFM I, k EFFUI, j I- EFF M 2, k 
h- 1) 
ýt 
K( 
hhn. 
Kh 
n. I 
(nM 
2 /=I ksj, k=l 2 
(n., 
j-1 koj, k-I 
( 
(5.8) 
where K is an appropriate kernel function and h is the smoothing parameter (also 
called bandwidth or window width). 
Letting 2, =nvfllnm2, and assuming A, --+4 as nml--+oo, where AE (0, oo) is a 
constant, the limiting distribution of equation (5.8) is standard normal (Li, 1996), i. e. 
n,, f IhI 
2jnd 
nd -. njfjnq2" ý-*N(0,1) (5.9) J'"'ý'Il, nA12, h - CA, h 
where &.,, his a consistent estimator of 
't 0.2 = 
2(f(Fml(EFF)-I'FM2(EFF)YdEFFýfK'(EFF)dEFF), and can be obtained as 
a2 = 2ý 
I K( EFF 
m', " - EFFM 
Ij 
+ 
; ý. ""' ýK EFFM 2, J -EFFAf 2, k 
2 
ZE 
2 
a h nA41 j=l k=l hh ni. 2 j=l k=l h 
All EFFM 2, j -EFFAII, k EFFA' EFFM 2, k 2 (EFF)dEFF] 
hnn 
EEK( 
hhnn 
ZýK 
h 
)I[JK 
A41 M2 J=l k-I MI M2 J=l k=l 
( 
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(5.10) 
The formulas described above use kernel density estimators of DEA efficiency 
scores, where some estimates (EFFm, ) equal to 1, providing spurious mass at the 
boundary value 1 in the discrete density to be smoothed. Therefore, the issue of 
bounded support arises. This can be circumvented either by the reflection method 
(Silverman, 1986), by ignoring or by smoothing the efficiency scores estimates (Simar 
and Zelenyuk, 2006). In this chapter latter method is utilized. Because it 'smoothes' 
away from the bound the DEA-estimates equal to one by adding a small noise within 
A the a -quantile of the empirical distribution of EFF., , ignoring those equal to unity, 
and of an order smaller than the noise of the estimation. In other words, smoothing is 
made by 
EFFL = 
EFPuj +. cmj, EFPmj =1 
EFPmj, otherwise 
where c., = Uniform(O, mint<, '("'N"), aj), and a is the a -quantile of the empirical 
distribution of EFP,, ignoring those equal to unity (where a= 
Since finite samples (a set of DEA estimates) are used here, the performance 
of the Li-test adapted to the DEA context needs to be improved by a carefully 
designed bootstrap. A modified version of bootstrapping Algorithm 2, as suggested by 
Simar and Zelenyuk (2006), is presented in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1. Algorithm of the Bootstrap for Simar-Zelenyuk-adapted-Li test for 
equality of the efficiency distributions 
1. For each bank in the sample compute 
EFFMjj 6=1,..., n) using methodology I 
(via DEA) and thus obtaining some 
sequence of estimated efficiency scores 
A 
EFF 
, wlj 
For each bank in the sample compute 
EFF, kf2j 0=1,..., n) using methodology 2 
(via DEA) and thus obtaining some 
sequence of estimated efficiency scores 
EFE, m 2. j 
2. Smooth the estimates of the original efficiency scores according to (5.11), and 
thus obtaining: 
JEFPLIJ j 1,..., n., 
I (Al) 
tEFPL2j i 11 
.... n. 21 (A2) 
3. Estimate the Li (1996) statistic (5.9) using the data (Al) and (A2), and bandwidth 
h* which is the minimum of the two bandwidths for EFF'*ml and EFF*m2. 
4. Resample from the sample (Al) or (A2) to obtain the bootstrap analogues of (Al) 
and (A2): 
tEFPýjj j n. ,I (A3) 
tEFPý2 
jjn. 21 
(M) 
5. Estimate the Li (1996) statistic (5-9) using the data (M) and (M), and bandwidth 
h* 
Repeat steps 4-5 B-times (b=l,..., B) to obtain bootstrap estimates of Li- 
statistics. 
5.2.5. The inter-distribution mobility of banks'positions 
To identify the mobility of banks' position with regard to the chosen 
Input/Output approach, transition probability matrices are constructed across the pairs 
of approaches. Since the change of the position of the bank rather than the absolute 
efficiency score when different approaches used is of interest, the efficiency scores 
are normalised relative to the mean as suggested by Tortosa-Ausina (2002a, 2002b): 
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NESJ" 
EFF 
," 
NEN EFF /=I 'I 
(5.12) 
The transition probability matrices, based on the NES of the banks, show the 
changes in the relative position of banks when moving from one group to another 
according to the different banking production models. Unlike Markov models, they do 
not show transitions over time (Tortosa-Ausina, 2003). A set of six states are 
considered, which array in increasing order of NES according to the pairs of analysed 
approaches. Each cell in the matrix presents the probability of a bank in this state to 
transit to another when alternative approach is used, and is calculated as p. = 
Njj / 
IN, 
where Ny is a number of banks crossing from state i to state j, and Nj is the total 
number of banks departing from state L 41 
As argued by Tortosa-Ausina (2002a) in constructing the transition probability 
matrix, the continuous process is discretised, and, no doubt, this discretization is 
arguable. Therefore, one can approach a shift of a bank's position from a continuous 
point of view, i. e. using stochastic kernels. The bivariate kernel density function can 
be generalised multivariate case as follows: 
1 (5.13) f (x; H) KH 
(X 
N 
where His the bandwidth matrix, and K is the kernel Munction. 
For the bivariate case, x= (xi, x2), and H= (hl, h2), where hl and h2 are the 
bandwidths for each coordinate direction, and the function to be estimated becomes: 
N x, - NESm, X2 - NESM2 EK -11 (5.14) Nhjh2 j=l h, h2 
Using the bivariate Gaussian kernel, the bandwidths are calculated according to the 
solve-the-equation plug-in approach for the bivariate Gaussian kernel, based on Wand 
and Jones (1994). 42 
41 in each case N, is equal to 159 
42 The computation for the bandwidth is performed using the Matlab code written by Taesarn Lee 
which is available from: 
http: //www. mathworks-com/matlabcentral/fileexchanl-:, e/loadCatec-, Ory. do? objectType=category&object 
Id=6. 
98 
5.3. Different banking production modeling 
methodologies and banks'returns 
Examining the existence of economies of scale is an issue of interest in many 
DEA studies. However, the model defined in the thesis requires presence of the 
convexity constraint, implying that the determination of local returns to scale 
suggested by Fdre and Grosskopf (1985) is not feasible. Instead, banks' returns are 
estimated according to Banker and Thrall (1992) and Seiford and Zhu (1999). 
Therefore, to perform the returns analysis for the discussed banks, the duals to models 
defined in Chapter 4 are considered 43: 
mR 
Min Xo u, x,,, -L wgyg + w'LLPO + uo r ro 
r=l 
s. t. 
mR 
u, x, L w, 9 ygj + m, 'LLPJ + uo ý! 0, n 
9 Wr 
sRrgo 
rR 
15) 
wb=I 
sR,, LLp. 
U19W 9 >0 
The dual to model (4.6) is written as: 
A4 R 
Min to u, x, o - 
1: w'y' + whvOLLPO + uo r rO 
r=l 
s. t. 
R 
u, x. E wl y, ', + w'y, LLPj + uo '2! 0, n 
W9 >rR r sRrgo (5.16) 
wb=1 sRYOLLpo 
U19W 9 >0 
43 The derivation of dual in the case of eq. 4.8 is given in Appendix G. 
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And the dual to model (4.8) is the following program: 
Al Rp 
Min ýo u, x, O - 2ý w-'y9 + w'yoLLPO +Z v'Q'o - -Q- +UO r rO pp 
LVq 
qO 
r=l P=j q-1 
S. t. 
A4 Rp 
u, x,, - I i4, lyl+w67., LLPJ+Ev'Q+ -Ev-Q- +uo ý: O, I, r ri -, p P/ q ql n 
1=1 r=l P=j q=l 
W9 >1rR r sRg rO 
wb=I 
sRYOLLp(. 
U,, w> 
(5.17) 
The multipliers of discretionary inputs (uj), non-discretionary inputs (v'p and vq P 
desirable outputs (w, ) and undesirable output (w b) can be interpreted as shadow 
prices of the corresponding variable. 44 
To investigate returns of a particular bank at a point on the efficient frontier 
constructed using the defined models (4.5,4.6 and 4.8), the intercept term uO is 
examined in models (5.15-5.17). In the analysis, the RTS analysis presented in Hua et 
al (2007) and Banker et al. (1984) is applied, according to which bank operates 
increasing returns (IR) if and only if uO < 0, decreasing returns (DR) if and only if 
uO > 0, and constant returns (CR) if and only if uO = 0. 
This approach is suitable for efficient banks only, i. e. banks which are on the 
frontier as calculated by models 4.5,4.6 and 4.8. Furthermore, the models 5.15-5.17 
can produce more than one optimal solution for uO. Following Hua et al. (2007) and 
Seiford and Zhu (1999) for general cases where banks are not efficient or alternative 
uO exist, modified versions of models 5.15-5.17 are used. To characterise a bank's 
returns with uo >0 in model 5.15, the following modified model can be used: 
44 In the analysis, I am assuming that the shadow prices of desirable outputs are assumed to equal to 
their market prices, therefore the obtained 'bad' output multiplier is its absolute shadow price. For 
more details, see Fare et al (1993). 
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Min uo 
S. t. 
Al R 
u, xo -Ew, y' + w'LLPO + uo = 00' rO 
r=l 
Xf R 
ul -jn x1l Ew, yrj+whLLPJ+uoý: 0, 
r=l 
,9>I l4r 
sR9 
rR 
rO 
h W 
sRYOLLp. 
U19W 9, ý 0 
ý: 0 
To investigate a bank's returns with uO >0 in model 5.16, the model is 
subsequently modified as: 
Min uo 
S. t. 
mR 
Zu, x, O-j]w, 'y'+w6yoLLPO+uo= rO A 
r=l 
mR 
U, x Wry' + w"y, LLP, + uo ý: 0, jn ri 
1=1 r=l 
W, g ýý 
IrR 
.0 sR, 
g ' 
wb=I 
sRYOLLp 
0 
U19W 9, ý 0 
ý: 0 
To characterise a bank's returns with u. >0 in model S. 17, the following 
modified model is used: 
(5.18) 
(5.19) 
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Min uo 
S. t. 
Al Rp 
'Y' +Ib V+ + 141, y LLP +1 0-2: "q Q, 10 + UO = 
00 U, X,. -2 ro oo, Q, ' r=l P=j q=l 
A4 Rp0 
Eu, 
x - 'gyg + wbrLLP, + v+Qp+, - ri 
2:, 
p 
2: 
v 
q 1, +UO 0, jn Wr 
r=l P=j q=l 
9>I Wr, -r 
sRrlo 
141b 
I 
sRYOLLp,, 
Ui 9 14yg , 
ýo >0 
(5.20) 
In the cases where models 5.15-5.17 yield uO < 0, the ýO ý: 0 in models 5.18- 
5.20 are interchanged for ý, :50, and the objective functions of models 5.18-5.20 are 
changed from minimisation to maximisation. Then, following Hua et al (2007), and 
Seiford and Zhu (1999), the following proposition can be stated: 45 
Proposition 1. Given the existence of an optimal solution with uO* >0 in model 
(5.15) [or (5.16) or (5.17)], (i) the returns of a banko are CR if and only if the optimal 
value which model (5.18) [or (5.19) or (5.20) respectively] achieves is zero, i. e., 
uO =0 and DR if and only if uO > 0. Given the existence of an optimal solution with 
uO <0 in model (5.15) [or (5.16) or (5.17)], (ii) the returns of a banko are CR if and 
only if the optimal value which the modified form of model (5.18) [or (5.19) or (5.20) 
respectively] achieves is zero, i. e., uO =0 and IR if and only if uO < 0. 
An analysis of the existence of scale economies 
To evaluate the returns to scale of the banks using uO* values, the following 
hypothesis is tested: 
HO : F(uO) = F(O) - No scale inefficiency (or equivalently, banks operate with 
constant returns to scale production) 
against the alternative hypothesis 
, 15 1 state this Proposition without formal proof, although the proof of Proposition I is similar to that of 
Proposition I in the survey of Hua et al. (2007), and Theorem 7 in the study of Seiford and Zhu (1999). 
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H, : F(uO*) # F(O)- Banks are not scale efficient (or equivalently, they operate with 
variable returns to scale production) 
where 0 is the null vector and uO is estimated using formula (5.15 and/or - 5.20). 
5.3.2. Density and inter-distribution mobility of returns 
parameter uo across different InputlOutput approaches 
As per the efficiency density and inter-distribution mobility analysis, densities 
of the returns parameter uO can be visualized across different input/output 
methodologies over the analyzed time period for three different methods of efficiency 
calculation, namely technical efficiency, technical efficiency adjusted for risk and 
technical efficiency adjusted for risk and the environment. The univariate Gaussian 
kernel is used to obtain the bandwidth using the solve-the-equation plug-in-approach 
by Sheather and Jones (199 1). 
Then, the correlation coefficients are considered to compare the returns 
parameter of the banks in the sample. However, these figures would not give any 
information about the changes of the banks' returns parameter when different 
modelling methodologies are used. Therefore, a transition probability matrix (in the 
same manner as for the relative efficiency analysis) is constructed for three groups (or 
states): IR (where the upper endpoint is -oo, i. e. negative return parameters), CR 
(where the upper endpoint is equal to zero, i. e. return parameters are zero) and DR 
(with an upper endpoint of +oo, i. e. positive return parameters). In sum, the transition 
probability matrix shows the probability of reporting different returns when 
alternative approaches are used. 
Again, as in the analysis of relative efficiency, I can consider continuous 
counterpart of these transition probability matrices and use stochastic kernels. As 
before, I utilize bivariate Gaussian kernel and calculate the bandwidths according to 
solve-the-equation plug-in approach for bivariate Gaussian kernel, based on Wand 
and Jones (1994). 
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5.4. Results 
5.4.1. An analysis of Efficiency scores density and inter- 
distribution mobility 
Figure 5.1 shows the distributions of the estimated individual efficiency scores 
for each method used to calculate technical efficiency (i. e. pure technical efficiency, 
adjusted for risk and adjusted for risk and the environment) across input/output 
modelling methodologies. As can be seen from the Figure 5.1, the estimated 
distributions appear to be different among the modelling approaches. The most 
significant discrepancy in the densities of the efficiency scores reported by the 
different input/output approaches was observed in 1998 by all three methods used to 
calculate technical efficiency. This divergence of densities is clear not only from the 
shape of the densities but also in their modes and modality, meaning that the levels of 
efficiency observed most frequently for the different approaches are at different 
levels. For instance, in the case of pure technical efficiency estimation, multi-modality 
exists in the density of the intermediation approach efficiency scores and, moderately, 
the density of the profit-revenue approach. 
Although the shape of the densities of efficiencies estimated by the different 
approaches is fairly different for the rest of the years, the estimated modes are roughly 
at the same level and multi-modality has almost vanished by 2003. Interestingly, the 
patterns of the densities are not mirrored across pure technical efficiency, yet they are 
very similar for efficiency adjusted for risk and adjusted for risk and environment. As 
is well known, different input/output approaches can sometimes give a similar pattern 
although the pattern dynamics can be different (e. g. 2003 (142) graph), or even 
reverse (e. g. 2001 (142) graph). Nevertheless, a common pattern emerges across all 
the efficiency estimation methods and the input/output approaches; over the analysed 
period the estimated density distributions become increasingly compact by end of the 
period. 
As distribution analysis suggests, the efficiency scores calculated by different 
input/output modelling specifications in some cases are not stable and can vary across 
the efficiency evaluation methods. Statistical tests for the equality of distribution 
between the efficiency scores calculated utilizing different input/output approaches 
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across the years are of particular -interest in this study. Table 5.2 presents the results 
for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests on consistency of 
efficiency scores obtained under the alternative methodologies. Equalities for most of 
the comparisons of the (1-p) efficiency results are rejected with 95% confidence. 
However, if the equality (I - 0) and (1 -0) efficiency results are considered then the null 
hypothesis (at 5% and 10% levels of significance) are rejected in fewer cases. Except 
for the year 1998 (for all efficiency measurement cases) and 2000 (for the efficiency 
measures (1-p) and (142)), the rejection/or acceptance of the null hypothesis is not 
consistent across the measurement models. 
Table 5.2. Tests on consistency of efficiency scores obtained under the alternative 
methodologies 
Efficiency measure (I-P) Efficiency measure (1-p) Efficiency measure (I-D) 
I vs. P I vs. PR P vs. PR I vs. P I vs. PR 
P vs. I vs. P I vs. PR P vs PR PR . 
KS 0.301* 0.245 0.276* 0.345* 0.786* 0.761 0.276* 0.283* 0.333* 
1998 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
wMW 2.306 -3.233* -2.390* 2.943 10.956* 10.033* 3.403* 1.507 3.423 (0021) (0.001) 
- 
(0.016) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) A0.001) (0.131) (0.001) 
KS 0.176* 0.100 0.157ý 0.176* 0.106* 0.132 0.195* 0.220* --.. 0.063 
1999 (0.014) (0.397) (0.039) (0.014) (0.000) (0.125) (0.005) (0.001) (0.912) 
wMW -2.553* 0.930 -1.805** -2.540* 1.235 -1.354 2.114* -2.486* -0.266 (0.011) (0.352) (0.071) (0-011) (0.216) (0.175) (0.034) (0.012) (0.791) 
KS 0.100 0.138** 0.125 0.201 0.333* 0.195* 0.150** 0.270* 0.138** 
2000 (0.397) (0.095) (0.162) (0.003) (0.000) (0.005) (0.053) (0.000) (0.095) 
wMW -0.470 1.782** -1.313 -3.070* 5.419* 2.350* -1.860** 3.744* 1.828** (0.638) (0.074) (0.189) (0.002i (0.000) (0.018) (0.062) (0.000) (0.067) 
KS 0.100 0.176* 0.176* 0.056 0.163* 0.188* 0.150** 0.138** 0.151** 
2001 (0.397) (0.014) (0.014) (0.961) (0.000) (0.007) (0.053) (0.095) (0.053) 
wMW 0.793 2.047* -2.664* -0.502 2.985* 2.430* 1.728** 0.260 1.515 (0427) (0.041) (0.007) (0.615) (0.003) (0.015) (0.083) (0.795) (0.129) 
KS 0.144** 0.056 0.138** 0.119 0.226* 0.132 0.106 0.094 0.132 
2002 (0.072) (0.961) (0.095) (0.206) (0.001) (0.125) (0.323) (0.479) (0.125) 
wMW -1.466 0.026 -1.608 -2.158* 3.956* 1.684** 1.132 0.365 1.316 (0.142) (0.979) 
- 
(0.107) (0.031) (0.000) (0.092) (0.257L 
--(0.714) 
(0.188) 
KS 0.100 0.075 0.100 0.188* 0-195* 0.094 0.119 0.138 0.088 
2003 (0.397) (0.756) (0.397) (0.007) (0.005) (0.479) (0.206) (0.095) (0.569) 
wMW -1.700** 0.687 -1.006 -3.078* 3.539* 0.478 1.713 -1.108 0.491 1 (0.089)_ (0.492) (0.314) 1 (0.002) (0.004) (0.632) (0.086) (0.268) (0.623) 
Notes. (1) Intermediation ADi)roach. (P R) Profit/Revenue Annrnach (PI PrMnot; nn 
Approach. (KS) Kolmogorov-Smimov test (D-value, p-value in brackets), (WMW) 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (W* value, p-value in brackets). Statistical significance: 
statistically significant at 5% level, ** statistically significant at 10% level. 
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The non-parametric KS and WMW tests are based on the estimated but not the 
true efficiency scores. Hence, the results are complemented by the equality test of 
efficiency scores using the Simar-Zelenyuk-adapted-Li test for equality of efficiency 
distributions, presented in Table 5.3. A comparison of the true efficiency results 
suggest that efficiency, the distribution of efficiency scores are drawn from different 
populations, i. e. in most cases the equality of distributions is rejected (at 5% and 10% 
levels of significance). 
Table 5.3. Simar-Zelenyuk-adapted-Li test for equality of efficiency distributions 
Null Hypothesis Efficiency measure Efficiency measure Efficiency measure 
( 1-0) ( I-P) 042) 
Test Bootstrap Test Bootstrap Test Bootstrap 
statistics p-value statistics p-value statistics p-value 
f(eff N')=f(eff 26.4544 0.000* 33.5101 0.000* 6.0966 0.000* 
1998 f(effWT)=f(effPR) 11.7704 0.000* 67.9844 0.000* 6.9777 0.000* 
f(effPR)=f(eff) 16.3593 0.000* 63.2521 0.000* 14.4112 0.000* 
f(efpN ')=f(eff) 2.5003 0.009* 2.7023 0.008* 2.3597 0.009* 
1999 f(e eT)=f(effPR) 0.7607 0.198 0.9313 0.095** 2.4663 0.012* 
f(effR)=f(eff) 2.9932 0.004* 2.7425 0.005* 0.3434 0.537 
f(effNT)=f(effp) 1.9008 0.017* 1.9236 0.026* 1.3160 0.054** 
2000 f(efffNT)=f(effR) 1.1484 0.052** 12.1761 0.000* 8.4651 0.000* 
f(effPR )=f(effp) 0.4193 0.518 4.9559 0.000* 2.7179 0.006* 
f(eff")=f(eff') 1.0839 0.083** 0.0817 0.918 0.4834 0.490 
2001 f(efeNT)=f(effPR 2.7043 0.008* 1.5669 0.042* 2.6570 0.006* 
f(effPR )=f(effp) 3.3166 0.003* 2.3260 0.012 1.4181 0.053** 
f(eff")=f(eff') 1.7330 0.031 0.6491 0.319 -0.0948 0.893 
2002 f(e ONT)=f(effPR) 0.0466 0.943 2.8917 0.006 1.3133 0.064** 
f(eftPR )=f(eff) 1.2321 0.061** 1.4258 0.051 1.3729 0.062** 
f(efVN ')=f(effp) 0.4298 0.527 1.7380 0.028 0.6819 0.264 
2003 f(effNT)=f(effPR) 0.0774 0.918 1.6637 0.028 1.2969 0.059** 
f(effPR )=f(eff) 1.1443 0.064** 0.9348 0.103 0.1565 0.828 
Notes: (INT) Inten-nediation Approach, (PR) Profit/Revenue Approach, (P) Production Approach. The 
-L 
-"' 
number of bootstrap iterations is 5000. For these tests, the Gaussian density, K(t) =-eI is 
Nr2--ir 
used, and h is the minimum of the two bandwidths for EFFM I and EFFM2, which are calculated 
i, where according to Silverman (1986) and equal to h" = 1.06An,, 
y5 
A= min(Vvar(u), iqr(u) / 1.349), and iqr(u) is the interquartile range of the random variable u, C, 
for which the density is estimated. Statistical significance: * statistically sigynificant at 5% level, 
statistically significant at 10% level. 
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The analysis of the distribution of efficiency scores do not provide any 
information about the banks' relative positions, therefore the transition probability 
matrices of normalised efficiency scores are estimated. Table 5.4 shows the transition 
probabilities from Intermediation to Production, from Intermediation to Profit and 
from Production to Profit-Revenue for the normalised pure technical efficiency (1-0); 
Table 5.5 for risk adjusted technical efficiency (1-p) and Table 5.6 - for risk and 
environment adjusted efficiency (142). The upper limits indicate the endpoints for 
each relative efficiency state. The interpretation for each cell in each matrix indicates 
the probability of the bank remaining in this state or moving to another according to 
the relative efficiency estimated by different approaches. 
Thus, according to Table 5.4, entry all for the Intermediation/Production 
transition probability matrix shows that according to relative efficiency scores (I - 0), 
the least efficient 16.7% of banks according to Intermediation approach with relative 
efficiency of less than 92.1%, remained with relative efficiency score in that range 
with probability 0.52 when Production approach was used. The remaining 0.48 
transited vastly to state 2- (0.29) and state 3- (0.12), whereas 7% moved to states of 
most efficient banks (state 4,5 and 6). Since this is a transition probability matrix, the 
sum of the probabilities in each row of the matrix sum to one. 
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Although, the probability mass is, in general, concentrated along the positively 
sloped diagonal, in some cases banks have a rather low probability of remaining in the 
same state when another approach is used (e. g. according state 2 in the 
Intermediation/Production and Intermediation/Profit-Revenue based approaches 
transition probability matrices shown in Table 5.5). Surprisingly, and in contrast to the 
results by Tortosa-Ausina (2001a), transition mainly occurs to a higher efficiency 
state and a transition to lower states occurs with fairly small amount of probability. 
Another interesting detail is that if a bank is identified in the least efficient or the most 
efficient state, it has a very high probability of remaining in the same state. These 
tendencies are similar in the case of risk adjusted technical efficiency (1-p) and risk 
and environment adjusted cfficicncy (I-Q), but in the (142) case, transition occurs at 
a more modest rate than (1-0) while the (1-p) case is the most moderate for such 
transitions. 
The continuous counterparts to transition probability matrices are stochastic 
kernels and arc displayed on the ftce dimensional graphs in Figures 5.2 - 5-4. As 
observed in the univariatc kernel graphs, most of the densities become more 
constricted. The upper endpoints of the limits in the transition probability matrices 
point the same conclusion by virtue of having taut ranges of efficiency scores in the 
state. This is also displayed by the sharp peaks in the stochastic kernels graphs. 
Conclusions regarding the transition of the banks' positions can be more 
accurately drawn from contour plots, shown in the Figures 5.2 - 5.4. The positive 
slope diagonal line in every contour plot graph represents the continuous counterpart 
of the transition matrix's diagonal. This diagonal line helps to visualise whether the 
bank's will change their position relative to the mean when different approaches are 
used. For instance, if concentration takes place along this diagonal the banks' 
positions relative to the mean do not vary. On the other hand, if concentration 
abandons the diagonal, then the banks' position change with the change of approach. 
According to Figures 5.2 - 5.4, it may be inferred that the inter-distribution mobility 
is not high for either input/output specification, however it is noticeable that 
dispersion seems skewed to the left and is much higher between the Production and 
Profit-Revcnue approaches efficiency scores and the Intermediation and Profit- 
Revenue approaches. 
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5.4. Z An analysis of banks'returns 
The returns characteristics of the banking production process reported by the DEA 
efficiency results are now discussed. Following Banker and Natarajan (2004), a test 
of whether the banks operate at constant or variable returns to scale is analysed by 
comparing the distribution of the returns parameter of the banks with the null vector. 
Table 5.7 reports the test results obtained by Kolmogorov-Smimov and Wilcoxon- 
Mann-Whitney tests. As can be seen, the KS test rejects the null hypothesis in all 
cases suggesting that banks operate variable returns to scale. These results are 
consistent with the WMW test, which fails to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level 
of significance in six cases only. 
Table 5.7. Test of Returns to Scale of Eastern European banks (1998-2003 
Efficienc y measure (1-0) Efficienc y measure (1-p) Efficienc y measure (142) 
P PR I P PR I P PR 
- 
KS 0.6981 08428 0.6604 0.7421 0.8491 0.8742 0.6164 0.5094 0.7175 
1998 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
wmw 6.531 11.300 -5.287 7.983 11.508 12.458 3.836 -0.311 -7.267 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0,000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000 (0.755) (0.000) 
KS 0* 8805 . 8805 0.8742 0.8616 0.8805 0.8868 0.6667 0.5283 
0.5660 
1999 (0,000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
wmw 12.544 12.544 12.337 11.923 12.544 12.752 5.495 -0.933 -2.177 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.350) (0.029) 
KS 0.5094 0.7358 0.7170 0.7421 0.6164 0.7296 0.6101 0.6038 0.5283 
2000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
wmw -0.311 T. 776 7.154 7.983 3.836 7.568 3.629 3.421 0.933 (0.755) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.350) 
KS 0.5220 0.6981 0.7610 0.5031 0.6164 0.5912 0.5220 0.5535 0.6667 
2001 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (O. O(M) 
wmw -0.726 -6.531 -8.605 0.104 4.054 -3.007 0.726 -1.869 -5.495 (0.468) (0.000) (0.000) (0.917) (0.000) (0000) (0.468) (0.061) (0.000) 
KS 0.8553 0.7987 0.9748 0.7799 0.7233 0.7170 0.6415 0.6289 0.5220 
2002 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0,000) 
wmw 11.715 9.849 15.655 9.229 7.361 7.153 4.665 4.251 0.726 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.468) 
KS 0* 7799 0.8113 0.7987 0.7673 0.7799 0.7610 0.7421 0.5660 0.5094 
2003 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
wmw 9.227 10.264 9.849 8.812 9.227 8.605 7.983 2.177 0.311 L (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 1 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.755) 
Note. (1) In tennediatio n Amroach. (PR) Profit/Reve nue Approach, (P) Production Anvro ach. 
(KS) Kolmogorov-Smimov test (D-value, p-value in brackets), (WMW) Wilcoxon-Mann- 
Whitney test (W* value, p-value in brackets). 
Table 5.8 gives an overview of the banks' returns reported by the alternative 
Input/Output approaches across the efficiency estimation methodology. Accordingly, 
in most cases, the majority of the banks operate at decreasing returns to scale with 
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only a few banks operate at increasing returns. Surprisingly, virtually no banks 
operate at constant returns to scale. Bearing in mind that operating at decreasing 
returns suggest that these banks produce services at a higher average cost, this result 
can be interpreted as a signal of the difficulty of most banks to absorb a new 
technology and new management strategy into their production process since they 
could have inherited an old production technology from the pre-transition period. 
Table 5.8. Overview of banks' returns reported by different approaches across three 
efficiency estimation cases 
. 
'ficiency measure (1-0) Case Eýf 
Intermediation Production Profit/Revenue-based 
IR CR DR IR CR DR IR CR DR 
1998 0.30 0.00 0.70 0.16 0.00 0.84 0.66 0.00 0.34 
1999 0.12 0.00 0.88 0.12 0.00 0.88 0.13 0.00 0.87 
2000 0.51 0.00 0.49 0.26 0.00 0.74 0.28 0.01 0.71 
2001 0.52 0.00 0.48 0.69 0.01 0.30 0.76 0.00 0.24 
2002 0.14 0.00 0.86 0.20 0.00 0.80 0.03 0.00 0.97 
2003 0.22 0'. 08 0.70 
. 
0.19 0.00 0.81 
, 
0.20 0.00 0.80 
Iýfficiency measure (1-p) Case 
Intermediation Production Profit/Revenue-based 
IR CR_ DR IR CR DR IR CR DR 
1998 0.26 0.00 0.74 0.15 0.00 0.85 0.12 0.01 0.87 
1999 0.14 0.00 0.86 0.12 0.00 0.88 0.11 0.00 0.89 
2000 0.26 0.00 0.74 0.38 0.00 0.62 0.27 0.00 0.73 
2001 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.37 0.08 0.55 0.59 0.00 0.41 
2002 0.22 0.00 0.78 0.28 0.00 0.72 0.28 0.00 0.72 
2003 0.23 0.08 0.69 , 
0.22 0.00 0.78 
, 
0.24 0.00 0.76 
Efficiency measure (142) Case 
Intermediation Production Profit/Revenue-based 
IR CR DR IR CR DR IR CR DR 
1998 0.38 0.00 0.62 0.51 0.00 0.49 0.72 0.01 0.28 
1999 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.53 0.00 0.47 0.57 0.00 0.43 
2000 0.39 0.00 0.61 0.40 0.00 0.60 0.47 0.00 0.53 
2001 0.48 0.00 0.52 0.55 0.02 0.43 0.67 0.00 0.33 
2002 0.36 0.01 0.64 0.37 0.00 0.63 0.48 0.01 0.52 
2003 0.26 0.00 0.74 1 0.43 0.01 0.56 1 0.49 0.00 0.51 
Note: IR refers to increasing returns, CR refers to constant returns, DR refers to decreasing returns. 
Figures are measured by the share of each return to scale characteristic to the total number of banks 
(159). For the analysis return parameter (uO) rounded to four decimal points. 
Figures 5.5 - 5.7 show the distributions of the estimated individual returns 
parameters (uo) for three alternative Input/Output approaches across (1-0), (1- p) and 
(I-fl) efficiency measuring models. As can be seen from Figure 5.5, measuring 
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efficicncý bý the Intermediation and Production approaches rcport approxlmatclý 
similar returns I'Or the analysed banks Micreas the densitN of rcturns parameters 
estimated bý the Profit'Rocilue-based approach is radlcallý dit'lCrent fi-oni the otlicr 
two approaches. floxwver. the modes fOr all threc densities are closc to /cro. 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
Kernel Est. Densities of Returns parameter(uO) -(1-Theta) 1998-2003 
S 
S 
S 
a 
7 
Sam.. * -0.4 -0,2 0 
Interemediation 
Production 
Profit/Revenue 
Oý2 040.6 
FigUrc 5.5. Distributions Of I-etL11-11S I)M1111letel, 14, in( 1 -0) 1110delling, OCC1,11CIC11C\ 
measure across three alternative methodologies. 
Note. Vertical axis refers to (estimated) probabilit\ densitN function ol'the distribL16011 01'Ctl-]CiCTIC\ 
scores and horizontal axis refer,, to returns parameter 
In nicasurin- I'CtUnis estimates accordino to the (I-/)) modellin-g. the dcn. s*ties 
for the returns parameters Lisiil,,,,,, the Intermediation and Production approaches are 
almost identical. albeit mde that the that of (1-0) (Figure 5.6). The density for the 
returns parametel'S LISIIIII tile PI-Olit'Revenue-based approach is extremely t1ohl and L- 
has a vcrý high estimated density probability at its mode. 
In both graphs (Figure 5.5 and 5.6) the densities are skcý\ccl to the lelt. 
suggestim, that according, to (1-, p) and ( 1-0) returns estiiiiates. banks tend to operale at z- zr - 
decreasing returns. 
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20 
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12 
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4 
2 
Kernel Est Densities of Returns parameter(uO) -(l-Rho) 1998-2003 
0 
-0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 
Intermediation 
Production 
Profit/Revenue 
: 0. 
: 0. 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Fioure 5.6. Distributions 01'returns parameter m, in (I -p) modellml.,, ofet'lliciency 
meaSLIrC across three altaname methodologies. 
Note. Vertical axis rellers to (estilliated) probabilit\ densit\ function ofthe distribution ofefficienc\ 
scores and hori/ontal axis refers to returns parameter u, 
In Fipirc 5.7 tile densities for the ( 1- -(2) returns parameters are Illustrated. In 
contrast to the 1\\, o previous cfticiellcý measurement illodels (1-0) and tile 
densities Im the Production and Profit/Re\enue approaches are similar. Hic density 
for the Intermediation approach is dissimilar to the other mo approaches since it is 
ti,, hter and has a hiolier densm probabilit\ estimate at its mode. Althotioli tile dcnsit\ 
of Production and Prol'it/Revenue-based returns parameters are rather symmetric. the 
density lor the Intermediation approach is sk-c\\-ed to tile right. 
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2.5 
2 
1.5 
1 
0.5 
Kernel Est Densities of Returns parameter(uO) -(1-Ornega) 1998 2003 
ILILlre 5.7. Distributions of'returns parameter u(, ]-. (2) modellinl, ofell-ci III iellc\ 
measure across three alternative methodologies. 
Note. Vertical axis rel'ers to (estimated) probabilitN densitý function ofthe distribution ofefficiencý 
scores and horizontal axis refers to returms parameter n, 
'Fable 5.9 reports the correlation coefficients tor the returns l)aI'aIIIetCI*S LIS'1110 t:, 
three measurements models across alternative Input'Output a pproac lies mer the 
anaksed period. As can he seen. in some cases the returns parameters e. \ti*ciiicl\ 
hi(, Iil\, correlate (e. o. 2001 (1-0) effic' L- .i iciicx meISLII'eIIICI1t modch while 
in other cases a 
low correlation IS l'OLInd (e., o. 1999 (1-p) ef*fiicicncý measurement modcl). I lowever. In 
most cases the two approaches are correlated strongly ý, vith each other and then, L- - 
correlation \\ith the third one is rouuhlý at the same level for both. 
'Fable 5.9. Correlation matrices of' returns parameter Otý)) across diftlerent approaches 
(threc efficiency estimation cases) 
I 
, ýJliciencýv I- neusure (I- - 
0)- Cuse E. IciencY Ineasure ( I-P) C(Ise netisure (142) Efficienc-v 1 ( 'ttse 
inter, prof Inter Prod Prot'llrod , Inter Prof Inter, prod Prot'llrod 
- Inter Prot, - Inter Prod - - Prol'Prod 
1998 0.5013 0.9652 0.5 0.1348 0.9653 0.1953 0.08119 0.6032 0.17 -18 
1999 0.4873 0.7 5630.4 0.485 1 0.5 137 0.3198 0.0W 0.1 )1ý 0.8081 
1000 0.6729 0.2330 0.21 11 1 ý 0.9W 0.2693 0.244 0. -3) 
798 0.1654 03083 
2001 0-9995 0.9921 0.9938 0.8978 0.5492 0.5754 -0.0330 -0.0369 0.9111 
2002 0.5208 0.8668 0.7575 0.4919 0.9433 0.3394 0.2 339 0.4768 0.75 17 
20033 0.0308 0.9997 0.0469 0.0425 0.9997 0.0541 0.13400 0.9972 0.1842 
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As the correlation coefficients do not give information about the mobility of 
returns parameters when different Input/Output methodologies are used, the transition 
probability matrices are constructed. These matrices describe the transition probability 
of banks' returns based on the returns parameter when alternative Input/Output 
methodologies are utilised; although the transitions over time are not quantified. In 
addition, this involves choosing the grids or limits of the states according to a certain 
rule, and the limits are chosen to equal (-oo, O), 0 and (O, oo), or based on Proposition 1, 
the limits can be defined as Increasing Returns (IR), Constant returns (CR) and 
Decreasing Returns (DR) respectively. The number of observations refers to the 
number of banks with the corresponding returns in the approach used as a departing 
point46 where Nj is the number used in formula (5.12). 
Table 5.10 displays the transition probability matrices of the banks' returns 
parameter. It is clear that the transition probabilities abandon the constant returns state 
completely in all cases. For the constant returns cases, transition occurs mostly to the 
decreasing returns state and rarely to the increasing returns state. Interestingly, the 
diagonal of the matrices suggest that if a bank reported increasing or decreasing 
returns in one approach, in most cases it has a relatively high probability of being 
reported with the same returns when an alternative approach is used. These transition 
matrices present transitions in a discrete way; therefore I also present their continuous 
counterparts in the form of stochastic kernels. 
Table 5.10. Transition probability matrices of returns parameter across different 
approaches (three efficiency estimation cases) 1998-2003. 
Efficiency measure (1-0) Case 
Intermediation vs. Production Intermediation vs. Profit Production vs. Profit 
Noý-f IR CR DR 
No of IR CR DR No of IR CR DR 
observ. observ. observ. 
IR 289 0.72 0.00 0.28 289 0.75 0.00 0.25 259 0.84 0.00 0.16 
CR 13 0.08 0.00 0.92 13 0.08 0.00 0.92 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 
DR 652 0.08 0.00 0.92 652 0.17 0.00 0.83 694 0.16 0.00 0.84 
46 In intermediation vs. Production and Intermediation vs. Profit this approach is Intermediation, and in 
Production vs. Profit approach this is Production approach. 
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Efficiency measure (1-p) Case 
Intermediation vs. Production Intermediation vs. Profit Production vs. Profit 
No of IR CR DR 
No of IR CR DR No of IR CR DR 
observ. observ. observ. 
IR 255 0.71 0.01 0.28 255 0.79 0.00 0.21 242 0.89 0.00 0.11 
CR 13 0.08 0.00 0.92 13 0.08 0.00 0.92 12 1.00 0.00 0.00 
DR 686 0.09 0.00 0.91 686 0.08 0.00 0.92 700 0.04 0.00 0.96 
Efficiencv measure (142) Case 
Interniediation vs. Production Intennediation vs. Profit Production and Profit 
No of IR CR DR 
No of IR CR DR No of IR CR DR 
observ. observ. observ. 
IR 350 0.59 0.00 0.41 350 0.69 0.00 0.31 444 0.96 0.00 -0.04 
CR 1 0.00 0.00 1.00 1 0.00 0.00 1.00 4 1.00 0.00 0.00 
DR 603 
. 
0.40 0.00 0.60 603 0.49 0.00 0.51 506 0.22 0.00 0.78 
Note: For the analysis return parameter (uO) rounded to four decimal points. 
Figures 5.8-5.10 report the results for the three dimensional plots of the 
stochastic kernels; to make the conclusions drawn more accurate, the contour plots are 
also presented. As said before, the positive diagonal line in contour plots refers to the 
diagonal of the relative transition probability matrix. If the pirobability abandons the 
diagonal line, banks are reported with different returns according to different 
Input/Output modelling. Alternatively, if the concentration of probability mass is 
along this diagonal, it suggests that banks report the same returns according to the 
altemative approaches. 
As can be seen from the figures for the (1-6) and (1-p) efficiency 
measurement models returns, the banks transit in Intermediation/Profit and 
Production/Profit cases and in (I -A Intermediation/Production and 
Intermediation/Profit. 
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5.5. Conclusion 
The research presented has analyzed and statistically tested the influence of the choice of 
different input/output methodologies on DEA efficiency scores and banks' returns estimated 
for Eastern European banks. The non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Wilcoxon-Man- 
Whitney and the Simar-Zelenyuk-adapted-Li tests are applied to test the equality of the 
efficiency scores distributions. These distributions were plotted using the kernel density 
estimates. An analysis of the distributions of true efficiency scores using the Simar-Zelenyuk- 
adapted-Li test reports their inequality in most comparisons than the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
and Wilcoxon-Man-Whitney tests. In general, the statistical test and density analysis indicate 
that different approaches to the specification of inputs and outputs of banking production can 
produce significantly different efficiency scores. 
The Tortosa-Ausina (2002a, 2002b) methodology was also applied to analyze the 
inter-density mobility of relative efficiency using stochastic kernel analysis. This analysis 
suggests that although the efficiency scores differ from approach to approach, according to 
the stochastic kernels of the relative efficiency scores banks do not change their relative 
position to the mean. 
An analysis of the returns parameters of the banks suggest that they operate at variable 
returns to scale. Close look at the share of the banks with increasing, constant and decreasing 
returns suggest that in most cases the majority of the banks operate at decreasing returns to 
scale, few banks operate at increasing returns and virtually no banks operate at constant 
returns to scale. Bearing in mind that decreasing returns suggest that these banks produce 
services at a higher average cost, this result can be interpreted as a signal of the difficulty for 
most banks to absorb new technology or a new management strategy into their production 
process since they might have inherited an old production technology from the pre-transition 
period. However, the stochastic analysis of the returns parameters of the banks implies that 
the conclusion regarding the returns of the banks is sensitive to the choice of particular 
approaches. 
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CHAPTER SIX: A NON-RADIAL LUENBERGER PRODUCTIVITY 
ANALYSIS OF EASTERN EUROPEAN BANKS: RISK AS 
UNDESIRABLE OUTPUT 
SUMMARY 
This chapter develops a Luenberger productivity index applicable to the technology 
where the desirable and undesirable outputs are jointly produced and are possibly negative. 
The components of the Luenberger productivity index - the efficiency change and the 
technological shift are decomposed into the factors determined by technology adjusted for 
risk and the environment, environmental and risk management effects. Additionally, the 
comparative analysis of the sensitivity of the productivity indexes to the choice of the 
modelling methodology is done using statistical tests and kernel density estimates (both 
univariate and bivariate). It is found that the main driver of productivity change in the Central 
and Eastern European banks is technological improvement. The tests for the stochastic 
dominance show that the productivity indexes reported by the Production approach in most 
cases stochastically dominate the Intermediation and Profit/Revenue based results. 
Additionally, the stochastic kernel density estimates of the productivity results show that a 
moderate transition of the productivity levels takes place when the alternative input/output 
methodology are utilised. 
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6.1. Introduction 
The measurement and analysis of productivity growth received paid increased interest 
among researchers studying firm performance. A Malmquist index of productivity change, 
initially defined by Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982) and extended by Fdre et al. (1992) 
by merging it with Farrell's (1957) efficiency measurement, has become increasingly 
popular. 47 However, if the technology has as a feature the joint production of desirable and 
undesirable outputs, the Malmquist index may not be computable (Chung et al. 1997). 
Therefore, I use the Luenberger productivity index to measure the productivity change of the 
banking firm's technology where the undesirable outputs are produced together with desirable 
outputs. 
The Luenberger productivity index is defined by Chambers et al. (1996) as the 
difference in values of the directional distance functions. In primal Luenberger productivity 
index the shortage function (directional distance function), which accounts for both input 
contractions and output improvement (Luenberger 1992a, b), is used. In this study, however, 
the output-oriented range directional technology, initially defined by Silva Portela (2004), is 
used modified to allow for weak-disposable undesirable outputs (Fare et al, 1989 and Fare and 
Grosskopf, 2004). Moreover, measures for a non-radial Luenberger productivity index are 
obtained since the non-radial measures have a higher discriminating power and they do not 
allow for non-zero slacks (input and/or output slacks, depending on the way of defining the 
technology). 48 
The research effort in this study has focused not only on measuring the productivity 
change, but also on the factors determining better performance. Therefore, to get a greater 
insight into the determinants of better performance and valuable information about the bank's 
management, the Luenberger productivity decompositions suggested by Boussemart et al. 
(2003) are extended by decomposing the efficiency change and the components of the 
technological shift into the factors determined by the technology adjusted for the risk and 
47 For a short survey, see Maniadakis and Thanassoulis (2004). Several extensions and applications of the 
Malmquist index can be found in Fare et al. (199 8). 
48 There are several studies measuring the non-radial Malmquist productivity index, for example, Chen (2003), 
Zhou et al. (2006) 
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environment, environmental and risk management effects. The method is applied to measure 
the productivity of the Central and Eastern European banks operating during 1998 - 2003. In 
addition, three alternative methodologies for defining the banking production process are 
utilised, namely Intermediation, Production and Profit/Revenue based. Although, there are 
several studies investigating the sensitivity of efficiency results to the choice of the 
input/output modelling (Tortosa-Ausina, 2002a, 2002b, 2003 and Silva Portela and 
Thanassoulis, 2007) to my knowledge, this chapter is the first attempt to analyse how the 
productivity change results have been affected by the different specifications of the banking 
production process. In this analysis, along with non-parametric tests of the productivity 
indexes distributions, the kernel density estimators technique (both univariate and bivariate) 
suggested by Tortosa-Ausina in the aforementioned papers are used. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 gives an overview of the banking 
productivity literature. In Section 6.3 the non-radial banking technology is redefined by 
incorporating undesirable outputs and allowing for the negative data in outputs proposed in 
Chapter 4. Section 6.4 presents the procedure of the Luenberger productivity index 
measurement and its decomposition. The 
- 
productivity results and the comparative analysis of 
the productivity indexes reported by the alternative approach are presented in Section 6.5. 
Finally, Section 6.6 provides conclusions. 
6.2. Overview of literature on banking productivity analysis 
There is a broad literature that addresses the theoretical and methodological issues on 
measurement of productivity and its decomposition. 49 Within the substantial economic 
literature investigating productivity change in the banking industry, most empirical studies 
focus on the analysis of banking industries in the developed economies (see, for example a 
survey by Berger and Humphrey, 1997 and a short review by Casu et al, 2004). The overview 
of the banking productivity studies presented in Table 6.1 supplements the review given in the 
Casu et al. survey. 
49 An excellent survey of non-parametric studies on productivity and its decomposition can be found in 
Grosskopf (1993,2003). 
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The majority of the studies on banking productivity analysis investigate the 
impact of different regulatory and environmental factors on the development of the 
banking market. For example, post-deregulation banking productivity performance in 
developed countries is assessed by Sturm and Williams (2004) in the case of the 
Australian banking industry; Tsionas et al (2003) and Rezitis (2006) investigate post- 
deregulation productivity of Greek banking; and the impact of deregulation in the 
Spanish banking system on banking efficiency and productivity is analysed by 
Lozano-Vivas and Humphrey (2002) and Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1996,1997). 
In the case of Australian banks, Sturm and Williams (2004) also considered 
the impact of foreign bank entry on post-deregulation banking efficiency and 
productivity. Additionally, they apply four different types of the banking production 
process specifications based on the Intermediation approach and, according to 
Malmquist indexes results, all of them excepting one input/output specification 
suggest post-deregulation productivity improvement. The productivity decomposition 
in their study shows that the major source of post-deregulation productivity gain of 
Australian banks is technological change, which is mainly attributed to foreign banks, 
rather than the efficiency improvement. Although Tsionas et al. (2003) found an 
improvement in performance in the case of Greek banking, it was mainly attributed to 
larger banks' technical change, the medium sized banks improved their TFP owing to 
positive (yet not substantial) improvement of technical efficiency. 
Spanish banking was assessed by Grifell-Tatjd and Lovell in 1996 who 
investigated post-deregulation productivity of savings banks and in the 1997 paper 
they examined the pattern of productivity change in both commercial and savings 
banking. The earlier analysis suggested that Spanish savings banks experienced 
productivity decline, mainly attributed to the deterioration in production possibilities 
(technical change). To explain the nature of the productivity decline, the authors 
examined the effect of branching and consolidation on the performance of the savings 
banks. However, neither the expansion of branching network nor mergers and 
acquisitions had been found as a source of productivity decline. As the authors 
suggested, Spanish savings banks had difficulties in adapting to a new environment 
with more open competition brought by deregulation and liberalisation. Additionally, 
the latter study found that the productivity performance of the two sectors differ 
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substantially, the best-practice banks in each sector improved their post-deregulation 
performance. 
Lozano-Vivas and Humphrey (2002) also assess the Spanish banking system 
using parametric (stochastic cost frontier) and nonparametric (Malmquist index) 
techniques and found evidence of a downward change in banking productivity during 
1986 - 1991. However, the main objective of the paper relates to the bias problem in 
banking productivity studies due the nature of the data. In analysing the banking 
production process, the authors consider five coverage levels of balance sheet assets 
and liabilities referred to as inputs and outputs. The core finding of the study is that 
the higher the coverage level of inputs and outputs is, the more of the bias is 
eliminated. 
Further support of the importance of the input/output methodology in 
production analysis can be found in Leightner and Lovell (1998). The authors 
consider two different specifications of the banking production process derived from 
the objectives of the banks-themselves (profit maximizing) and of the central bank. 7 
The Bank of Thailand (fostering economic growth along with preserving safety and 
soundness of banking system). They performed two separate analyses of the Thai 
banking system, one which investigates the ability of the banks to pursue their own 
objectives and another which examines the ability of banks to satisfy the objectives of 
The Bank of Thailand. The analysis shows that the majority of the banks adapted well 
to financial liberalisation and improved their performance in meeting their own 
objectives. Overall, the financial liberalisation had a positive impact on the Thai 
banking system; in particular it led to an increase in the banks' ability to raise their 
profits and to finance economic growth. 
An assessment of banking productivity in the emerging countries after 
liberalisation and deregulation is also available. Gilbert and Wilson (1998) conduct a 
case study of the Korean banking industry. Isik and Hassan consider productivity 
development of the Turkish banking industry: the authors carry out a study of post- 
deregulation performance of Turkish banks (2003a) while a survey examines the 
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impact of the financial crisis on the Turkish banking industry productivity (2003b). 50 
The productivity assessment of Polish banks in transition is investigated by 
Havrylchyk (2004). The aim was an analysis of post-merger and post-acquisition 
productivity, so the study considered only merged and acquired banks in the Polish 
banking industry. 
The results of Gilbert and Wilson (1998) on Korean banks were consistent 
with the view that privatisation and deregulation enhance potential output and 
productivity. Similar evidence was found for the Turkish banking analysis by Isik and 
Hassan (2003a). Interestingly, Turkish banks improved their efficiency, providing the 
main source of productivity growth, as technical progress was found not to be 
improved. Furthen-nore, it has been shown that the inclusion of OBS items produced 
some evidence of technical progress of Turkish banks. The importance of OBS items 
is highlighted by the fact that their exclusion significantly deteriorated the average 
efficiency and productivity measures of the entire industry. This gives further support 
to the importance of the appropriate definition of inputs and outputs in the analysis of 
banking effiýiency and productivity. As expected, financial distress leads to a 
considerable productivity decline (Isik and Hassan, 2003b). Moreover, they show that 
foreign banks suffered the most from the crisis followed by domestic private banks. 
Regarding the size of the banks, small sized banks received a disproportionately 
negative impact of the shock. 
Although several studies undertake a cross-country analysis of banking 
productivity performance, in general, they concentrate on the banking industry of 
developed countries (Lozano - Vivas and Pastor, 2006; Casu et al., 2004; Pastor et al., 
1997). In particular, Pastor et al. (1997) compared the efficiency and productivity of 
different European and US banking systems whereas a comparative cross-country 
productivity assessment (both parametric and nonparametric) of European banking is 
presented in Cdsu et al. (2004). According to the former study, the most productive 
banking systems are located in Austria, Italy, Germany and Belgium, and the least 
productive are in the USA, the UK, France and Spain. Similar results are found in the 
latter study. For example, the results show that productivity improved in the Italian 
'0 An interesting aspect of their study is that although the financial crisis has a significant negative 
impact on productivity, state-owned banks as well as the small-sized banks suffered the most from the 
crisis, whereas the state banks passed the crisis relatively unharmed. - 
137 
and Spanish banking industries while German and French banks exhibit mixed results. 
However, the combination of the technological and efficiency changes is very 
different in different banking systems, as in Austrian and German banking, where a 
major part of productivity change is due to technological change whereas in Spain and 
France it is efficiency catching-up. 
The study of Lozano - Vivas and Pastor (2006) differs from all other studies 
as it investigates the synergy between banking and economic productivity. The 
analysis is based on the construction of an overall banking and economic frontiers and 
estimation of a global Malmquist productivity index. More recently, authors examine 
the relationship between economic and banking performance; determining the 
components of banking productivity are examined since they play a fundamental role 
in explaining economic growth. The analysis of the paper suggests that banking 
performance and technical change in particular has a (positive) effect on economic 
productivity and its convergence. 
... 
On the whole, the aforementioned surveys suggest that liberalisation and de- 
regulation of the banking industry enhances efficiency and productivity5l in both the 
developed and emerging economies. Moreover, some studies show that the 
performance of the banks is mainly attributed to technological change, and factors 
such as size, ownership and objectives of the banks affect productivity measures. 
This result is supported by most cross-country and single country analysis studies, 
which suggest that the improvement of banking productivity is mainly due to the 
technological change. Although several non-parametric and parametric methods are 
employed in the productivity studies, the most popular method of banking 
productivity measurement is the non-parametric Malmquist index. 
The main contributions of this chapter to the existing literature are as follows. 
First, a cross-country analysis of banking productivity in the transition economies is 
performed. Second, in assuming undesirable output production, negative data is 
incorporated in the range direction methodology. The Luenberger productivity 
measure is estimated and decomposed into several - risk management and 
51 As has been noted before, the exception is the Spanish banking industry where the findintgs suggest 
that there was little or no change in productivity (Lozano-Vivas and Humphrey, 2002) or even a C, 
productivity decline (Grifell-Tatjd and Lovell, 1996). 
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I 
environmental factors. Finally, a comparative analysis of productivity measurement 
estimated using three alternative input/output methodologies is performed. 
6.3. Modelling technology 
Let us redefine the models proposed in Chapter 4 in terms of directional 
distance function notations in formulating the Luenberger productivity indexes and its 
decomposition. Hence, let D. (x,, , yJ, b. 1 
) be the maximising objective function of the 
following linear program which is identical to (4.5): 
n 
Ajx 9> y-' +a Rg; ii `: ý XO; -1, Yrj - rO r rO 
R+ 
Dj(x yb) =argmax, O= -Ear - EA)LLPJ = LLPO -, 
BORLLp 
S r=l s 
Aj ýý 0; Vj n 
(6.1) 
where R LLPO -min(LLP ) and R9 = max{yg, ) -yg, ,r=1, ..., R, are range LLPO ii rO iI ro 
directional vectors of undesirable output (risk in banking) and desirable outputs 
respectively. 
Let us refer to the risk management banking technology defined in Model 
(4.6) as DRM (x ,y, b): 
:9x> ygo + a, Rgo Elti u 0; 
1 "jyry 
ro ro g 
J=j J. 1 
RI 
DRM (x yb )=argmax p= a+-, 8 2] Er Aj yj LLPJ = yo LLPO - 60 
Ry., 
ýLp. s r=l s 
Aj = 1; Aj ýt 0; Vj n 
J. 1 
(6.2) 
where RYLLp,, -, 4 yOLLPO - minjyj LLP, ), and the parameter y is found from i 
(4.4). 
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The envirorunent and risk adjusted technology output directional technology 
redefined as DER (x, y, b) (Model 4.8): 
t? op 
Ex : 5x,,; FAyg AJ yjý: y, 
9,0 + a, R, 10 
J=j jzl 
lljyjLLP = yLLP, - 
PRrLLP,.; 
RI 
DER (x, y b )=argmax Q=-lar+-J6l,, l 
po, p 
P; Aj Qq, ý: Qq,,, qQ SsE Aj QP+j :! ý Q+ 
Aj = 1; Aj ýt 0; Vi n 
(6.3) 
where Q, ' = (Q+ + Q+ ) and Q- = (Q-, Q- Qý, ) are the li I 
Q2j pi i Ij 2j vectors of banking 
system specific variables with positive or negative influence. 
The D. (xj, y., bj ), DRM, (x.,, yj, bj ) and DER, (x,, y., b., ) are the measures 
of technical inefficiency of the firm j. The output range directional distance 
function D (x ,y, b) can 
be additively. decomposed as follows 52 : 
(x 
DER (x yb )+(DRM (x yb )-DER (x yb : (D (x yb )-DRM (x y, b 
(6.4) 
The summation in the first brackets can be interpreted as the environmental 
effect (EE) on technology Dj (x,, y., bj ) while the risk management effect (RME) - 
the second brackets: 
D, (x ybj) =DER, (xj, yb, ) + EEJ (xj, ybj) + RME, (x yj, b, ) (6.5) 
6.4. Productivity measurement 
According to Chambers (2002), the productivity indicator can be directly 
constructed from the technology directional distance function, and the technology t 
I 
Luenberger productivity indicator is defined by: 
f+l 1+1 1' ') - j 
D' (x bj j, yj bj (x, b",, xj yj bj ii Yj - (x (6.6) 
while the technology t+1 Luenberger productivity indicator is: 
52 0 This decomposition has been suggested by Pastor (1999a, 2002); but the decomposition in this paper 
is additive rather than multiplicative. 
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1+1 1tW, y)f+], 1+1 1+1 1,1 t 1+1 1+1 1+1 (x,, y., bj', X., b., )=D, (x., y., b, ) - D, ' (x, +', y., , b, ). 
(6.7) 
The two indexes yield the same values if, and only if, the output distance 
function is of the form 
Dj(x. i, y., b, )=A(r)D., (x, yj*, b., »), r=t, t+I (6.8) 
Although this statement is analogous to the statement given in Fare et al. 
(1999) for Malmquist indices, it is also true for Luenberger productivity indices (the 
proof is given in the Appendix H). 
The output Luenberger productivity index in the case of output range 
directional distance functions is defined as an arithmetic mean of (6.6) and (6.7) as 
follows: 
L(x y', b, x", y"' b'+') =1, (x y', b) - D, (x"', y", b'. +) iJJi, 1211111) 
+ (Dý" (x y.  
ý1) - Dj, " (xj", yj", bj"1»] 
(6.9) 
Productivity growth is indicatýd by a positive value of the Luenberger productivity 
index whereas a negative Luenberger productivity index is evidence of productivity 
decline of the firm between the considered time periods. 
The output Luenberger productivity index (6.9) can be additively decomposed 
into two components (Boussemart et al, 2003): 
L(xj, y,., bxj", y, "', bj+') = 
[Dj (xj, yj, b., ) - Dj" (xj", y, ", b, ")] 
1 [(p, 
+2 "' (xj", y, ", bj") - D, (x, ", y, ", b, "»+ 
(D, " (x,., ybj) - D, (xj, ybj»] 
(6.10) 
The first difference captures technical efficiency change of the output range 
directional functions between periods t and t+I while the arithmetic mean of the last 
two differences measures the technological change, i. e. the shift of the technology 
between two periods. 
Using the additive decomposition of D (x ,y, b) defined in formula (6.5), 
the technical efficiency change can be decomposed as follows: 
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EFFCH(x y,  b x., 
", y", b., +1) = 
[DER, (xj, y 
*, , 
ý, )+ EE, (x y.  b, )+R Mg (ý y.  b, ) 
] 
'-" "') + EE. " (x y b, 
[DER', 
, 
")+RME, "(x., ", y b,  
(x., ", yj b., IA 
(6.11) 
Rearranging (6.11) gives the following decomposition: 
EFFCH(x', y', b' X. " "' bl+') =[DER., (x.,, y', b., ) -DER, " (x`l, y", bl+l 1 .1 11 11Y. 1 Iii 
+[EE'. (xl, l, b')-EE, "(x", y" b+' ./iY. 1 ii .11 .1 )l 
+ 
[RME, '(x.,, y.,, bj') - RME, +'(x., +', y., " I 
Y, ")] 
(6.12) 
whereby the first difference (inside the first square brackets) measures the change of 
efficiency adjusted for risk and the environment, while the second and third 
differences captures the change in the environmental effect and risk management 
effect respectively. 
Technological change can be decomposed into two components - the 
magnitude of technological change and the bias of technological change as follows: 
TECH(x, ', y, ', b',, x, "', y, '+', b, )=[D (x b )-D, (x,. +' +', b' ii Yj ,jj 
ýyj 
+1[(D (x', y, ', b; )-D, (x,., y,, b; ))+(Dj'(xj+', yj'+, b, +')-D, '+I(xj , Yi , bj 2j 
(6.13) 
or, altematively, as 
TECH(x, ', y, ', bx, "', y, ", b, +1) = 
[D, +' (xy,, b, )-D, (xyb, )] 
+1 
[(D. " (xi", y, ", b, ") - D, (x, " yi. 
", bi"»+ (Di (xyb, ) - Di" (x., yj, bj»] 2 
(6.14) 
where the difference in the first square brackets measures the magnitude of 
technological change and the arithmetic mean of the last two differences measures the 
bias of technical change between period t and t+1. The bias index makes no 
contribution to productivity change if the magnitude of technical change is the same 
when measured along the two rays. In other word, if, and only if, the distance 
functions are of the form (6.8), the bias index is equal to zero. 
It is possible to gain additional insight into the nature of the magnitude and the 
bias of technological change with respect to the environment and risk management of 
142 
the banks by decomposing it into the magnitude and bias indices of changes of 
environment and risk adjusted efficiency and environmental and risk management 
effects. Formula (6.13) is used for the decompositions. The magnitude of 
technological change can be decomposed as follows: 
MTECH (x, ' , y., , 
Y, 
,x', 
", yJ"', bJ"') = 
[DER, "(x. ', +', Yl+l bf+')+EE'+'(x'+', y', +', b., +')+RME; +'(x'+', "' b'+')] / Y. / 
1 1+1 +1 - 
[DER. ' 
, 
(x' +, yj'+', bj"' )+ EE, ' (x, + , YJ 
ý, )+RMEý, (x, +', y., +', b., ")] 
(6.15) 
Rearrangement of (6.15) gives three components for the technological change 
magnitude: 
I" 1+1 +1 (xf+l, Yl+l, b,, x, y ") = 
[DERJ' MTECH( j b, jj0 
DER. '(x'+', y'+', b, 
+ 
[EE, '+'(x, '+'l y, +',, bj'+') - EE, (x, '+', y, '+', ý1+1 )l 
+ 
[RME, +'(xj+', y, +, bj'+') - RME, (x, +, y, +, bj'+' 
(6.16) 
where the difference in the first brackets represents the magnitude of efficiency 
adjusted for environment and risk, the second brackets provide a measure of the 
magnitude of the environmental effect, and the difference in the last brackets is the 
magnitude of the risk management effect. 
Analogously, the decomposition of the bias of technological change is as 
follows: 
BTCH(x, , y'  b x, 
", y. ", ýI') = 
1[ [(DERJ" (x. ',, yi, bi) + EE, +(xi, y,, b, ) + RME, +'(x J, yj', 
bj )) 
2 
)+EEI(x', y, bj'. )+RME, '(x', y', bjl))] - 
(DERJ'(Xj', 
Y., bj' iiii j 
1+1 1+1, bl+l)+RME'(X'+' 1+1 bl+') + [(DER'. W", y'+', bj"') + EE, (x yj iij 'yj 
+1 '+', y, '+', bj"')+EE. ' (xj'. +, y, + jl+'(x'+', y'+', b, '+'))] - 
(DER, (x, bjj RMEJ i1 
(6.17) 
which can be rearranged into the following: 
II1 1+1 1+1 1 ýl BTCH(xj, y,, b. ',, x, yj s j- 
1+1 (xt+i '[(DERý"(x'j, y',, bj')-DER, '(x', Y'j, b, '))+(DERJ'(x'+', '+', bj+')-DERj y bj+'))] 2111 yj i 
l+I [(EE, "'(x, y, b, )-EE, (x', y, b, 
»+(EE, (x"', y"', b, ")-EE""(x'«", y"', b) 
A 
2iiiiiii 
(+I xl+I , i+I, "' (x'+, y", bj"'»] 
1 [(RME, (x y bj) - RME, (x y bj» + 
(RMEj 
i Yj 
bj") - RME; ii 2 
(6.18) 
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The arithmetic mean of the differences in the first square brackets compares the 
difference in the magnitude of technological change adjusted for risk and environment 
along the two rays, the arithmetic mean of the differences in the second brackets, the 
magnitude of the environmental effect; and the arithmetic of the differences in the last 
brackets is the magnitude of the risk management effect. Alternatively, the bias index 
of technological change can be decomposed into input bias and output bias indexes. 
Four alternative decompositions of this type are given in the Appendix H. 
The assumption of variable returns to scale is maintained in the defining and 
decomposing all indexes, as it is a necessary condition to deal with negative data for 
modelling technology (see Silva Portela, 2004). Therefore, the productivity indexes 
estimated in this study are not total factor productivity indexes, since a total factor 
productivity index assumes the constant returns to scale technology (Fare and 
Grosskopf, 1996). 
6.5. Estimation results 
Productivity changes are measured and decomposed for the Eastern European 
banking industry using the same panel data as in previous sections based on three 
alternative approaches, namely Intermediation, Production and Profit/Revenue. Next, 
a general description of the productivity results and its decomposition is provided; a 
detailed analysis will be presented in the latter part of the section. 
Tables 6.2-6.4 report the Luenberger index (LI) results obtained from (6.9) 
averaged across the analysed countries' banking systems, sub-groups' and the total 
sample. 53 The decompositions into efficiency change (EFFCH) and technological 
change (TECH) components (6.10) are also presented. A positive (negative) value of 
the index indicates productivity growth (decline), while an index equal to zero 
indicates no change in productivity between period t and t+1. 
53 
C' Briec et al. (2003) and Filre and Primont (200' )) define the aggregate Luenberger productivity index. 
This aggregation is inappropriate in the modellinZg, technology used here since the directional vector is 
not constant for all the DMUs but varies for each DMU according to the range of the possibilities for 
improvement. For that reason, Tables 6.2-6.4 and Tables 6.5-6.7 report the decomposition of the 
Luenberger productivity index provide the corresponding arithmetic averages. 
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Looking at the Luenberger index, the highest average productivity growth rate 
is in the period 1998 - 99 for all three approaches. For instance, Intermediation LI 
reports average productivity growth rate of 10.1%, which is mainly explained by the 
efficiency change (the technological change had a negative impact on productivity 
growth of -1.2% level). For the rest of the considered period, the Intermediation 
approach reports a productivity decline which is mainly due to the negative efficiency 
change. However, the lowest level of productivity decline was due to the negative 
technological change and occurred between the years 2001-02. Indeed, according to 
the risk decomposition the risk management technology in that particular time period 
in virtually all banks was very inefficient, primarily as a result of the internal factors. 
The results also suggest that productivity does not change in the period 2002-03, and a 
closer look shows that the positive efficiency change was outweighed by the negative 
technological change at the absolute level of 0.04%. 
As was mentioned before, the LI productivity results reported by the 
production approach also suggest that the highest average -productivity growth 
occurred in the period between 1998-99, and this level of productivity growth (15.8%) 
is the highest across the input/output modelling approaches. The Profit/Revenue- 
based productivity index for that period is slightly lower, 14.5%, but still fairly high 
compared to the one reported by the Intermediation approach. The productivity 
indexes in the next two time periods 1999-00 and 2000-01 (Production and Profit 
approaches) show that the average productivity of the sample continued to improve 
but at a slightly lower rate (6.9% - 8.9% and 1.8% respectively). However, both 
components of the average Ll decomposition (EFFCH and TECH) are positive in the 
production approach, whereas the profit approach shows that, although, technical 
change was positive, the efficiency change contributed negatively to Ll at those 
periods. 
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The decomposition of the changes in technical efficiency, i. e. the "catch-up" 
part of the productivity index, estimated by the three alternative input/output 
approaches is given in Table 6.5 - 6.7. According to the Intermediation approach, the 
decomposition of the technical efficiency catching-up for the years 1998-99,2000-01 
and 2002-03, the change in risk management effect on the technical efficiency in most 
countries was negative, i. e. it lessened the efficiency change. However, the negative 
impact of the change in risk management effect was offset by the positive impact of 
the environment and risk adjusted efficiency change and the envirom-nental effect 
change resulting in an overall positive efficiency change. The exception is the period 
2000-01 when all banks had a negative technical efficiency change, caused not only 
by the negative changes in the risk management effect, but also, in some cases, by the 
worsening environmental effect and negative environment and risk adjusted efficiency 
change. 
Like in the Intermediation approach decomposition, the production approach 
decomposition of technical efficiency change shows that in virtually all countries 
throughout the analysed time period the technical efficiency change positively 
contributed productivity. The change of risk management effect was negative in 1998- 
99,2000-01 and 2002-03. The change in the environment and risk adjusted efficiency 
negatively contribute the overall change of the technical efficiency change in the 
period 1999-00. The Profit/Revenue based decomposition of the technical change 
exhibits similar trends as in Intermediation approach, however the elements of 
technical efficiency change are somewhat superior to the Intermediation 
decomposition (except for period 1998-99 when it is the reverse). 
The part of productivity change which appears in the form of technological 
change (or frontier-shift) and its decomposition into magnitude and bias components 
across the alternative methodologies is shown in the Tables 6.8-6.10. Tables 6.11 - 
6.13 show the decomposition of the magnitude of the technological change across the 
different input/output specification, while the Tables 6.14-6.16 provide the 
decomposition of the bias index of technological change. As per the previous tables, 
the efficiency change component of the Luenberger productivity index is relatively 
stable for the country averages and averages of the country sub-groups. However, the 
technological change index is rather heterogeneous and volatile across the countries, 
implying that in differences the productivity changes across the countries reflect the 
divergence of technological change among them. 
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For instance, all three approaches suggest that the average productivity in the 
Hungarian banking system was extremely high in the period 1998-99, and the major 
factor of this productivity growth was attributed to the substantial technological shift. 
Looking at individual Hungarian banks, the results show that, the most productive 
bank at that period was Orszagos Takarekpenztar es Kereskedelmi - Bank-National 
Savings and Commercial Bank Ltd (OTP) - the largest bank in the Hungary, which 
achieved substantial productivity growth primarily as a result of significant 
technological change. Looking further at the decomposition of technological change, 
the shift of the technology is a result of the bias index, i. e. the difference of the 
magnitudes, particularly the bias index of the environment and risk adjusted 
efficiency. Indeed, according to Global Finance (2001), the OTP was the only bank 
among the large Hungarian banks to significantly improve its profits, while at the 
same time conducting its activities in a rapidly changing market environment. In fact, 
to maintain its dominant position in retail banking, in the second half of the 1990s, the 
OTP's strategy focused on increasing the profitability and productivity of its retail 
business by investing heavily in information technology (Bonin and Abel, 2000). As a 
result, according to the aforementioned study, in 1999 OTP owned 43% of all the 
ATMs in Hungary and the value of its bank card transactions was 71% of the total 
volume of the bank card business. 
At the same time many banks in the sample, as given by the negative 
Luenberger index, experienced a productivity decline, possibly as a result of the 
financial distress caused by the Russian financial crisis of 1998. Hence, the 
productivity performance of the OTP bank was outstanding when compared to the 
other analyzed banks. However, for the subsequent time periods the productivity 
performance of the OTP bank was fairly comparable to the other banks. A possible 
reason for this might be that these banks carefully monitored the risk in their activities 
taking into account the changes in the environment (possibly, the effect of 'disaster 
myopia'). Moreover, the strong competition from other banks - large and foreign- and 
competition policy 54 may also contribute to this finding. 
54 For example, in the changes to competition law and policy propose or envisaged, which is available 
at 
http: //www. oecd. org/dataoecd/45/22/2409112. pdf#search=ý/ý22hungaryý/ý20otpý/ý20competitioný/`20la 
w%22, it was stated that the market conduct of OTP, with regard to the 'New Home' a five-year 
building deposit campaign, is abusive and the bank was imposed a fine amounting to HUF 10 million 
(about USD 48 thousand). 
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Taking another example, in the period 1999-2000 the banking industry of 
Slovakia appeared to be remarkably productive, where again the productivity growth 
is gained as a consequence of a technological shift, but this time is due to increase of 
the bias index - risk management efficiency bias in particular. The main driver of the 
technological change, and as a consequence of the high average productivity growth, 
in that period is the second largest bank in the Slovak Republic - Vseobecna Uverova 
Banka (VUB). In 2000 the first phase of the privatization of this bank was completed, 
and an agreement was entered into with EBRD and IFC on the sale of approximately 
25% of the shares in VUB in February 2001. Moreover, in 2000 the bank established 
a new organizational structure with a focus on strengthening the risk management 
system and reducing the number of management levels. These initiatives resulted in a 
10% decrease in the bank's general operating costs and improved its financial 
performance. Besides the restructuring of the bank, VUB achieved the technological 
shift as a result of developing electronic distribution channels which facilitated e- 
banking communication, such as home banking, a wide network of ATMs, EFT POS 
terminals and internet banking. And, according to the VUB 2000 Annual Report, by 
activating such services, VUB has become one of the leaders in electronic banking in 
Slovakia. 
The Romanian banking industry also experienced a notable productivity 
change in three input/output methodologies in the period 1999-2000. However, unlike 
the Slovakian banks, they experienced a productivity decline. The decomposition of 
productivity suggests that the cause of the productivity decline is a negative 
technological shift caused by the high negative magnitude of environmental effect 
changes, mainly in the largest Romanian bank - Romanian Commercial Bank (BCR). 
Also in 2000, the largest Romanian investment fund Fondul Nalional de Investijii 
(FNI) collapsed as a result of gross mismanagement, fraudulent practices and poor 
regulatory oversight. This triggered a decline - in the confidence in the Romanian 
financial sector (IMF, Remes and Ghizari, 2000), amplified by the panic among the 
people trying to withdraw their funds from the BCR branches (BBC, 2000). 
II The banking system in the Czech Republic experienced a serious productivity 
decline in the period 2001-2002. The results suggest that main cause of the average 
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productivity decline is the negative technological shift of Ceskoslovenska Obchodni 
Banka (CSOB). The decomposition of the technological change shows that the bias 
index positively contributed the productivity growth, although the substantial negative 
magnitude of the technological change had a significant influence on the 
technological change and, as a result, on the productivity change. A detailed 
decomposition of the magnitude and bias indexes of technological change suggest that 
the core elements of the change in technology are related to the risk management 
effect. Indeed, the magnitude of the risk management effect had a considerable 
negative impact which was not sufficiently offset by the positive bias of the risk 
management effect. A rigorous look at the Czech banking industry for that period and 
the productivity decomposition results gives a detailed picture about the country's 
banking system and the CSOB in particular. In 2000 the third largest bank of the 
Czech Republic - Investment and Postal Bank (Investi6ni a Pogtovnf banka or IPB), 
bailed out causing a major corporate governance scandal (World Bank, 2002). In June 
2001 IPB was sold to CSOB, which was the fourth largest bank at the time with a 
strong background in corporate banking and a sound risk management system, 
Making it the largest Czech bank. The reorganization of the bank's structure following 
the acquisition, which Anderson (2001) called a 'shotgun marriage', is captured by 
the technological process. The positive bias index suggests that the risk management 
reorganization was improved. Yet, the negative magnitude of the risk management 
effect indicates that there was still scope for further improvement for this period 
(comparing the risk management technology of the CSOB before the acquisition). 
In taking a more detailed look at the productivity growth and its 
decomposition results for the individual banking sub-groups, it is clear from Figures 
6.1 to 6.3 that, while the average Luenberger productivity indexes for different sub- 
groups are typically very different, the average efficiency change across the sub- 
groups often exhibits similar trends over time. This is particularly true with respect to 
the Intermediation and Profit/Revenue based approaches. Figure 6.1 and 6.2, for 
example, illustrate very clearly that, according to these approaches, the banking 
subgroups exhibit a clear improvement in technical efficiency levels in the periods 
1998-99 and 2001-02, whereas in the period between 1999 and 2001 the efficiency 
change was negative. Although there is a considerable degree of convergence between 
the efficiency change results estimated using these two approaches, these figures 
highlight the greater variation of the efficiency change levels produced using the 
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With respect to the technological change, there appears to be a clear doANmtum 
in the technological shift for the negotiating country sub-group in the period 1999- 
2000, which is likely to be attributable to the Romanian financial crisis. A similar 
downturn is seen for the accession country sub-group in the period 2001-2002, which 
is related to the negative technological shift of the CSOB, one of the largest banks in 
the region. It is interesting to note that the productivity change for all three approaches 
mirrors the technological change. Not surprisingly, a well-developed and advanced 
technology platform allows banks to offer a wider and more integrated level of 
banking services, making them more attractive to customers. Therefore, technological 
improvement of the banking production process is a key factor of the banking 
productivity growth in the Eastern and Central European banking industries. Given 
the fact that the trend for the efficiency change by the Production approach is positive 
it can be inferred that the analysed banks are interested in increasing their market 
shares in the deposits and loans segments of the banking services. 
In view of the fact that three alternative input/output modelling procedures are 
used, a comparative analysis of the productivity indexes estimated by the different 
input/output approaches can be performed. Figure 6.4 indicates that the productivity 
growth results provide an interesting contrast between the three input/output 
methodologies. Although the general trend of productivity growth reported by the 
different approaches is similar, the Production approach tends to produce higher 
productivity indexes than the Intermediation and Profit/Revenue based approaches. 
Even though the average efficiency change varies across the input/output approaches, 
the efficiency change tendency in the Intermediation and Profit/Revenue based 
approaches are relatively similar. Interestingly, the trend of the technological change 
is quite similar across the modelling methodologies, suggesting that the improvement 
or deterioration of the banking technology affects different aspects of the banking 
process in an equivalent way. In sum, Figure 6.4 once again provides evidence that 
the productivity growth of the Eastern European banks is mainly determined by their 
technological advancement. 
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In statistically analysin- the consistency ofthe hicnberger productivit\ 
across the alternative modelling methodologies. an analysis ofthe distributions is also 
undertaken. Figure 6.5 shows the kernel density estimators which are used to 
approximate the distributions of the Luenberger productivit\ inclex 1`6r the ditTerent 
iIIpUt/OLIIPLIt approac lies. The estimated distributions of' the Intumediation and 
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Profit/Revenue based productivity indexes are relatively similar for all years. An 
exception is the estimated probability density at the mode of the Profit/Revenue based 
productivity index; in all cases it is lower than the corresponding mode of the 
Intermediation approach. The distribution of the Production approach is clearly 
different from the other two approaches and, interestingly, in all the cases it has the 
estimated mode of the distribution at the positive level of productivity change. 
The results of the hypothesis test for the equality of distributions of 
productivity indexes estimated by the alternative approaches are presented in Table 
6.17. As shown, the null hypothesis is rejected for equality of the Intermediation and 
Profit/revenue based productivity indexes compared with the productivity indexes 
estimated by the Production approach. The results suggest that the productivity index 
estimated by the Intermediation and Profit/revenue based approaches is statistically 
the same. The test for the stochastic dominance presented in Table 6.18 shows that 
the Production productivity index in most cases is superior to the Intermediation and 
Profit/Revenue based productivity indexes at the 10% level of significance. 
Table 6.17. Tests on consistency of Luenberger productivity indexes obtained under 
the alternative methodologies 
I vs. P I vs. PR P vs. PR 
1998-1999 KS 0.7673* 0.1195 0.7610* 
(0.000) (0.206) (0.000) 
WMW -10.972* -0.746 11.140* (0.000) (0.455) (0.000) 
1999-2000 KS 0.8868* 0.0629 0.8868* 
(0.000) (0.912) (0.000) 
WMW -13.547* -0.564 13.004* (0.000) (0.573) (0.000) 
2000-2001 KS 0.8616* 0.1132 0.8113* 
(0.000) (0.260) (0.000) 
WMW 
-13.011 0.901 11.926* (0.000) (0.367) (0.000) 
2001-2002 KS 0.8302* 0.0755 0.8050* 
(0.000) (0.756) (0.000) 
WMW 
-12.438* -0.825 11.939* (0.000) (0.409) (0.000) 
2002-2003 KS 0.8994* 0.0943 0.8742* 
(0.000) (0.479) (0.000) 
WMW 
-13.785* 0.202 13.596* (0.000) (0.840) (0.000) 
Notes. (1) Intermediation Approach, (PR) Profit/Revenue Approach, (P) Production Approach. (KS) 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (D-value, p-value in brackets), (WMW) Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (W* 
value, p-value in brackets). Statistical significance: * statistically significant at 5% level. C, 9: 1 
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Table 6.18. Probabilities of stochastic dominance of productivity indexes calculated 
by different input/output methodologies (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) 
Ho- F'(Ll')> FP(EFF") Ho - FPR (LI ') > F'(EFF) Ho - FPR (L] PR) > Fp (EFFP) 
HI -not HO HI -not HO HI -not HO 
1998-1999 0.144 0.476 0.139 
1999-2000 0.061 * 0.482 0.078* 
2000-2001 0.078* 0.529 0.113 
2001-2002 0.097* 0.473 0.113 
2002-2003 0.053* 0.507 0.059* 
Note. (1) Intermediation Approach, (PR) Profit/Revenue Approach, (P) Production Approach. 
Statistical sigynificance: * statistically significant at 10% level. 
The stochastic kernel results, describing the intra-distribution mobility, are 
shown in Figure 6.6. Specifically, the graphs represent bivariate density functions 
estimates for the productivity indexes estimated using different input/output 
approaches. Each coordinate direction represents a Luenberger index estimated by the 
particular modelling methodology and the stochastic kernels attempt to describe the 
transition of the productivity level from one modelling methodology to another. 
Looking at the graphs and their contour plots, it can be inferred that moderate 
mobility takes place across the approaches, since the probability mass is "not 
concentrated along the positively sloped diagonal in the contour plots. Although the 
stochastic kernel of the Intermediation and Profit/Revenue based productivity indexes 
ignore the positive sloped diagonal, its mode is located on it. Intuitively, this means 
that if the bank reported for the level of the Intermediation productivity index has the 
highest frequency (roughly in the range -0.05 and 0.05), the Profit/Revenue based 
productivity index has a very high probability of being in the same range. 
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6.6. Conclusions 
This chapter presents a non-radial DEA approach to measuring the 
productivity performance of the CEE banking using the Luenberger productivity 
index based on technology which incorporates production of undesirable outputs and 
allows for negative data. In addition, the efficiency change and technological shift 
components of productivity growth are decomposed into the factors which take into 
account the environmental and risk management effects along with the variation of 
the technical efficiency adjusted for the risk and environment. This decomposition 
provides complementary information about the risk management and environmental 
sources of productivity changes and provides valuable information for managerial 
decisions. As the proposed technique has been applied to 13 Central and Eastern 
European banking industries to model their performance from 1998 to 2003 utilising 
three alternative input/output methodologies, the sensitivity of non-radial productivity 
indexes to the choice of modelling approaches of the banking production process was 
also conducted. 
The findings suggest that the main driver of productivity change in the 
Central and Eastern European banks is technological improvement. The 
decomposition of the technological change suggests that in the beginning of the 
period, when the region experienced several financial crises, the productivity growth 
of a transition bank hinged on its ability to capitalise on advanced technology and 
successfully take into account the risk and environment as in the case, for instance, of 
OTP bank in Hungary. Although, the later periods provide evidence that technology 
can be affected by the environmental effect (for example, BCR bank in Romania) one 
of the most important factors of technological improvement/ decline is risk 
management, for example VUB bank in Slovakia and CSOB bank in Czech Republic. 
Although the visual graphs of the productivity growth dynamics suggest that 
the trends reported by different input/output methodologies are quite similar, the 
statistical tests indicate that the Intermediation and Profit/Revenue based approaches 
produce statistically different productivity results from the Production approach. 
Moreover, the tests for the stochastic dominance show that the productivity indexes 
reported by the Production approach in most cases stochastically dominate the 
174 
Intermediation and Profit/Revenue based results with 90% confidence. In addition, the 
stochastic kernel density estimates of the productivity results, which attempt to 
identify the changes in the levels of the productivity growth/decline when different 
approaches are used, show that a moderate transition of the productivity levels takes 
place when the alternative input/output methodology are utilised. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis of this thesis is aimed at filling a major gap in both the theoretical 
and empirical literature on banking efficiency and productivity analysis. It focuses on 
the risk and environmental dimensions of bank efficiency and productivity and their 
sensitivity to the choice of the input/output methodology used. In particular, the main 
contributions of this thesis are as follows. First, undesirable output technologies can 
be classified according to two categories: technological and behavioural. Second, a 
non-radial efficiency measurement model of production technology with undesirable 
output(s) is developed, where the outputs (both desirable and undesirable) can be 
negative. Third, a new way of incorporating banking risk into the efficiency and 
productivity analysis as an undesirable output and its decomposition is provided. 
Fourth, the Luenberger productivity index for undesirable output technology with 
negative outputs and a decomposition of productivity components into the factors 
determined by the risk management and environmental factors are suggested. Fifth, a 
meta-analysis of input/output variables and approaches in banking efficiency and 
productivity studies is given. Sixth, statistical tests of the sensitivity of efficiency 
measures, return parameters and productivity indexes to the choice of input/output 
methodology are analysed. However, perhaps the main value of the thesis is its 
application to the Eastern European transition banking. 
Before outlining the directions for further work, unambiguous conclusions 
have emerged with regard to the modelling methodologies in the banking efficiency 
and productivity analysis. First, as meta-analysis showed, the chosen approach and 
the definition of the input and output variables mainly rely on theoretical concepts of 
and the choice of a particular approach in describing the banking production process 
is not affected by the availability of particular input or output variable information. 
However, the empirical literature uses different specifications for the inputs and 
outputs within the same input/output approach. Here, the efficiency and productivity 
measures and the return parameters in the defined models for the undesirable output 
technology with negative outputs estimated utilising three alternative methodologies, 
namely Intermediation, Production and Profit/Revenue, are statistically compared. In 
general, the statistical test and density analysis indicate that different approaches in 
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the specification of inputs and outputs of banking production can produce 
significantly different efficiency scores, although the inter-density mobility analysis 
of relative efficiency using stochastic kernels suggests banks do not change their 
relative position to the mean. On the other hand, the stochastic analysis of the returns 
parameters and productivity indexes of the banks implies that the conclusions 
regarding the returns of the banks is sensitive to the choice of particular approaches. 
The empirical results also suggest that of the Central and Eastern European 
countries analysed Czech, Hungarian and Polish banks are the most technically 
efficient banks. The risk decomposition suggests that banking risk is generally 
affected by external environmental factors. The environmental effect component of 
banking efficiency estimated by the Production approach reflects possible effects of 
financial distress on banking efficiency scores in Romania for the year 2000. This is 
not supported by the Intermediation approach and is supported empirically by the 
Profit/Revenue approach for the years 2002-2003. Furthermore, both the LLP 
decomposition and Risk Management effect component of banking efficiency 
calculated by three methodologies suggest that in 2001 banks in most countrýes 
manage risk worse than in other years, which is a possible reflection of the 'Disaster 
myopia' phenomenon in banking. The productivity analysis implies that the main 
driver of productivity change in the Central and Eastern European banks is 
technological improvement. The decomposition of the technological change suggests 
that one of the most important factors of technological improvement/decline in CEE 
transition banking relates to risk management. 
The analysis presented in this thesis offers considerable opportunities for 
further research. The non-radial efficiency technique defined in the thesis reduces the 
impact of slacks on the efficiency measure. It would also be interesting to consider the 
Slack Based Model suggested by Tone (2001) in the analysis of CEE banking with a 
theoretical discussion of important properties of SBM measures: continuity and 
commensurability. Another research direction could include constructing the CEE 
regional frontier in order to see the relationship between economic growth and 
banking sector development in transition following the recent discussion in the 
economic theory literature (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; and Sylla, 2006). Finally, a 
theoretical area of research also deserving additional attention concerns the 
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comparison of efficiency scores. Simar and Zelenyuk (2006) suggested a bootstrap 
methodology to test the equality of efficiency scores' distribution. However, there is a 
considerable lack of statistical methodologies to test the stochastic dominance of 
efficiency scores of two groups of DMUs or efficiency measures estimated using 
alternative input/output approaches. 
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APPENDIX A. PRUDENTIAL REQUIREMENTS IN THE 
ANALYZED CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN BANKING 
INDUSTRIES 
This Appendix gives an analytical overview of the evolution of the prudential 
regulations in the thirteen analyzed banking sectors on the Central and Eastern 
Europe, namely Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. The survey 
focuses on the overview of the countries' banking regulations and supervisions with a 
particular emphasis on the regulations on the minimum capital requirement, capital 
adequacy, credit requirements, loan classification, foreign currency open position, 
required reserves, investment regulations and other requirements. The countries' 
banking regulations and supervisions are discussed in the alphabetical order. 
A. 1. Banking regulation in Croatia 
Central bank: The HNB (Hrvatska Narodna Banka - Croatian National Bank) 
is the central bank of the Republic of Croatia. It is responsible for the issuing/revoking 
licenses for the banks and supervision of banks. The Banking Law, which is available 
at http: //www. hnb. hr/propisi/zakoni-htm-pdf/ezbanke-7-2002. pdf, sets out the broad 
principles underlying the HNB's supervision of the banking system. Supervision is 
carried out through on-site inspections and by the provision of relevant financial and 
other data by banks to the HNB. The Management and Supervisory Boards of a bank 
may challenge the findings set out in the resulting HNB report. 
Minimum Capital: The minimum capital requirement for a bank is HRK 
20mn. Depending on the amount of capital, banks may carry out a wider range of 
banking activities. 
Capital Adequacy: Banks are required to maintain their liable capital above 
10% of risk-weighted assets as defined by the BIS, and are obliged to submit to the 
HNB quarterly reports on this capital ratio. 
Credit Requirement: Exposure to'a single borrower may not exceed 25% of 
capital. Exposure to a shareholder owning more than 3% of the bank's capital may not 
exceed 5% of capital. Aggregate exposure to shareholders owning more than 5% of 
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the bank's capital and to associates of those shareholders must not exceed 25% of 
capital. Aggregate large exposures (those which individually exceed 10% of capital) 
must not exceed 400% of capital. Exposures to the Republic of Croatia, the HNB and 
the Croatian Guarantee Agency are exempt from the limits set out above. 
Credit provision: The loan classification is given in Table Al. 
Table Al. The loan classification by Croatian banking regulation. 
Loan Categories Days Overdue Provision rate 
"A" Current 0% 
"B" 30-60 days overdue 10%-20% 
licif 61-180 days overdue 50% 
"D" 181-365 days overdue 60%-90% 
"E" Over 365 davs overdue 100% 
Source: World Bank. 
Liquidity: The regulation requires 87% of all liabilities with maturity of less 
than one year be invested in assets maturing within one year (World Bank). 
Foreign currency open position: Banks must keep a ratio of short-term 
foreign exchange assets to short-term foreign exchange liabilities at the level least 
than 53%. Additionally, the net open foreign exchange position must not exceed 30% 
of liable capital. 
Required reserves: According to the HNB Banks Bulletin, in 2000 the 
reserve requirements are 23.5% and reduced from the level of 28.5%. 
Investment regulations: A bank must notify the NHB of all shareholders 
with an individual equity holding exceeding 10% of total voting shares. A bank must 
seek approval from the CNB before acquiring or ceding a stake in another bank or 
company that is greater than 10 percent of the bank's liable capital. A bank's 
investments in land, buildings, equipment, and office facilities may not exceed 30% of 
liable capital. The sum of a bank's total investments in land, buildings, plant, office 
equipment, and owner's equity in banks and other companies may not exceed 70% of 
liable capital. 
Other requirements: According to World Bank, the State Agency for 
Savings Deposit Insurance and Bank Rehabilitation set up a deposit insurance scheme 
in July 1997. According to the scheme, all banks were obliged to contribute an initial 
0.6% of total retail deposits and an initial 0.3% of their equity to the fund. Thereafter, 
quarterly contributions are made at 0.2% of the average balance of insured retail 
deposits. Retail deposits were insured, fully up to HRK 30,000, whereas amounts 
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between HRK 30,000 and HRK 50,000 were 75% covered. Balances exceeding HRK 
50,000 were not covered under this scheme. The summary of 
prudential regulation in Croatian banking industry is given in Table A2. 
Table A2. Summary of prudential regulations in Croatia 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Minimum capital (Depending DM 5 DM 5 DM 5 HRK 20 HRK 20 
on the license, i. e. limited or min min min DM bin bin 
fully licensed) DNI DNI 10 15 min HRK 40 HRK 40 
1 Omin min bin bin 
HRK 60 HRK 60 
bin bin 
Minimum capital adequacy 8 8 8 10 10 
ratio, % 
Maximum exposure to single 30 30 30 25 25 
borrower, % of capital 
Maximum total large 200 200 200 400 400 
exposures, % of capital 
Maximum related party 30 25 
lending, % of capital 
Max. Open foreign exchange 30 30 
position, % of capital 
Maximum investment in one 10 
non-financial enterprise, % of 
capital 
Maximum investment in non- 70 
financial enterprises, % of 
capital 
Minimum reserve with the 31 31 30 29.5 23.5 
National bank, % of deposits 
Source: World Bank, HNB. 
181 
A. 2. Banking regulation in Czech Republic 
The central bank of Czech Republic is Czech National Bank (CNB), and it 
defines the prudential framework for banking business and banks' activities are 
governed by Act No. 21/1992. From 2002, banks required to have their internal risk 
management systems audited. Additionally, CNB has instructed each bank to disclose 
a quarterly survey of its activities and results. Moreover, in 2002 CNB introduced 
minimum requirements for disclosure of information by banks and foreign bank 
branches in order to promote the safety and soundness of the banking system by 
increasing its transparency. 
The consent of the CNB is required for foreign capital participation in an 
existing bank, for merger, amalgamation or split of the bank or reduction in the bank's 
authorised capital unless it results from a loss, and for transfer of more than 15% of 
the bank's equity through one or more transactions to any one or more parties. 
Minimum Capital: The minimum regulatory capital requirements for banks 
and foreign bank branches was raised in January 1994 from CZK 300mn to CZK 
500mn necessary for the granting of a banking license, which payable to the CNB in' 
cash to ensure the capital is real. 
Capital Adequacy: The law on solvency requirements was amended in 1991, 
requiring banks to have 8% BIS solvency ratios by end-1996. Moreover, according to 
2005 Annual report on banking supervision, banks will be allowed to use special 
approaches based on advanced mathematical models for calculating the capital 
requirements for credit risk (IRB approach) and the newly introduced operational risk 
(AMA approach) under the revised capital adequacy framework (Basel 11, or the 
revised EU directives 2001/12/EC and 93/6/EEC). However, the implementation of 
these approaches is still on earlier stages: pre-validation of the IRB approach was 
conducted in four banks, while the AMA approach was addressed by CNB staff in 
three banks. Nevertheless, a capital ratio of 8% of the value of risk-weighted assets is 
still considered as an absolute minimum. 
Credit Requirement: According to the Provision of the CNB No. 2 of 
3.07.2002, the large credit exposure limits are subject to the following guidelines: 
a) Credit risk exposure to one person or to any group of connected counterparties is 
limited to 25% of the bank's capital. 
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b) Credit risk exposure of all counterparties connected to a bank, may not exceed 20% 
of the bank's capital. 
Credit provision: The loan classification is given in Table A3. 
Table A3. The loan classification by Czech banking regulation. 
Loan Categories for Days Overdue Provision 
Loss Provisioning 
- 
rate 
Standard less than I month overdue 0% 
Watch 1-3 months overdue, rescheduled before 6 months 5% 
Substandard 3-6 months overdue, rescheduled within the last 6 months 20% 
Doubtful 6 months to I year overdue 50% 
Loss overdue for over I year; debtor under bankruptcy or 100% 
settlement 
Source: World Bank. 
Foreign currency open position: An amendment to the CNB Provision, 
effective from January 1996, increased the total limit for the open foreign currency 
position for banks and branches of foreign banks to 20% from 15% of bank capital. 
Additionally a 15% of capital limit was introduced for open bank positions in 
individual convertible currencies. 
Required reserves: At the start of 1997, the CNB cut the ratio from 11.5% to 
9.5%, and in mid-1998 it formulated a medium-term programme to reduce it further. 
This was done in three steps: to 7.5% effective 30 July 1998; to 5.0% effective 28 
January 1999; and to 2.0% effective 7 October 1999. Simultaneously, the preferential 
4% ratio for building societies and INskomoravskd zdru6ni a rozvojovd banka (the 
Czech-Moravian Guarantee and Development Bank) was abolished. A uniform ratio 
applies to all the credit institutions in the reserve requirement regime (CNB)55. 
Investment regulations: Equity investment in an enterprise cannot exceed 
15% of the bank's capital, and the aggregate of such investments cannot exceed 60% 
of the bank's capital. The consent of the CNB is required to buy shares, or acquire 
interests which total more than 10% of the equity of any legal person which is not a 
bank; or to buy shares, or acquire other interests, in legal persons of a non-bank nature 
which total more than 25% of the bank's equity and reserves (World Bank). 
The summary of prudential regulation in Czech Republic banking system is 
given in Table A4. 
'5 More details can be found at 
http: //www. cnb. czJwww. cnb. cz/en/monetary_policy/inflation-reports/boxes-annexes/zpinflace-ol-aPr 
il-a2. html. 
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Table A4. Summary of prudential regulation in Czech Republic 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Minimum Capital CZK 
500 
mln 
Minimum capital adequacy ratio, % 6.25 6.25 8 8 8 
Minimum Liquidity ratios, % 
Maximum exposure to single borrower, % of capital 40 25 25 25 25 
Maximum total large exposures, % of capital 230 230 230 230 
Maximum related party lending, % of capital 20 20 20 20 
Max. Open foreign exchange position, % of capital 20 20 20 20 
Maximum investment in one non-financial 10 10 15 15 
enterprise, % of capital 
Maximum investment in non-financial enterprises, 25 25 60 60 
% of capital 
Minimum reserve with the National bank, % of 11.5 9.5 7.5 2.0 
deposits 
Source: World Bank. 
AA Banking regulation in Estonia 
Under the "Eesti Pank Act" (Eesti Pank - the central bank of Estonia) 56, the 
EP is responsible for regulating financial institutions in Estonia. Off-site inspection is 
carried out constantly, based on financial analysis carried out using reports presented 
by banks. On-site inspections are conducted as often as needed, but at least once every 
two years and prudential regulations are strictly enforced (Credit Institutions Act). 
According to World Bank, the EP exercises the supervision of all credit 
institutions in Estonia. A Supervisory Committee was established at EP in October 
1993, and new reporting procedures and forms for banks were introduced. Banking 
supervision, in particular, is responsible for monitoring adherence by banks to EP 
prudential regulations in the following areas: 
loan classifying and provisioning 
the minimum size of own funds 
liquidity 
foreign exchange risks 
high customer risk concentration 
money laundering 
- internal audit systems and procedures 
- capital adequacy 
- reserve requirement 
- transactions with the related persons 
- investment restrictions 
56 The "Eesti Pank Act" is available at httl2: //www. le, -,, altext. ee/text/en/X70022. htm. 
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Prudential regulations in Estonia have been amended to follow corresponding 
EU directives, for instance, the Minimum Capital requirement for a bank is the 
Kroon equivalent of EUR 5mn, payable only in cash. The previous requirement was 
EEK 60mn until 1 January 1998, EEK 75mn thereafter until I January 2000. 
Capital Adequacy: The minimum ratio was raised on October 1,1997 to 10% 
(from 8%). Four months earlier the risk weighting of loans to local government was 
raised to 100% from 50%. As from July 1998, the 10% capital adequacy ratio applies 
to banks on a consolidated basis. In Feb 2005 (Decree No 2), the minimum ratio of 
capital requirement is set at the level of 8%. 
Credit Requirement: According to Appendix 3 of Decree No 12 (July 2002) 
of the Govemor of EP: 
- Exposure to a single borrower, or any group of connected borrowers, cannot 
exceed 25% of a bank's capital; 
- Exposure to a bank's own subsidiary, its parent company, or other subsidiary 
of the parent cannot exceed 20% of the bank's capital; 
- Total large exposures (those exceeding 10% of capital) should not exceed 
800% of capital. 
Credit Provision: Credit institutions should establish internal methodologies 
and policies regarding classifying overdue loans and the appropriate allocation of 
reserves for losses. Established intemal polices and methodologies are subject to 
regulatory review as well as reviewed as part of the extemal audit. 
Liquidity: Three liquidity levels are monitored: Liquidity I is the ratio of cash 
and assets convertible to cash within two banking days to liabilities which can be met 
within two banking days. Liquidity 11 is the ratio of highly liquid assets to short term 
liabilities. The minimum Liquidity II ratio is set at 35%. Liquidity III is the ratio of 
highly liquid assets to total balance sheet and certain off-balance sheet liabilities. 
Liquidity should also be monitored based on cash flow. Assets and liabilities should 
be structured according to the remaining maturity, and the net positions monitored 
(World Bank). 
Foreign currency open position: Under the guidelines of EP (Decree No 8, 
May 2005), the net open position of a single freely convertible currency must not 
exceed 15% (soft currencies must not exceed 5%) of bank's own funds. However, 
these limits dot not apply to the currencies of the countries joined to the European 
Monetary System's exchange rate mechanism ERM 11. 
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Required reserves: In order to increase liquidity buffers, following the tight 
liquidity situation at the end of 1997, the central bank decided to raise the reserve 
requirement to 13% from 10% of demand, time and savings deposits and other 
liabilities of the same character (including securities). According to EP Governor's 
Decree No 6 (July 2006), the new general reserye requirement rate is 15%. 
Investment regulations: A credit institution cannot invest in an unlimited 
liability entity. Equity investment in an enterprise cannot exceed 15% of the bank's 
capital, and the aggregate of such investments cannot exceed 60% of the bank's 
capital. These restrictions do not apply to holdings in other credit or financial 
institutions. Total investments based on balance sheet value cannot exceed the bank's 
capital. 
Summary of prudential regulations is given in the Table A5. 
Table A5. Summary of prudential regulation in Estonia 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2006 
Minimum Capital EEK EEK EEK EEK EUR 5 EUR 5 
25 mln 50 mln 60 min 75 mln mln mln 
Minimum capital adequacy ratio, % '-- 8 8 10 10 10 8 
Maximum exposure to single 25 25 25 25 25 25 
borrower, % of capital 
Maximum total large exposures, % 800 800 800 800 800 800 
of capital 
Maximum related party lending, % 25 25 25 25 25 25 
of capital 
Max. Open foreign exchange 30 30 30 30 
position, % of capital 
Maximum investment in one non- 15 15 15 15 15 15 
financial enterprise, % of capital 
Maximum investment in non- 60 60 60 60 60 60 
financial enterprises, % of capital 
Minimum reserve with the National 10 10 10 13 13 15 
bank, % of deposits 
Source: World Bank, EP web- site. 
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AA Banking regulation in Hungary 
The Magyar Nemzeti Bank- (MNB), as according to Act LVIII of 2001, is the 
central bank of the Republic of Hungary. It will promote the stability of the financial 
system and development and smooth conduct of policies related to the prudential 
supervision of the financial system. 
In accordance with Grigorian and Manole (2006), licensing requirements and 
regulations were tightened in the Hungarian banking sector. The law introduced 
stricter requirements for bank managers and members of the board, doubled the 
minimum registered capital for banks from Ftl billion to Ft 2 billion, and added a 
second step to the approval process at the Hungarian Banking and Capital Markets 
Supervision Agency (HBCMS). Agency is also responsible for licensing securities 
firms. 
Minimum Capital: The Credit Institutions Act raised the minimum registered 
capital upon establishment as follows: for Banks - HUF 2bn; Co-operatives - 
HUF I OOmn; Financial undertakings - HUF20mn. 
Capital Adequacy: The requirements set the minimum capital adequacy ratio of a 
credit institution at 8%. 
Credit Requirement: No single exposure may exceed 25% of bank's capital. The 
total value of all large exposures, explicitly those which arc exceeding 10% of bank's 
capital, cannot exceed eight times bank's capital. 
Liquidity: At least 10% of average monthly total assets must be. It remains 
flexible as to the way of provisioning for liquidity: there are no portfolio liquidity 
requirements, whilst the obligation to maintain liquidity resides in an "adequate" 
matching of the maturity and amounts of assets and liabilities. This leaves it to the 
HBCMS to assess the "adequacy" of institutions' individual liquidity management 
(World Bank) 
The summary of prudential regulation in Hungarian banking system is 
presented in the Table A6. 
Table A6. Summary of prudential regulation in Hungary 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Minimum Capital HUF I HUF I HUF 2 bn HUF 2 bn HUF 2 
bn bn bn 
Minimum capital adequacy ratio, % 8 8 8 8 8 
Minimum Liquidity ratios, % 10 10 10 10 
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Maximum exposure to single borrower, 25 25 25 25 25 
% of capital 
Maximum total large exposures, % of 800 800 800 800 800 
capital 
Max. Open foreign exchange position, 30 30 30 30 
% of capital 
Maximum investment in one non- 40 15 15 15 15 
financial enterprise, % of capital 
Maximum investment in non-financial 100 100 100 60 
enterprises, % of capital 
Source: World Bank. 
A. 5. Banking regulation in Latvia 
The principal basis of banking legislation is the Law "On Credit Institutions", 
adopted in 1995. The legislative framework for banking meets EU requirements and 
in some respects exceeds them (World Bank). The Bank of Latvia (the central of the 
Republic of Latvia) had already started to implement the most important EU 
directives concerning the banking sector. As in Article 10 of the Law "On the Bank of 
Latvia" (May 1992), the Bank of Latvia performs supervision as well as on-site and 
off-site examinations of credit 
Minimum C. apital: The banks must have a minimum capital base. qf at least 
5mn Euros in the LVL equivalent in accordance with the exchange rate established by 
the Bank of Latvia. 
Credit Requirement: A credit institution's exposure is considered large if it 
exceeds 10% of own funds. According to the regulation, the total of large exposures 
may not exceed 800% of own funds while exposure to a single client or a group of 
connected clients may not exceed 25% of own funds. Moreover, any credit exposure 
to a non-related entity or group of non-related entities may not exceed 25% of credit 
institution's equity and the total credit exposure to all related parties may not exceed 
15% equity. Table A7 reports the loan classification and the provision rate in Latvian 
banking. The summary of prudential regulation is given in Table A8. 
Table A7. Loan classification in Latvia 
Loan Categories for Loss Provisioning Days Overdue Provision 
rate 
tandard Perfonning 0% 
Close-watch Overdue < 30 days 10% 
Substandard Overdue 30 - 90 days 30% 
Doubtful Overdue > 90 days 60% 
Loss Lost loans 100% 
Source: World Bank. 
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Table A8. Summary of prudential regulation in Latvia 
1996 1997 1998 1999 
Minimum Capital LVL I LVL I min LVL 2 min EUR 5 
min min 
Minimum capital adequacy ratio, % 10 10 10 10 
Minimum Liquidity ratios, % 30 30 
Maximum exposure to single borrower, % of 25 25 25 
capital 
Maximum total large exposures, % of capital 800 800 800 
Maximum related party lending, % of capital 15 15 15 
Max. Open foreign exchange position, % of 20 20 20 
capital 
Maximum investment in one non-financial 15 15 15 
enterprise, % of capital 
Maximum investment in non-financial 60 60 60 
enterprises, % of capital 
Minimum reserve with the National bank, % 8 8 
of devosits 
Source: World Bank. 
AA Banking regulation in Lithuania 
The Bank of Lithuania (BOL) is the central bank of the Republic of Lithuania. 
According to World Bank, the BOL inspects banks, requires reports, issues rules and 
instructions, and applies various sanctions to banks violating any banking laws and 
regulations. However, according to the U. S. Department of Commerce, "Goverru-nent 
policies do not interfere in the free flow of financial resources or the allocation of 
credit. " 57 
Minimum Capital: The minimum capital requirement for all banks is EUR 
5. Omn in LTL equivalent as of January 1,1998, and increased from ECU 3.8mn 
($4.6mn) as in line with EU rules. 
Capital Adequacy: The capital adequacy requirement specifies that the ratio 
of eligible bank capital and risk-weighted assets and off-balance sheet liabilities may 
not be less than 8%. 
Credit Requirement: The BOL lending requirements state that the maximum 
exposure to one borrower may not exceed 25% of the bank's capital. Amount of loans 
granted by the bank to its parent enterprise, other subsidiaries of the parent enterprise 
57 2006 Index of Economic Freedom, 
http: //www. heritalge. org/research/features/index/Country. cfm? id=Lithuania 
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or of the bank, may not exceed 75 per cent of bank capital for each borrower, if the 
BOL carries out consolidated supervision of the financial group as a whole. If the 
BOL does not carry out consolidated supervision of the financial group as a whole, 
the loan amount granted by the bank to its parent enterprise, other subsidiaries of the 
parent enterprise or of the bank, may not exceed 20 per cent of bank capital for each 
borrower. . In addition, 
lending to connected persons is limited to 20% of bank 
capital. Moreover, the large exposure ratio may not exceed 800 per cent of bank 
capital. The loan classification and their provision is given in Table A9. 
Table A9. Loan classification in Lithuania 
Loan Categoriesfor 
Loss Provisioning 
Days Overdue Provision 
rate 
Standard loans Timely repayment, reliable financial position, 0% 
adequately secured 
Watched loan Overdue < 30 days, unstable/unknown financial 0% 
position, not adequately secured 
Substandard loans Overdue 31-90 days, deteriorating financial position, 20% 
not adequately secured 
Doubtful loans Overdue 91-180 days, not secured 40% 
Bad loans Overdue > 181 days, going bankrupt or in liquidation, 100% 
collateral nledQed to other creditor- 
Source: World Bank. 
Liquidity: Commercial banks are required to ensure at least a 30% liquidity 
ratio. This is calculated by dividing the bank's liquid assets by liabilities on each 
claim. This constrains banks' assets according to their liability allocations. 
The maximum open position in foreign currency and precious metals: the 
overall open position in foreign currency (Euro position is excluded) may not exceed 
25% of bank capital, and the ratio of the open position in one currency (Euro position 
is excluded) or precious metals may not exceed 15% of bank capital. 
Required reserves: The reserve requirement rate is 6%. Zero reserve 
requirement rate is applied to the following: 1) deposits with initial maturity of over 
two years or with the redemption notice term 
, 
specified in a relevant agreement of over 
two years; 2) debt securities issued with an initial maturity of over two years; and 3) 
repurchase agreements. 
Investment regulations: The Law on Banks requires that total bank 
investment in the shares or capital of other companies may not exceed 60% of bank's 
capital, while investment in an individual company is limited to 15% of bank- capital. 
These provisions are not applicable to investment in the shares and capital of such 
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companies that are attributed to the type of enterprises engaged in credit and financial 
activities in the laws of the Republic of Lithuania and the legislation of the Bank of 
Lithuania. Banks are prohibited from acquiring shares in a company that holds a 
controlling interest in the bank, or become a co-owner of such a company. 
The summary of prudential regulation in Lithuania is given in Table A 10. 
Table AlO. Summary of prudential regulation in Lithuania 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2006 
Minimum Capital ECU 3.8 ECU 5 ECU 5 ECU 5 
min min min rnin 
Minimum capital adequacy ratio, % 10 10 10 8 
Minimum Liquidity ratios, % 30 30 30 30 
Maximum exposure to single borrower, % of 25 25 25 25 
capital 
Maximum total large exposures, % of capital 800 
Maximum related party lending, % of capital 10 10 10 
Max. Open foreign exchange position, % of 30 30 30 25 
capital 
Maximum investment in one non-financial 10 10 10 15 
enterprise, % of capital 
Maximum investment in non-financial 60 
enterprises, % of capital 
Minimum reserve with the National bank, % 6 10 10 10 6 
of devosits 
Source: World Bank, LOB. 
A. 7. Banking regulation in Moldova 
The National Bank of Moldova (NBM) is the central bank of the Republic of 
Moldova. 
Minimum Capital: The central bank has increased the minimum capital 
requirement, which is expected to contribute to consolidation in the banking sector. 
Current requirement for the minimum capital of the banks is set at MDL50 mn, MDL 
100 mn and MDL 150 mn according to the license (last amendment June 2006). 
Capital Adequacy: From January 1,2000 all banks must have and maintain a 
ratio of Total Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets of at least 12 percent, an 
increase from previous requirement of 10%. 
Credit Requirement: The net credit exposure of the bank to a person or 
group of interrelated persons should not exceed 25 percent of the bank's Total 
Regulatory Capital. 
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The sum large credits (a "large credit" defined as the net credit exposure of the bank 
to any person or group of interrelated persons equal to 10 percent or more of Total 
Regulatory Capital) shall not exceed 5 times the bank's Total Regulatory Capital. 
Credit Provision: In accordance with the Regulation on credit classification 
and allowance for loan losses ("Risk Fund") (last amendment June 2006), all loans are 
subdivided into five categories: standard, under supervision, substandard, doubtful 
and loss (Table Al 1). 
Table Al 1. Loan classification in Moldova 
Loan Categ-oriesfor Loss Provision 
Provisioning rate 
Standard loans 2 
Loans under supervision 5 
Substandard loans 30 
Doubtful loans 75 
Loss 100 
Source: NBM. 
Liquidity: the liquidity ratio requires the ratio of liquid assets to deposits with 
maturity of less than 30 days to be'no less than 30% (World Bank). 
Foreign currency open position: According to the Regulation on bank's 
open foreign exchange position (last amendment June, 2006), the following limits 
were set: 
e the long open foreign exchange position ratio for each foreign currency shall 
not exceed "+10%"; 
* the short open foreign exchange position ratio for each foreign currency shall 
not be less than "-10%" (USD - "-15%"); 
e the sum of long open foreign exchange position ratios for all currencies shall 
not exceed "+20%"; 
e the sum of short open foreign exchange position ratios for all currencies shall 
not be less than "-20%"; 
* ratio of the sum of balance-sheet assets in foreign currency and the sum of 
balance-sheet liabilities in foreign currency shall not exceed "+25%" or be less 
than "-25%". 
However, the limit stipulated in this point shall not have any impact upon 
banks whose both the sum of balance sheet assets in foreign currency and the one of 
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balance -sheet liabilities in foreign currency will not exceed, separately for each of 
them, 10% of the total regulatory capital. 
Investment regulations: A written authorization from the National Bank of 
Moldova for a bank to hold an equity interest in legal entities shall be obtained prior 
to entering into purchase transaction or transferring equity interest in legal entities. 
Banks shall inform the National Bank about any equity investment in legal entities, 
and shall present the decision of competent body, within 10 days after the investment 
took place (Regulation on equity investments of banks in legal entities, last 
amendment Jan 2006). 
The summary of prudential regulation in Moldova is given in Table A 12. 
Table A12. Summary of prudential regulation in Moldova 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2006 
Minimum Capital in MDL (Three I min 4 min 4 min 8 min 8 min 50 min 
types of licenses) 4 min 8 min 8 min 16 min 16 min 100 min 
8 min 12 min 12 min 24 min 24 min 150 min 
Minimum capital adequacy ratio, % 44 6 8 10 
Minimum Liquidity ratios, % 30 30 
Maximum exposure to single borrower, 30 30 -- 30 25 
% of capital 
Maximum total large exposures, % of 500 500 
capital 
Maximum related party lending, % of 20 20 
capital 
Maximum investment in one non- 15 15 
financial enterprise, % of capital 
Maximum investment in non-financial 50 50 
enterprises, % of capital 
Source: World Bank, NBM. 
A. B. Banking regulation in Poland 
The National Bank of Poland (NBP) is the central bank of the Polish Republic. 
In accordance with the 1997 Banking Law and The Act of the National Bank of 
Poland, supervision is to be exercised by the Commission for Banking Supervision 
(CBS). The executive body of the Commission is the, General Inspectorate of Banking 
Supervision (GIBS). The CBS is responsible for: i) regulating banks, in order to 
safeguard the security of funds accumulated by banks; ii) supervision of banks in 
terms of compliance with the Banking Law and the NBP Law, permits granted for 
formation, and bank's Articles of Association; iii) periodical controlling of banks' 
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financial performance and reporting the results to the Council of Monetary Policy; iv) 
execution of supervision duties through the GIBS. 
Minimum Capital: The minimum capital for domestic banks has been lifted 
several times and now stands at EUR 5mn, reflecting the requirements of the 
European Second Banking Coordination Directive. Foreign banks' capital 
requirement is set at the equivalent of $6mn to be held in local currency (World 
Bank). 
Capital Adequacy: The Banking Law requires banks to maintain a solvency 
ratio of at least 8%. However, all banks, which began operations, are obliged to 
maintain a solvency ratio of 15% during the first twelve months of activity and 12% 
during the second year. The calculation of the solvency ratio is broadly in line with 
the Basle Capital Accord and the European Own Funds and Solvency Ratio Directives 
(World Bank). 
Credit Requirement: Under NBP rules, banks are subject to credit exposure 
limits similar to those specified in the European Large Exposures Directive: 
9 the sum of credits and contingent liabilities (excluding those guaranteed by the 
State or international financial institutions or cash-secured) to a .. single entity or 
group can-not exceed 25% of a bank's own funds: 
* each single credit exceeding 10% of a bank's own funds has to be reported to the 
CBS; 
* The aggregate amount of the bank's exposure to a single party or a group of 
interconnected parties must not exceed 800 percent of the bank's capital. 
The classification of loans is given in Table A 13. 
Table A13. Loan classification in Poland 
Loan Categories 
for Loss 
Provisioning 
Days Overdue Provision 
rate 
Standard There are no major delinquencies in payments, and the economic (0%) 
and financial situation of the debtors does not arouse particular 
doubts. I 
Watchlist Loans where payments are < 30 days overdue; financial standing (0.5%) 
of the debtor is good, but the risk of country, region, industry or 
debtor's customers is "being watched". 
Substandard Payments are between thirty and ninety days overdue. (20%) 
Doubtful Debt service is overdue between 90 and ISO days; or, loans from (50%) 
debtors whose economic and f inaneial situation considerably 
deteriorates and losses affect equity. 
Loss Overdue loans exceeding 180 days; 'or, borrowers under (100%) 
liquidation or bankruptcy proceedings, or, loans from debtors 
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against whom the bank has had recourse to the law; or, loans 
contested by debtors. 
Source: World Bank 
Foreign currency open position: Each bank- must limit its net open position 
in individual convertible currencies to 15% of its own funds, and in individual non- 
convertible currencies to 2% of its own funds. 
Investment regulations: The total value of equity and bond investments 
(excluding State and NBP bonds) cannot exceed 15% of a bank's own funds. 
Summary of prudential regulation is given in Table A14. 
Table A14. Summary of prudential regulation in Poland 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Minimum Capital ECU 5 ECUS EUR5 
mln mln mln 
Minimum capital adequacy ratio, %8 12 12 12 12 
Minimum Liquidity ratios, % 
Maximum exposure to single borrower, % of 15 25 25 25 
capital 
Maximum total large exposures, % of capital 800 800 800 800 800 
Maximum related party lending, % of capital 15 10 10 
Max. Open foreign exchange position, % of 30 30 30 
capital 
Maximum investment in one non-financial 15 15 15 
enterprise, % of capital 
Maximum investment in non-financial 25 25 60 60 60 
enterprises, % of capital 
Minimum reserve with the National bank, % of 20/11/5* 20/11/5 5 
deoosits 
*- Demand / Time / Foreign 
Source: World Bank. 
A. 9. Banking regulation in Romania 
The National Bank of Romania (NBR) is the country's central bank and is 
responsible for authorizing and supervising banks in Romania. To bring the legal 
framework to EU standards, the Romanian legal framework on banking underwent a 
comprehensive review process. Amendments to the Banking Law strengthen the 
power and independence of NBR, set forth clear procedures for declaring insolvent 
banks bankrupt and tighten banking supervision. 
Minimum Capital: The minimum level of the initial capital is established 
through regulations issued by the National Bank of Romania and may not be less than 
the equivalent in domestic currency of EUR 5 million. 
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Capital Adequacy: According to World Bank, From April 30,2000, banks 
must maintain a capital adequacy ratio of at least 12% which is an increase from 8%. 
Credit Provision: Credit provision matrix given in Table A15, is defined by 
quality of the borrower and debt service history. Quality of the borrower is classified 
as: 
A: Very good & not expected to decline. Permits payment of debt at maturity 
B: Very good or good though long-term performance is somewhat 
questionable 
C: Satisfactory, but there is a clear negative trend 
D: Deteriorating. Financial crises occur within short intervals 
E: Shows losses. Clear evidence that debt cannot be repaid 
The debt service history of the debtor is evaluated and classified as follows: 
Good: Principal & interest paid at maturity within 7 days of maturity 
Weak: Principal and interest paid within 7-30 days 
Inadequate: Principal and interest paid after 30 days 
Table A 15. Romania: loan classification matrix 
Good 'Weak Inadequate 
A Standard (0%) Watch (5%) Substandard (20%) 
B Watch (5%) Substandard (20%) Doubtful (50%) 
C Substandard (20%) Doubtful (50%) Loss (100%) 
D Doubtful (50%) Loss (100%) Loss (100%) 
E Loss (100%) Loss (100%) Loss (100%) 
Source: World Bank. 
The summary of prudential regulation in Romania is given in Table A 16. 
Table A16. Summary of prudential regulation in Romania 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2006 
Minimum Capital, ROL 25 bin 25 bin 50 bin 50 bin 50 bin EUR 
5mn 
Minimum capital adequacy ratio, % 8 8 8 8 8 
Minimum Liquidity ratios, % 
Maximum exposure to single borrower, 20 20 20 20 20 
% of capital 
Maximum total large exposures, % of 800 800 800 800 800 
capital 
Maximum related party lending, % of 20 20 20 20 20 
capital 
Max. Open foreign exchange position, 10 10 10 
% of capital 
Maximum investment in one non- 20 20 20 20 10 
financial enterprise, % of capital 
Maximum investment in non-financial 
196 
cnterprises, % of capital 
Minimum reserve with the National 7.5 /40 9 /20 25 /20 25 /20 25 /20 
bank, % of deposits* 
*-% of domestic and % of foreign deposits respectively 
Source: World Bank. 
A. 10. Banking regulation in Russia 
According to the Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation 
(Bank of Russia)" of June 2002, the Bank of Russia is the central bank of Russian 
Federation. 
Minimum Capital: The authorized capital minimum requirements set for 
newly established credit organizations is EUR 5 mn in ruble equivalent. 
Capital Adequacy: The capital adequacy ratio has been set at 10%- 11% as of 
Feb 2004. 
Credit Provision: According to Bank of Russia, before August 1,2004, loan 
loss reserves were calculated for fopr credit risk groups and a fixed percentage of 
deductions was set for each group (Bank of Russia Instruction No. 62a, dated June 30, 
1997, "On the Procedure for Making and Using Loan Loss Provisions"). After August 
1,2004, calculations have been made for five loan categories. Provisions have been 
cancelled for (the highest) Category I loans and minimum and maximum provisions 
have been established for Category 11,111 and IV loans, depending on the collateral of 
Category I and 11 quality (Bank of Russia Regulation No. 254 - 
P, dated March 26, 
2004, "On the Procedure for Making by Credit Institutions Loan Loss Provisions and 
Provisions for Loan Debts and Similar Debts"). Classification and their provisions are 
given in Table A17. 
Table A 17. Loan classification in Russia 
Loan Calegoriesfor Loss Provisioning Provision 
rate 
I (Standard) 
-0 11 (Substandard) 1-20 
III (Doubtful loans) 21-50 
IV (Problem loans) 51-100 
V (Bad loans) 100 
Source: Bank of Russia. 
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Liquidity: According to Instruction No 5529 as Feb 2004, the instant liquidity 
ratio has been set at 15% of the balance. The current liquidity ratio has been set at no 
less than 70% of the balance and the long-term liquidity ratio has been set at no more 
than 120%. The share of liquid assets in the total assets of a credit organization has 
been set at no less than 20% of the balance. 
Foreign currency open position: the percentage ratio of the total value of the 
open currency positions to equity capital equals or exceeds 2% 
Required reserves: According to the decision of the Bank of Russia Board of 
Directors, since July 8,2004, the required reserves for obligations to households were 
lowered from 7% to 3.5% and for other obligations of credit institutions in rubles and 
in foreign currency from 7% to 3.5%. 
Summary of prudential regulation in Russia is given in Table A 18. 
Table A 18. Summary of prudential regulation in Russia 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2006 
Minimum Capital, ECU 2 mln 3 mln 5 mln 5 mn 
EUR 
Minimum capital adequacy ratio, % 4.5 5 6 7 8-9 10-11 
Minimum Liquidity ratios, 20 30 50 70 
Maximum exposure to single borrower, % of 50- 60 40 25 25 25 
capital 100 
Maximum total large exposures, % of capital 1200 1000 800 800 800 
Maximum related party lending, % of capital 60 20 20 
Max. Open foreign exchange position, % of 30 
capital 
Maximum investment in one non-financial Not regulated 10 10 
enterprise, % of capital 
Maximum investment in non-financial Not 45 25 25 
enterprises, % of capital regula ted 
Minimum reserve with the National bank, % 3.5 
of devosits 
Source: World Bank, Bank of Russia. 
A. 11. Banking regulation in Slovakia 
The National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) is the central bank of the Slovak Republic and 
was established in Jan 1993 the National Bank of Slovakia Act No. 566/1992 Zb. 
According to World Bank, the Banking Supervision Division of NBS consists of three 
departments: On-Site Supervision, Off-Site Supervision Departments and Licensing 
Department. The duties of the banking supervision department include both the 
monitoring of performance and the adherence to banking regulations, as well as the 
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imposition of sanctions in cases of non-compliance. Moreover, the NBS may ask 
auditors - all large banks must be audited by a "big 6" audit firm -to provide it with 
additional prudential information when necessary. 
Minimum Capital: Act on Banks (last amendment in 2006) specifies a 
minimum monetary deposit towards a bank's registered capital of SKK 500 mn and a 
minimum monetary deposit towards the registered capital of a bank performing 
mortgage transactions of SKK lbn. 
Capital Adequacy: By the prudential regulation, banks should achieve a 
minimum adequacy ratio of 8%. 
Credit Requirement: The NBS's Decree No 2/2004, which amends Decree 
No 8/2002 of the National Bank of Slovakia on large exposures of banks, is effective 
from 31 January 2004. Pursuant to Article 31 paragraph 9 and Article 32 paragraph 5 
of Act No 483/2001 on banks as amended, a bank is obliged to observe the limits on 
large exposure as follows: 
* The limit on a bank's large exposure to a parent company or subsidiary or to a 
group'Of economically connected persons, of which the bank- is a member 
(20% of own funds); 
* The limit on a bank's large exposure to another person, a group of 
economically connected persons, or to countries and central banks (25% of 
own funds; 
9 The limit on the sum of a bank's large exposure's (800% of own funds; 
* The ratio between large exposure to a natural person and own funds set at the 
level of no more than 2%; 
,ý The ratio of large exposure to a legal person, except for a bank- with its 
registered office in a Zone A country to own funds, set at a maximum level of 
10%; 
e The ratio of large exposure to all related persons to the bank to the bank's own 
funds, set at a maximum level of 40%. 
The loan classification and the provisions in Slovakia are presented in Table 
A19. 
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Table A19. Loan ýIassification and provision 
Loan Categories for Loss Days Overdue Provision 
Provisioning rate 
Standard Client solvent, overdue < 30 days 0% 
Special Mention Temporary financial difficulties, 30 days < overdue >90 days 5% 
Substandard Degenerating financial position, 90 days < overdue > 180 days, 20% 
restructured claims 
Doubtful & Litigious Borrower insolvent, 180 days < overdue > 360 days, 50% 
restructured several times 
Loss Client bankrupt Or in liquidation, overdue > 360 days 100% 
Source: World Bank. 
Liquidity: According to The Decrees 3/2004 and 2/2002, the liquidity 
indicator of a bank for a time period of up to and including seven days is the ratio of 
the sum of assets and the sum of specified liabilities. Liquidity indicator of a bank or 
liquidity of a branch office of a foreign bank for a period of up to and including seven 
days shall be at least 1.00. The liquidity indicator of fixed assets and non-liquid assets 
of a bank is the ratio of the sum of balances in accounts of fixed assets reduced by 
balances of accounts of assets that the bank received as a guarantee transfer of rights 
and balances of accounts of non-liquid assets of the bank to the sum of balances of 
accounts of capital and reserves of the bank. Liquidity -indicator of permanent and 
non-liquid assets of a bank shall not be higher than 1.00. 
The summary of prudential regulation in Slovakia is given in Table A20. 
Table A20. Summary of prudential regulation in Slovakia 
1995 1996 1997 1998 2006 
Minimum Capital, SKK 500 min 500 min 500 min 500 500 min 
min I bn 
Minimum capital adequacy ratio, % 7.25 8 8 8 
Minimum Liquidity ratios, % 
Maximum exposure to single borrower, % of 40 25 25 25 
capital 
Maximum total large exposures, % of capital 800 800 800 
Maximum related party lending, % of capital 25 25 25 
Max. Open foreign exchange position, % of capital 25 25 
Maximum investment in one non-financial 
enterprise, % of capital 
Maximum investment in non-financial enterprises, 25 25 25 10 
% of capital 
Minimum reserve with the National bank, % of 3 and 9*,, 9 9 9 
devosits 
!- Time and Demand deposits 
Source: World Bank, NBS. 
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A. 12. Banking regulation in Slovenia 
Under the Bank of Slovenia Act (July 2002), Banka Slovenije (Bank of 
Slovenia - BoS) is the central bank of the Republic of Slovenia. The BoS establishes 
and oversees the implementation of minimum capital requirement rules, licensing 
procedures, auditing and reporting procedures and loan classification guidelines as 
well as consolidation and mergers regulations. 
Minimum Capital: Under Regulation on the harmonization of the amounts of 
the minimum initial capital of a bank and a savings bank (Jan 2004) , the minimum 
capital requirement for a commercial bank is set at SIT 1.22 bIn. 
Capital Adequacy: Banks must adhere to a capital adequacy ratio of 8 
Credit Requirement: Banking regulation shall be considered the large 
exposure where its value is equal to or exceeds 10% of bank's funds. The bank's 
exposure to a single client does not exceed 25% of bank's funds. Exposures to 
entities connected to the reporting bank must not exceed 20% of capital. The bank 
should not incur large exposures, which in aggregate exceed 800% of its own funds. 
Credit Provision: The BoS has provided the following guidelines for the 
classification of assets by banks (Table A21). 
Table A21. Loan classification and provision in Slovenia 
Loan Categories 
for Loss 
Provisioning 
Days Overdue Provision 
rate 
Standard Very good and no difficulties expected. Pay obligations on 1% 
time 
Watch Good even though current financial position weak. Not 5-15% 
expected to worsen 
Substandard Expected that cash flow will not be sufficient to regularly 1540% 
repay due liabilities 
Doubtful Great chance of losses, or under rehabilitation or bankruptcy 40-99% 
procedures. 
Loss Shows losses, or customers not expected to repay debts. 100% 
Source: World Bank. 
The summary of prudential regulation is given in Table A22. 
Table A22. Summary of prudential regulation in Slovenia 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2006 
Minimum Capital, SIT 1 1.22 
Minimum capital adequacy ratio, % 8 ý8 -- '8 88 
Maximum exposure to single borrower, % ý25ý 25 25 25 25 
of capital 
Maximum total large exposures, % of 100 800 
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capital 
Maximum related party lending, % of 5 20 
capital 
Max. Open foreign exchange position, % 20 
of capital 
Maximum investment in one non-financial is 15 15 15 15 
enterprise, % of capital 
Maximum investment in non-financial 60 60 60 60 60 
enterprises, % of capital 
Source: World Bank, BoS. 
A. 13. Banking regulation in Ukraine 
The National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), the central bank of Ukraine, exercises 
the functions of the banking regulation and the supervision over the business of banks. 
It also exercises the the permanent supervision of the compliance of banks with the 
banking legislation, regulation and the economic norms. 
Minimum Capital: According to the Law of Ukraine on Banks and Banking, the 
minimum size of the bank-authorized capital at moment of registration cannot be less 
than 
1) 1 million EURO - for local cooperative banks; 
2) 3 million EURO - for banks that carry out their activity on the territory of a certain 
oblast (region); 
3) 5 million EURO - for banks that carry out their activity on the entire territory of 
Ukraine. 
Capital Adequacy and Solvency: Minimum capital adequacy ratio is 8%. 
Credit Requirement: Maximum Large Credit Exposure benchmark (the ratio 
between total large credit exposures and bank capital) is maximum 10% for all 
Ukrainian banks. Maximum Exposure per Single Borrower is 25%. The bank should 
not incur large exposures, which in aggregate exceed 800% of its own funds. 
Loan classification and the rate of provision for loans is given in Table A23. 
Table A23. Loan classification and provision in Ukraine 
Loan Categories Days Overdue Provision 
rate 
Standard (Class A) Financial performance is very good and permits the 2% 
payment of loan principal and interest at maturity. At the 
same time, it is judged that the financial performance will 
continue at the same high level. 
Watch (Class B) Financial performance is good or very good, but cannot 5% 
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be maintained at this level over a longer period. 
Substandard (Class C) Financial performance is satisfactory, but shows a clear 20% 
tendency of deterioration. 
Doubtful (Class D) Financial performance is poor and shows clear cyclicality 50% 
over short periods of time. 
Loss (Class E) Financial performance shows losses and clear evidence 100% 
that neither loan principal nor interest can be paid. 
Source: World Bank. 
Liquidity: Quick Liquidity is set at minimum 20%. 
Foreign currency open position: The General Bank Open FX Position 
Limitation is calculated as a ratio of general open FX position to bank capital. The 
benchmark for General Bank Open FX Position is no more than 30%. The benchmark 
for Long (Short) Open FX Position in Hard Currency is no more than 20%. The 
benchmark for Long (Short) Open FX Position in Soft Currency is be no more than 
10%. 
The summary of prudential regulation in Ukrainian banking regulation is 
given in Table A24. 
Table A24. Summary of prudential regulations in Ukraine 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2006 
Minimum Capital, ECU (EUR) 0.75 1 min 2 min 3 min I min 
bin 3 min 
5min 
Minimum capital adequacy ratio, % 8 8 8 8 
Minimum Liquidity ratios, % 20 
Maximum exposure to single borrower, 45 25 25 25 25 
% of capital 
Maximum total large exposures, % of 800 800 800 800 800 
capital 
Maximum related party lending, % of 40 40 40 
capital 
Max. Open foreign exchange position, 40 30 30 
% of capital 
Maximum investment in non-financial 50 50 50 
enterprises, % of capital 
Minimum reserve with the National 15 15 15 15 15 
bank, % of deposits 
Source: World Bank, NBU. 
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APPENDIX B. MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC META-REGRESSIONS 
WITH PRODUCTION APPROACH AS A BASE APPROACH 
Table B3. Results of Multinornial Logistic Meta-Regressions with Production 
approach as a base approach 
Intermediation Value-Added Unspecified Intermediation Value-Added Unspecified 
Xiabour -0.08 (0.932) 1.09 (0.929) -0.09 ( 0.929) Yloans 1.08 0.280 1.54 0.963 -0.44 0.659 
Dpubl 1.91 (0.056) 1.02 ( 0.309) 0.13 (0.893) Dp, hl 1.94 0.052 1.06 0.291 0.52 0.605 
Year 0.09 (0.932) -1.09 (0.274) 0.07 (0.942) Year -0.678 0.500 -1.54 0.124 -0.52 0.606 
Xdep,,, it -0.13 (0.896) -0.74 0.462 0.18 0.860 Yi"est 0.09 0.931 0.05 0.963 -0.03 0.974 
Dpubl 1.98 (0.048) 0.78 0.436 0.23 0.822 Dp,, bi 1.98 0.047 0.68 0.495 0.20 0.843 
Year 0.73 (0.465) 0.15 0.880 -0.26 0.794 Year 0.67 0.502 -0.33 0.739 -0.18 0.859 
Xcapital -0.46 0.642 -0.46 0.642 -0.45 0.651 Y'. 0.39 (0.699) 0.51 0.612 -0.16 0.871 
Dpuhl 1.67 0.094 0.50 0.616 0.19 0.851 Dpubl 1.76 (0.078) 0.51 0.612 0.23 0.818 
Year 0.47 0.642 0.46 0.643 0.44 0.661 Year 0.70 (0.483) -0.54 0.590 -0.20 0.839 
Xi,, t,,, P -0.39 0.696 -0.00 1.000 -0-00 
1.000 Yobs -0.14 (0.888) 0.10 0.919 -0.00 1.000 
Dp,, hl 1.96 0.050 0.29 0.770 0.23 0.820 Dpubl 1.95 (0.051) 0.69 0.492 0.20 0.845 
Year 0.96 0.337 0.68 0.499 -0.19 0.847 Year 0.87 (0.386) -0.38 0.702 -0.17 0.863 
Xnonint 20.93 0.000 17.67 0.000 Ynonc, 0.00 (1.000) -0.00 1.000 0.00 1.000 
Dpubl 1.76 0. 
, 
078 0.52 0.600 0.21 0.832 Dpubl 1.95 (0.052) 0.68 0.496 0.24 0.807 
Year 0.30 0.762 -0.79 0.427 -0.20 0.844 Year 0.63 (0.530) -0.38 0.706 -0.22 0.828 
Xquality 0.00 1.000 -0-00 1.000 -0-00 1-000 
Yintrev 0.19 (0.850) 1.27 0.203 -0.46 0.647 
Dpubl 1.94 0.053 0.68 0.496 0.24 0.811 Dpubl 1.97 (0.049) 0.71 0.476 0.20 0.842 
Year 0.89 0.372 -0.38 0.706 -0.21 0.831 Year 
0.68 (0.497) -1.27 0.203 0.45 0.652 
Ydepos -0.46 (0.646) 0.05 0.963 -0.03 0.974 
Dpubl 2.21 (0.027) 0.68 0.495 0.20 0.843 
Year 14.94 (0.00) -0.33 0.739 -0.18 0.859 
Note: Table presents estimated parameter Z statistics with p- value in brackets. 
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, APPENDIX C. LIST OF ANALYZED CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPEAN BANKS 
CROATIA LATVIA 
1 Zagrebacka Banka dd 38 Hansabanka 
2 Privredna Banka Zagreb 39 SEB Latvijas Unibanka 
3 Raiffeisenbank Austria d. d., Zagreb 40 Parekss Banka-JSC Parex Bank 
4 HVB Splitska Banka dd 41 NORD/LB Latvija 
5 OTP banka Hrvatska dd 42 Latvijas Hipoteku un zemes banka- 
6 Hrvatska Postanska Bank DD Mortgage and Land Bank of Latvia 
7 Medimurska banka dd 43 Rietumu Banka 
8- Jadranska Banka dd 44 Aizkraukles Banka A/S 
9 Podravska Banka 45 Latvian Savings Bank-Latvijas KrajBanka 
10 Partner Banka dd 46 Latvian Economic Commercial Bank- 
11 Kreditna Banka Zagreb LATEKO Banka 
12 Gospodarsko Kreditna Banka d. d., 47 Baltijas Tranzitu Bank-Baltic Trust Bank 
Zagreb 48 Multibanka 
13 Istarska Kreditna Bank Umag d. d. 49 Sampo Banka 
14 Slavonska Banka dd, Osijek 50 Baltijas Starptautiska Banka-Baltic 
15 Varazdinska Bank d. d. International Bank 
16 Centar Banka dd 51 Trust Commercial Bank-Trasta 
17 StedBanka d. d. Komercbanka 
18 Hypo Alpe-Adria-Bank dd 52 Paritate Bank 
53 Ogres Komercbanka A/S 
- .. 
QZECH REPUBLIC 54 Latvijas. Tirdzniecibas Banka-Latvian 
19 Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka - Trade Bank 
CSOB 55 VEF Banka 
20 Ceska SporiteIna a. s. 
21 Komercni Banka LITHUANIA 
22 HVB Bank Czech Republic AS 56 SEB Vilniaus Bankas 
23 , Ceska Exportni Banka-Czech Export 57 AB Bankas Hansabankas 
Bank 58 AB Bankas NORD/LB Lietuva 
24 Calyon Bank Czech Republic as 59 Bankas Snoras 
25- J&T Banka as 60 Siauliu Bankas 
26' eBanka as 61 AB Ukio Bankas 
27 PPF banka a. s. 62 UAB Medicinos Bankas 
63 AB Parex Bankas 
ESTONIA MOLDOVA REP. OF 
28 Hansa Pa nk-HansaBan k 64 Moldindconbank SA 
29, SEB Eesti 0hispank 65 Victoriabank 
30'_ AS Sampo Pank 66 Moldova Agroindbank SA 
31 Eesti Krediidipank-Estonian Credit Bank 67 JSCB Banca Sociala SA 
68, EuroCreditBank 
HUNGARY 
32, Orszagos Takarekpenztar es POLAND 
Kereskedelmi - OTP Bank-National 
69 Bank Pekao SA-Bank Polska Kasa 
Savings and Commercial Bank Ltd Opieki SA 
33 K&H Bank-Kereskedelmi es Hitelbank 70 Bank Zachodni WBK S. A. 
RT 71 Kredyt Bank SA 
34 MKB Bank Rt 72 BRE Bank SA 
35 CIB K6z6p-europai NemzetkOzi Bank Rt- 73 Bank Saski S. A. 
Central-European International Bank 74 ING Bank Slaski S. A. 
Ltd. - CIB Bank . 
75 Bank Handlowy w Warszawie S. A. 
36 Raiffeisen Bank Rt 76 Bank Millennium 
37 Inter-Europa Bank Ltd 77- Raiffeisen Bank Polska SA 
78 Bank Ochrony Srodowiska SA - BOS SA 
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79 Fortis Bank Polska SA 119 National Bank Trust 
80 Getin Bank SA 120 NIKoil IBG Bank 
81 BNP Paribas Bank (Polska) SA 121 NOMOS-Bank-Joint-Stock Investment 
82 Gospodarczy Bank Wielkopolski S. A. Commercial Bank Novaya Moskva 
83 ABN Amro Bank (Polska) SA 122 Novosibirsk Bank for Foreign Trade- 
84 WestLB Bank Polska SA N ovosibirskvneshtorg bank 
85 Deutsche Bank Polska S. A. 123 Probusiness Bank 
86 Kredyt Bank SA 124 Rossiysky Capital Bank (The) 
87 East European Bank-Bank Wspolpracy 125 SDIVI Bank 
Europejskiej SA 126 Urals Transport Joint-Stock Bank - 
88 AIG Bank Polska SA UralTransBank 
127 UralSib-Ural-Siberian Bank, OJSC 
ROMANIA 128 Vozrozhdeniye Bank 
89 Romanian Commercial Bank SA-Banca 129 Yapi Kredi Bank Moscow 
Comerciala Romana SA 
90 Banca Tiriac-Commercial Bank Ion Tiriac SLOVAKIA 
91 UniCredit Romania SA 130 Vseobecna Uverova Banka a. s. 
92 Banca Romaneasca S. A. 131 Slovak Savings Bank-Slovenska 
93 Finansbank (Romania) SA sporitel'na as 
94 Emporiki Bank - Romania SA 132 OTP Banka Slovensko, as 
95 Daewoo Bank (Romania) SA 133 Dexia banka Slovensko a. s 
96 Banca de Credit si Dezvoltare 134 Ludova Banka, as 
Romexterra SA-Romexterra Bank S. A. 135 Istrobanka 
136 Postova Banka, A. S. -Post Bank JSC 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION 137 Komercni Banka Bratislava a. s. 
97 ABH Financial Limited 138 Tatra Banka a. s. 
98 AK Bars Bank 139 UniBanka, a. s. 
99 Aljba Alliance 140 Ludva Banka, as 
100 Avtobank-Nikoil 
101 Baltiyskiy Bank SLOVENIA 
102 Bank of Investments and Novation-B. I. N. 141 Nova LjubIjanska Banka d. d. 
Bank 142 *Abanka Vipa dd 
103 Bank Petrocommerce 143 SKB Banka DD 
104 Bank Zenit 144 Banka Celje dd 
105 Chelindbank - Chelyabinsk Joint Stock 145 Raiffeisen Krekova Banka dd 
Commercial Bank-Chelindbank Group 146 Factor Banka d. d. 
106 Commercial Bank of Regional 147 Gorenjska Banka d. d. Kranj 
Development - RegioBank 148 Banka Koper d. d. 
107 Credit Bank of Moscow 149 SB Banka DD 
108 Evrofinance Mosnarbank 150 Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor d. d. 
109 Far Eastern Bank 
110 Gazprombank Group UKRAINE 
ill Industry & Construction Bank - ICB 151 PrivatBank 
112 International Moscow Bank - IMB 152 Joint Stock Post-Pension Bank Aval 
113 Joint Stock Bank Avangard 153 ' Nadra Bank 
114 Joint Stock Commercial Bank - Bank of 154 First Ukrainian International Bank 
Moscow 155 Kredyt Bank (Ukraine) 
115 KM13 Bank / Small. Business Credit Bank 156 Vseukrainsky Aktsionerny Bank-VABank 
116 Lanta Bank 157 Industrialbank' 
117 MBRD-Moscow Bank for Reconstruction 158 Ukrgazprombank 
& Development 159 Credit Dnepr Joint Stock Bank 
118 MDM-Bank Saint Petersburg 
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APPENDIX D. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR ANALYZED 
BANKS GROUPED BY INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES 
Croatia 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Inputs 
Deposits and short term funding (1) 1292008 2310464 12060 11100000 
Personnel expenses (1), (PR), (P) 26468.59 49283.7 623 232670 
Total Fixed assets (1) 61395 124642 1651 620325 
Other non-interest expenses (PR), (P) 29012 51474 423 265357 
Outputs 
Desirable outputs 
Total customer loans (1), (P) 915395 1531352 22507 7953245 
Total other earning assets (1), (P) 709602 1322885 7944 6466599 
Net Interest Revenue (PR) 58228 98852 3156 517782 
Other Income (1), (P), (PR) 4106 11136 -9138 94106 
Net commission, net fee and net 27073 49580 -5004 238719 
trading income (1), (PR), (P) 
Deposits and short term funding (P) 1292008 2310464 12060 11100000 
Undesirable outputs 
Loan Loss Provisions (1), (PR), (P) 14533 23027 -8622 125628 
Czech Republic 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Inputs 
Deposits and short terra funding (1) 9710988 12500000 23542 34400000 
Personnel expenses (1), (PR), (P) 132373.5 179004 2216 462535 
Total Fixed assets (1) 343850 488150 587 1424472 
Other non-interest expenses (PR), (P) 86303 134731 0 564958 
Outputs 
Desirable outputs 
Total customer loans (1), (P) 
Total other earning assets (1), (P) 
Net Interest Revenue (PR) 
Other Income (1), (P), (PR) 
Net commission, net fee and net 
trading income (1), (PR), (P) 
Deposits and short term funding (P) 
4169763 5168333 1328 15700000 
6545412 8551041 36643 25400000 
328861 435351 -2624 1214219 
54301 92721 100 371653 
180645 240903 -3569 684221 
9710988 12500000 23542 34400000 
Undesirable outputs 
Loan Loss Provisions (1), (PR), (P) 102349 319981 -166251 1504579 
Estonia 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
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Inputs 
Deposits and short term funding (1) 2571453 3249926 73512 11300000 
Personnel expenses (1), (PR), (P) 51911 63715 3509 215112 
Total Fixed assets (1) 110775 107731 6375 338245 
Other non-interest expenses (PR), (P) 66020 70424 3664 223896 
Outputs 
Desirable outputs 
Total customer loans (1), (P) 2112040 2668332 47403 10100000 
Total other earning assets (1), (P) 854062 1168886 27296 3755047 
Net Interest Revenue (PR) 124726 160169 4716 500925 
Other Income (1), (P), (PR) 1791 8968 -22071 17321 
Net commission, net fee and net 67683 90823 447 292494 
trading income (1), (PR), (P) 
Deposits and short term funding (P) 2571453 3249926 73512 11300000 
Undesirable outputs 
Loan Loss Provisions (1), (PR), (P) 23784 28427 602 93791 
Hungary 
Variable Alean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Inputs 
Deposits and short tenn funding (1) 6723179 5629747 1211941 22100000 
Personnel expenses (1), (PR), (P) 115743 115642 18456 476414 
Total Fixed assets (1) 204079 237940 6692 913045 
Other non-interest expenses (PR), (P) 292782 397834 27371 1443558 
Outputs 
Desirable outputs 
Total customer loans (1), (P) 4432343 3067341 769178 15900000 
Total other earning assets (1), (P) 2653350 2444324 302808 8431270 
Net Interest Revenue (PR) 320866 338733 40123 1371919 
Other Income (1), (P), (PR) 130376 266054 -32540 980210 
Net commission, net fee and net 87356 164608 -425512 472108 
trading income (1), (PR), (P) 
Deposits and short term funding (P) 6723179 5629747 1211941 22100000 
Undesirable outputs 
Loan Loss Provisions (1), (PR), (P) 30671 29260 4830 106567 
Latvia 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Inputs 
Deposits and short terrn funding (1) 584760 780660 8772 3782329 
Personnel expenses (1), (PR), (P) 11674 14179 439 69076 
Total Fixed assets (1) ' 23672 29251 341 146988 
Other non-interest expenses (PR), (P) 17297 21545 402 121491 
Outputs 
Desirable outputs 
Total customer loans (1), (P) _318778 
552859 412 2758233 
Total other caming assets (1), (P) 286751 368421 4825 2100408 
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Net Interest Revenue (PR) 21405 28438 -412 12 8112 Other Income (1), (P), (PR) 1867 2682 -2349 13569 Net commission, net fee and net 16535 28593 -96491 151406 
trading income (1), (PR), (P) 
Deposits and short term funding (P) 584760 780660 8772 3782329 
Undesirable outputs 
Loan Loss Provisions (1), (PR), (P) 5148 13215 -3292 11622 8 
Lithuania 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Inputs 
Deposits and short term funding (1) 949662 1217233 16064 5111481 
Personnel expenses (1), (PR), (P) 25601 25390 2105 81850 
Total Fixed assets (1) 71542 66619 5489 210135 
Other non-interest expenses (PR), (P) 27721 29937 1447 114465 
Outputs 
Desirable outputs 
Total customer loans (1), (P) 
Total other earning assets (1), (P) 
Net Interest Revenue (PR) 
Other Income (1), (P), (PR) 
Net commission, net fee and net 
trading income (1), (PR), (P) 
Deposits and short term funding (P) 
577406 820132 15395 4026648 
345075 447298 7898 1456537 
37948 44784 2168 156329 
2904 3325 -1639 13243 
25667 28192 1491 112869 
949662 1217233' 16064 5111481 
Undesirable outputs 
Loan Loss Provisions (1), (PR), (P) 3590 12114 -28059 52168 
Moldova 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Inputs 
Deposits and short tenn funding (1) 159297 
. 
111479 2634 456515 
'Personnel expenses (1), (PR), (P) 7954' 5934 741 20941 
Total Fixed assets (1) 20648 12368 7450 56605 
Other non-interest expenses (PR), (P) 8175 4686 439 17420 
Outputs 
Desirable outputs 
Total customer loans (1), (P) 123525 86341 1373 375266 
Total other earning assets (1), (P) 60387 45910 3301 153578 
Net Interest Revenue (PR) 19578 14906 584 59924 
Other Income (1), (P), (PR) 1936 2980 100 16125 
Net commission, net fee and net 10982 6288 247 24894 
trading income (1), (PR), (P) 
Deposits and short term funding (P) 159297 111479 2634 456515 
Undesirable outputs 
Loan Loss Provisions (1), (PR), (P) 4423,5043- -2341 18603 
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Poland 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Inputs 
Deposits and short term funding (1) 5727031 6758524 43135 31800000 
Personnel expenses (1), (PR), (P) 126667 155099 2004 733651 
Total Fixed assets (1) 217317 276289 522 1185106 
Other non-interest expenses (PR), (P) 121550 127045 943 515705 
Outputs 
Desirable outputs 
Total customer loans (1), (P) 3667491 4133443 24985 18800000 
Total other earning assets (1), (P) 2692876 3455629 3247 16200000 
Net Interest Revenue (PR) 243391 314412 4514 1542730 
Other Income (1), (P), (PR) 3717 13926 -9996 118014 
Net commission, net fee and net 190775 225672 -37552 1003864 
trading income (1), (PR), (P) 
Deposits and short term funding (P) 5727031 6758524 43135 31800000 
Undesirable -outputs 
Loan Loss Provisions (1), (PR), (P) 83278 139157 -14751 783944 
Romania 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Inputs 
Deposits and short tenn funding (1) 2565229 5614535 26277 23800000 
Personnel expenses (1), (PR), (P) 104450 227846 1251 963459 
Total Fixed assets (1) 357663 822597 2316 3792885 
Other non-interest expenses (PR), (P) 83144 144371 2290 551854 
Outputs 
Desirable outputs 
Total customer loans (1), (P) 1231865 2698442 6282 12700000 
Total other earning assets (1), (P) 1639608 3702135 28779 14900000 
Net Interest Revenue (PR) 293334 739508 3063 4015469 
Other Income (1), (P), (PR) 27202 79301 -6054 438841 
Net commission, net fee and net 116750 245650 340 1183182 
trading income (1), (PR), (P) 
Deposits and short term funding (P) 2565229 5614535 26277 23800000 
Undesirable outputs 
Loan Loss Provisions (1), (PR), (P) 97867 322083 -15163 2025190 
Russia 
I Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Inputs 
Deposits and short term funding (1) 1946978 2767663 52504 14200000 
Personnel expenses (1), (PR), (P) 62296 92330 528 428940 
Total Fixed assets (1) 95182 119463 785 712269 
Other non-interest expenses (PR), (P) 72619 97961 4511 636280 
210 
Outputs 
Desirable outputs 
Total customer loans (1), (P) 1201289 1774236 1580 10300000 
Total other earning assets (1), (P) 906048 1567587 1030 9134146 
Net Interest Revenue (PR) 88939 126532 -141163 695721 
Other Income (1), (P), (PR) 15246 40657 -280331 198734 
Net commission, net fee and net 72648 188353 -1419131 714423 
trading income (1), (PR), (P) 
Deposits and short term funding (P) 1946978 2767663 52504 14200000 
Undesirable outputs 
Loan Loss Provisions (1), (PR), (P) 41241 216846 -1017627 2707264 
Slovakia 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Inputs 
Deposits and short term funding (1) 3395022 3659395 176227 12000000 
Personnel expenses (1), (PR), (P) 44806 52755 3553 173535 
Total Fixed assets (1) 150530 170434 3746 630254 
Other non-interest expenses (PR), (P) 217904 266944 8964 1135569 
Outputs 
Desirable outputs 
Total customer loans (1), (P) 1660411 1878491 113235 8702248 
Total other earning assets (1), (P) 2034053 2648089 88345 10500000 
Net Interest Revenue (PR) 100302 122816 -109042 478017 
Other Income (1), (P), (PR) 28999 38907 -41500 210443 
Net commission, net fee and net 29736 43761 0 156985 
trading income (1), (PR), (P) 
Deposits and short term funding (P) 3395022 3659395 176227 12000000 
Undesirable outputs 
Loan Loss Provisions (1), (PR), (P) -3738 173566 -1033022 537707 
Slovenia 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Inputs 
Deposits and short terrn funding (1) 2264433 2644437 102626 12100000 
Personnel expenses (1), (PR), (P) 43453 51181 1801 234265 
Total Fixed assets (1) 97420 112243 648 465227 
Other non-interest expenses (PR), (P) 49777 54675 2268 238082 
outputs 
Desirable outputs 
Total customer loans (1), (P) 1481060 1684228 93875 8333072 
Total other earning assets (1), (P) 1127025 1366057 33227 6131282 
Net Interest Revenue (PR) 97137 102133 3364 435054 
Other Income (1), (P), (PR) 6112 11246 -6084 50697 
Net commission, net fee and net 42245 47471 3020 246847 
trading income (1). (PR), (P) 
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Deposits and short tenn funding (P) 2264433 2644437 102626 12100000 
Undesirable outputs 
Loan Loss Provisions (1), (PR), (P) 25205 30555 1016 144019 
Ukraine 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Inputs 
Deposits and short tenn funding (1) 1405610 2061139 18312 8985620 
Personnel expenses (1), (PR), (P) 51301 80748 1436 369765 
Total Fixed assets (1) 117750 150922 898 661063 
Other non-interest expenses (PR), (P) 75639 105625 857 386190 
Outputs 
Desirable outputs 
Total customer loans (1), (P) 1025499 1765519 11670 8556351 
Total other earning assets (1), (P) 461789 513036 17483 2668528 
Net Interest Revenue (PR) 101635 139496 1846 628427 
Other Income (1), (P), (PR) 4733 9658 100 55457 
Net commission, net fee and net 94473 131175 -1714 467044 
trading income (1), (PR), (P) 
Deposits and short term funding (P) 1405610 2061139 18312 8985620 
Undesirable outputs 
Loan Loss Provisions (1), (PR), (P) 39600 69548 -6449 270867 
1H 
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APPENDIX E. ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
USED IN THE ANALYSIS 
Table E 1. PPP US dollar exchange rate in the analysed CEE countries (1998-2003) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2001 2003 
Croatia 3.69 3.78 3.88 3.90 3.97 4.02 
the Czech 
Republic 13.87 14.08 13.93 14.47 14.68 
_ 
14.83 
Estonia 5.81 5.99 6.26 6.44 6.64 6.81 
Hungary 92.65 98.89 106.42 112.87 123.54 128.68 
Latvia 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25 
Lithuania 1.52 1.49 1.48 1.44 1.42 1.41 
Moldova 1.70 2.35 2.93 3.21 3.42 3.65 
Poland 1.70 1.79 1.87 1.91 1.92 1.91 
Romania 3063.31 4460.17 6301.54 8454.99 10329.64 11713.82 
Russia 3.02 5.13 6.91 7.95 9.06 10.24 
Slovakia 13.57 14.23 14.83 15.27 15.70 _ 16.42 
Slovenia 113.11 118.84 123.07 131.19 140.10 145.54 
Ukraine 0.56 0.70 0.84 0.91 0.93 0.99 
Source; IMF WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK Database. September 2004 
Table E2. Average wage (per month in USD) in the financial intermediary institutions 
in the analysed CEE countries (1998-2003) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2001 m 2003 
Croatia 916.56 942.71 948.26 1187.24 1420.07 
the Czech 
Republic 704.94 647.25 680.73 806.53 1048.38 1289.87 
Estonia 668.18 629.44 655.27 697.68 889.34 1169.69 
E2Eg2g 652.12 662.54 677.03 789.58 1072.88 1316.71 
_ Latvia 512.07 530.58 579.25 629.67 768.36 862.72 
Lithuania 474.06 494.75 518.00 573.64 742.47 911.66 
Moldova 103.01 143.69 198.03 173.89 187.48 229.34 
Poland 561.19 648.12 787.84 915.16 994.62 1050.08 
Romania 368.61 320.88 316.55 364.57 462.48 596.89 
Russia 94.64 146.45* 337.00* 394.57* 414.33 532.00 
Slovakia 523.71 473.27 473.53 509.04 684.59 887.67 
Slovenia 1433.95 1288.49 1229.82 1240.73 1523.53 1925.40 
Ukraine 83.15 78.56 102.97 155.58 177.36 193.79 
Note: All categories are reflect wages for International Labour Organization's tabulation category J 
'Financial Intermediation' which includes codes 65 for'Financial Intermediation, except Insurance and 
Pension Funding', 66 for 'Insurance and Pension Funding, except Compulsory Social Security', 67 for 
'Activities auxiliary to Financial Inten-nediation'. Data for Belarus are average wage in the economy. 
Data for FYR Macedonia 1998 - 2000 are for Category 7 'Transport, Storage and Communication'. 
Data for Russia (1999-2001) are proxies and calculated by author (reflects the growth of wage in 
Belarus). 
Source: International Labour Organization http:, I/laborsta. ilo. orP-, OANDA Corporation 
ht ////wwwýoandaL.. com, IIM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), Statistics and Analysis of Trade Unit 
(SATU) http: //Nkww. tiktradeinfo. coiii, own calculations 
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Table E3. GDP deflator in the analysed CEE countries 0 998-2003) (base vear 2004) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2001 2003 
Croatia 81.06 84.12 94-30 97.33 
the Czech 
Republic 84.68 87.18 88.09 92.42 94.98 96.60 
Estonia 77.45 80.79 85.11 90.02 94.06 96.36 
Hungary 62.55 67.14 73.49 80.26 87.43 94.23 
Latvia 80.96 84.84 88.04 89.91 93.00 96.15 
Lithuania 98.92 98.32 99.34 99.23 99.21 98.28 
Moldova 35.75 49.98 63.64 71.34 78.35 89.20 
Poland 80.11 85.20 90.93 94.58 95.78 96.27 
Romania 20.56 30.36 43.78 60.15 74.24 88.51 
Russia 23.57 40.66 55.96 65.18 75.44 86.17 
Slovakia 73.45 78.19 84.80 88.33 91.86 96.14 
Slovenia 69.34 73.42 77.06 84.56 91.28 96.14 
Ukraine 46.66 59.46 73.23 80.55 84.60 90.47 
Source: IMF WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK Database, September 2004 
Table E4. Unemployment rate in the analysed CEE countries (1998-2003) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2001 2003 
Croatia 11.9 13.5 16.1 15.8 14.8 14.3 
the Czech 
Republic 6.5 8.7 8.8 8.1 7.3 7.8 
Estonia 9.8 12.2 13.6 12.6 10.3 10.0 
Hungary 7.8 7.0 6.4 5.7 5.8 5.6 
Latvia 14.1 14.3 14.4 13.1 12.0 10.6 
Lithuania 13.2 14.6 16.4 17.4 13.8 12.4 
Moldova 10.0 11.1 8.5 7.3 6.8 7.9 
Poland 10.5 13.9 16.1 18.2 19.9 19.6 
Romania 6.3 6.8 7.1 6.6 8.4 7.0 
Russia 13.3 12.6 9.8 8.9 7.9 8.0 
Slovakia 12.5 16.2 18.6 19.2 17. 
Slovenia 7.7. 7.4 -7.2 5.9 5.9 6.6 
Ukraine 11.3 11.6 11.6 1 10.9 1 "9.6 9.1 
Sourse: International Labour Organisation, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
Note: Unemployment rate for Moldova 1998 approximate and calculated by author using rate of 
regestred unemployment and difference between regerstered and total unemployment in 1999 
Table E5. Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per capita 
GDP in the analysed CEE countries (1998-2003) 1- 11, 
1998 1999 2000 
1 
20W 
ý 
2001 2007 
Croatia 8098.22 8510.85 8941.75 = 500.87 70108.70 10491.65 
the Czech 
Republic 12881.75 13139.29 13869.43 14711.42 15191.40 15668.76 
Estonia 8462.61 8651.10 9598.75 10446.43 11310.40 12 89.89 
Hungaty 10796.82 11457.19 12366.92 1 3213.01 13874.05 14574.49 
Latvia 6495.76 6837-13 7527.22 8362.29 
- 
9044.12 
- 
968 16-9 
rLithuania 8070.70 8094.85 8654.40 9485.55 10273.25 11036.09 
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Moldova 1467.49 1437.56 1500.98 1634.21 1771.82 1905.91 
Poland 8761.43 9252.43 9822.93 10151.18 10403.88 10853.89 
Romania 5416.40 5440.82 5676.90 6158.07 6546.47 6974.03 
Russia 5930.21 6440.56 7240.15 7829.80 8314.97 9000.60 
Slovakia 10623.66 10ý98.39 11372.28 12015.26 12675.82 13362.88 
Slovenia 15213.84 16159.52 17239.66 18123.02 18916.12 19618.25 
Ukraine 3669.56 3736.34 4076.47 4601.88 4924.93 5312.40 
Source: IMF WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK Database, September 2004 
Table E6. Annual percentage change of GDP in the analysed CEE countries (1998- 
2003) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2001 2003 
Croatia 2.5 -0.9 2.9 4.4 5.2 4.3 
the Czech 
Republic -1.0 0.5 3.3 2.6 1.5 3.1 
Estonia 5.2 -0.1 7.8 6.4 7.2 5.1 
Hungary 4.9 4.2 5.2 3.8 3.5 2.9 
Latvia 4.7 3.3 6.9 8.0 6.4 7.5 
Lithuania 7.3 -1.7 3.9 6.4 6.8 9.0 
Moldova -6.5 -3.4 2.1 6.1 7.8 6.3 
Poland 4.8 4.1 4.0 1.0 1.4 3.8 
Romania -4.8 -1.2 2.1 5.7 5.0 4.9 
Russia -5.3 6.3 10.0 5.1 4.7 7.3 
Slovakia 4.2 1.5 2.0 3.8 4.4 4.2_ 
Slovenia 3.6 5.6 3.9 2.7 3.4 2.3 
Ukraine -1.9 -0.2 5.9 9.2 5.3 9.4 
Source: IMF WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK Database, September 2004 
Table E7. Inflation rate in the analysed CEE countries (1998-2003) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2001 2003 
Croatia 113.28 125.33 131.52 134.54 136.56 
the Czech 
Republic 130.59 133.37 138.58 145.27 147.89 148.05 
Estonia 148.05 152.94 159.08 168.23 174.22 176.56 
Hungary 166.97 183.67 201.67 220.23 231.90 242.80 
Latvia 133.48 136.64 140.25 143.73 146.49 150.79 
Lithuania 142.58 143.69 145.12 147.07 147.43 145.68 
Moldova 148.67 207.03 271.83 298.37 314.13 350.83 
Poland 154.02 165.27 181.96 191.96 195.61 197.18 
Romania 562.62 820.32 1194.94 1606.81 1968.93 2269.67 
Russia 216.48 402.10 485.64 589.87 682.97 776.30 
Slovakia 119.72 132.48 148.42 159.30 164.59 178.67 
Slovenia 128.44 136.35 148.45 160.97 173.05 182.74 
Ukraine 230.95 283.34 363.25 406.69 409.78 431.12 
Source: IMF WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK Database, September 2004 
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Table E8. Inflation change in the analysed CEE countries (1998-2003) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2001 2003 
Croatia 5.7 4.1 6.2 4.9 2.3 1.5 
the Czech 
Republic 10.6 2.1 3.9 4.8 1.8 0.1 
Estonia 8.2 3.3 4 5.8 3.6 1.3 
Hungary 14.3 10 9.8 9.2 5.3 4.7 
Latvia 4.6 2.4 2.6 2.5 1.9 2.9 
Lithuania 5.1 0.8 1 1.3 0.3 -1.2 
Moldova 7.7 39.3 31.3 9.8 5.3 11.7 
Poland 11.8 7.3 10.1 5.5 1.9 0.8 
Romania 59.1 45.8 45.7 34.5 22.5 15.3 
Russia 27.7 85.7 20.8 21.5 15.8 13.7 
Slovakia 6.7 10.7 12 7.3 3.3 8.5 
Slovenia 7.9 6.2 8.9 8.4 7.5 5.6 
Ukraine 10.6 22.7 28.2 12 0.8 5.2 
Source: IMF WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK Database. September 2004 
Table E9. Ratio of deposit money bank claims on domestic nonfinancial real sector to 
the sum of deposit money bank and Central Bank claims on domestic nonfinancial 
real sector in the analysed CEE countries (1998-2003) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2001 2003 
Croatia 1.000 0.996 0.996 0.998 0.999 0.997 
the Czech 
Republic 0.963 0.951 0.964 0.958 0.960 0.966 
Estonia 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.998 0.998 
Hungary 0.554 0.624 0.714 0.799 0.869 0.918 
Latvia 0.887 0.931 0.934 0.970 0.960 0.976 
Lithuania 0.999 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.999 0.999 
Moldova 0.535 0.519 0.600 0.660 0.696 0.755 
Poland 0.915 0.925 0.938 0.938 0.978 0.999 
Romania 0.890 0.795 0.861 0.945 0.987 1.000 
Russia 0.584 0.668 0.760 0.816 0.834 0.887 
Slovakia 0.984 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.972 
Slovenia 0.989 0.990 0.991 0.996 0.996 0.991 
Ukraine 0.418 0.413 0.506 1 0.605 1 0.698 1 0.7961 
Source: Financial Structure and Economic Development Database, World bank 
Table E 10. Market share of assets of three largest banks as a share of assets of all 
commercial banks in the banking system of the analysed CEE countries (1998-2003) 
1998 1999 - 2000 2001 2001 2003 
Croatia 0.710 0.702 0.656 0.642 0.613 0.575 
the Czech 
lg!! ý 0.823 0.776 0.749 0.704 0.687 0.702 
Estonia 0.989 0.989 0.979 0.985 0.982 0.982 
Hungary 0.635 0.647 . 0.566 0.562. 0.538 0.540 
Latvia 0.569 0.491 0.550 0.561 0.551 0.529 
Lithuania 0.955 0.943 0.877 0.829 0.799 0.794 
Moldova 0.755 0.604 0.566 0.563 0.552 0.670 
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Poland 0.588 0.498 0.497 0.462 0.435 0.419 1 
Romania 0.842 0.759 0.713 0.717 0.688 0.662 
Russia 0.726 0.331 0.239 0.243 0.237 0.225 
Slovakia 0.671 0.701 0.680 0.667 0.679 0.674 
Slovenia 0.662 1 0.649 0.6361 - 0.647 0.631 0.606 
Ukraine 0.595 1 0.507 0.516 1 0.505 0.461 0.490] 
Source: Financial Structure and Economic Development Database, World bank 
Table E 11. Accounting value of bank's overhead costs as a share of its total assets in 
analysed CEE countries (1998-2003) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2001 2003 
Croatia 0.054 0.052 0.050 0.041 0.039 0.045 
the Czech 
Republic 0.057 0.047 0.033 0.028 0.022 0.021 
Estonia 0.066 0.065 0.049 0.042 0.046 0.043 
Hungary 0.049 0.058 0.052 0.048 0.050 0.047 
Latvia 0.094 0.065 0.047 0.053 0.038 0.032 
Lithuania 0.069 0.071 0.063 0*060 0.049 0.040 
Moldova 0.081 0.100 0.085 0.082 0.068 0.060 
Poland 0.040 0.039 0.051 0.044 0.048 0.035 
Romania 0.078 0.079 0.098 0.088 0.080 0.074 
Russia 0.101 0.077 0.076 0.066 0.061 0.049 
Slovakia 0.036 0.040 0.039 0.086 0.040 0.034 
Slovenia 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.031 0.029 0.029 
Ukraine 0.110 1 0.105 0.088 0.066 0.061 0.046 
Source: Financial Structure and Economic Development Database, World bank 
Table E12. Accounting value of bank's net interest revenue as a share of its interest- 
bearing (total earning) assets in analysed CEE countries (1998-2003) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2001 2003 
Croatia 0.062 0.062 0.057 0.046 0.043 0.050 
the Czech 
Republic 0.051 0.040 0.030 0.029 0.020 0.020 
Estonia 0.053 0.050 0.044 0.040 0.038 0.036 
Hungary 0.039 0.045 0.052 0.056 0.060 0.056 
Latvia 0.071 0.053 0.044 0.037 0.029 0.027 
Lithuania 0.056 0.060 0.052 0.040 0.035 0.031 
Moldova 0.167 0.138 0.108 0.099 0.076 0.078 
Poland 0.058 0.049 0.051 0.043 0.044 0.040 
Romania 0.104 0.104 0.088 0.073 0.067 0.063 
Russia 0.059 0.074 0.078 0.070 0.065 0.057 
Slovakia 0.038 0.027 0.029 0.029 0.035 0.034 
Slovenia 0.043 1 0.038 0.043 0.034 1 0.031 J -0.03-21 
Ukraine 0.144 1 0.119 1 0.097 0.079 1 0.062 1 
Source: Financial Structure and Economic Development Database, World bank 
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Table E13. Corruption Perception Index in analvsed CEE countries (1998-2003) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2001 2003 
Croatia 2.7* 2.7 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.7 
the Czech 
Republic 4.8 4.6 4.3 3.9 3.7 3.9 
Estonia 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.5 
Hungary 5.0 5.2 5.2 5.3 4.9 4.8 
Latvia 2.7 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.7 3.8 
Lithuania 3.8* 3.8 4.1 4.8 4.8 4.7 
Moldova 2.6* 2.6 2.6 3.1 2.1 2.4 
Poland 4.6 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.6 
Romania 3.0 3.3 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.8 
Russia 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.3 2.7 2.7 
Slovakia 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Slovenia 6.0* 6.0 5.5 5.2 6.0 5.9 
Ukraine 2.8 2.6 1.5 2.1 2.4 
Source: Transparency International, Internet Centre for Corruption Research 
Note: Indexes for Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova and Slovenia in 1998 are taken as for 
1999 
218 
Z, 
uj 
Q) 
Q 
uj 
co 
uj 
Q 
co 
Q 
zI 
LLJ 
CL 
OL 
I 
I 
I 
.......... 
13 0 
A: X. p 
.... . ...... .... 
....... ... 
.... ............ . ... .... ... 
13 0 
... ........ ........... ...... ..... ...... ............. .................. ................ . .... ............ 
. ..... ........... . .............. .... ......... . 
... ....... . .... .. 
.... ...... I ....... 
........... ................ . .............. ........... ............. ........... .... -II ........... ............ ......... . 
. ...... ..... 
.......... 
......... . ............ . ..... ....... 
............ ............. 
I 
I 
I 
..... ......... ...... 
......... ... ...................... ......... ...... ........ ...... . ............ ... .................... ... ............. ........... .............. .......... ..................... .................... .......... ................... .... .............. ............ ..... ...... ..... ...... ........ .......... ............ .. ........... ....... ............. ..... ....... . .... ......... ..... . .............. .......... ........... .......... 
CD 
C 
Cl 
Cl 
APPENDIX G. DERIVATION OF THE DUAL FOR THE LINEAR 
PROGRAMMING 4.8. 
The primal model is equation 4.8: 
iRI 
Max ! Q=-la,. +-P 
8 r=l s 
s. t. 
x<X, o 
Y9 > Y9 + a,. R9 j rj rO rO 
n 
Aj rj LLPJ = ro LLPO - 80 R YOLLPO 
J=j 
Q+ Q+ pi PO pP 
n 
Aj Qq-j > QqO5 qQ 
J=j 
n 
E "i = 1, Aj >o 
J=j 
where R LLPO -min{, YjLLP } and Rýo = max{y,, gj) -yg (Silva Portela, Y'LLP. 
Yo 
r ri rO 
Thanassoulis and Simpson, 2004) 
1) Re-arrange desirable and undesirable output constraints: 
Max n= 
i 
ar + '8 S r=1 S 
S. t. 
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x X, o y 
-a,. Rl > Y9 rl rO - rO )=I 
n 
A) y., LLPJ + 80 Ry(, LLP(, = voLLPO 
J=j 
1A)Q+ Q+ Pi P05 
AjQ- q1 qO 
1A =I A >0 -, .111 J=j 
q=1,..., Q 
2) Assign dual variables (for simplicity in writing-up the dual) and multiply desirable 
output and environmental variables with negative impact on efficiency constraints by 
(-l) to get consistency in inequality signs of constraints: 
R 
Max 0=II ar +I 
S r=l s 
S. t. 
(U) 
n 
ZAJ 
xy :5X, O, 
M 
J=j 
(w') +arR9 rO r <-yg, r=l,..., R o i r 
(w 
n 
J: AjyjLLýl +, 80RY,, LLp. voLLPO 
J=j 
(v+) pi : 5Q+, pP PO 
(V-) Aj (-Q-) ql -Q- qQ qo 
J=j 
(UO) 
n 
J=j 
AJ0 
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3) Write-up the dual: 
Rp0 
Min ýo u, x,, - wgyg + w'7oLLPO + I: v+Q+ - Vq 0+ UO r rO p po -Qq 1.1 r=l P=j q=l 
s. t. 
Rp0 
zu, xi, -I: WrgYrgl+W'7, LLPi+Lv'Q'- v-Q-+uýý: O, n p PI q ql 
1=1 r=l P=j q=l 
9 ý: ---I , Wr 
sRgo 
rR 
wh =I 
sRYOLLpo 
U,, 14' 9 >0 
4) Shadow price of bad output = wb (not normalised) 
5) To examine bank's return (follow Banker and Thrall, 1992, and Seiford and 
Zhu, 1999) 
Min., ý, 
s. t. 
Rp 
u, x, o -Zw'y' +wh7oLLPO +Lv+Q+ -Lv-Qqo 
+ uo 
r rO p po q0 
r=l P=j q=l 
A4 RpQ 
ulx wg 9 +wh LLPJ +Ev+Q+ -Lv-Q- +uo ý: O, jn #-Z rYrj Yi p Pi q ql r=l P=j q=l 
9 ýý 
I, 
Wr 
sRrgo 
rR 
wb=I 
sRYOLLpo 
uigw 9>0 
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APPENDIX H. SOME ISSUES ON LUENBERGER 
PRODUCTIVITY INDEX AND ITS DECOMPOSITION 
Proof of (38): Suppose that the distance is of the form of (6.8), then (6.6) 
becomes [A(t)15 (xi, ', b')-A(t), b (x"' y"' Y") and (6.7) becomes 
./i 
Y) j ./i1 .11 ./I 
y.,, bj) - A(t), 
b, (x., ", y, "', bj"')j. As can be seen the two definitions 
coincide. 
Decomposition of the Bias Index of the technical change component of the 
arithmetic mean version of the Luenberger productivity index: 
The bias index BTCH(ý,, yj', bj', yj"', bj"'): 
1 1+1 1+1 BTCH(x,, y, ', b, ', x, + y, qbj 
1 [(D, "' (x' , y', b') - D, (x,, y, b, 
' + (D, '(x"', y"', bj'+') - Dj'+' (xl+l y 'I, bj'+'))] 
can be decomposed into an input bias and an output bias index. Since I assume the 
production technology which takes into account the undesirable by-products, there 
may be four possible decompositions. 
The decomposition of bias index where I hold the input vector constant at x'+I 
and compare the magnitude of technical change along a ray through. ý and b' with the 
magnitude of technical change along a ray through. ý+' and b"': 
BTCH(x', y,, bj', xj"', y"', YA) = OBTCH(yl, b, x'+', Y", b'+') + IBTCH(xj', y', b,, x+' iiiiIiiij 
1 [(D, +1(x, +, yb, )-D, (x, +' ', b, 
»+(Dj(XI+l t+l t+I +' (x'+', y'+', b'+'»] 2ýy, i IY. i lbj 
)-D; 
iii 
+ "'(xyb, ) - D, (xyb, 
»+ (Dý(x., -", yb, ) - D, "'(x, -", yb, 
»] 1 [(D) 
2 
The arithmetic mean of the differences in the first square brackets can be referred as a 
period t+l output bias index, whereas the arithmetic mean of the differences in the 
second square brackets -a period t+1 input bias index. 
Alternatively, I may hold an output constant at the level of t+1 period. 
However, since I have both desirable and undesirable outputs, I may hold only 
desirable output constant at. ý +1 : 
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BTCH(x, ', y', b,, x., ", y"' b"') -- OBTCH(xý, Y X"' "' b'+') + IBTCH(x, ', y', Y 1+1 j9 
Yj 
11 
.1j .1 Jý, 
=1 
[(Dj+'(x, ', y., b., ) 
.1j, 
b., ))+(D, (x, +', y., +', b, ' jj 
bj' D'(xl, y D, '+' (xf+l IyA 2 
1 [(Dj 
+ '+'(x' 
. j, 
yj', Dý, (x.,, yý, y, '+', bj') - D; " (x.,, y., +', bj'))] 2 
or hold the undesirable output constant at b'+' 
BTCH(x, ', y, ', b, ', x, '+', y', +', bj'+')=OBTCH(x',, y'j, x, '+', Y, b, )+IBTCH(xj', y.,, bj', b, '+) 
1+1 1+1 
-D (x = 
! [(D+1(X, 
y1, )- D(x, y, b'))+ (D(x, 'yj ' b')1 2 
1 [(Dj 
+ '+'(x,, y', b, ) - D' (x,, y', ý, ))+ 
(Dý, (x,, y.,, b., ) - Dý, +'(x, y', b, "'))] 2 .1jj 
or both undesirable and desirable outputs constant at. ý+' and b'+' : 
+1 BTCH(x, ', y. ' ', x, +', Yl+l b"')=OBTCH(x,, x"' y"' b"')+IBTCH(x, ', yj', b, ', y, b, ., b, i, j1 11 1111) 
1+1 F+l 1, ", " -Dj'+' J'+, y'+' , 
b; +))] =I 
[(D, +'(x,, yj'+', bj'+') - D, ' (x, ' , yj , bj )) + 
(D., (x, + yI bi ) (xj i 2 
[(D, '+'(xj, y',, b, )-D., (x',, y,, b, '))+(D, '. (x,, y, bj+l)-Dj' (xj yj bj 2 
The input bias indexes in all four decompositions are expressed in terms of output 
distance functions, however, since the technology I assume requires the variable 
returns to scale assumptions, it is unfeasible to express the input bias indexes more 
naturally, i. e. in terms of input distance functions as Fare et al (1999) have done for 
decomposition of the technical change component of the Malmquist productivity 
index. 
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